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by Katie L. H. Gray 
 
Due to capacity limits, the brain must select important information for further 
processing. Evolutionary-based theories suggest that emotional (and specifically threat-
relevant) information is prioritised in the competition for attention and awareness (e.g. 
Ohman & Mineka, 2001). A range of experimental paradigms have been used to 
investigate whether emotional visual stimuli (relative to neutral stimuli) are selectively 
processed without awareness, and attract visual attention (e.g. Yang et al., 2007). 
However, very few studies have used appropriate control conditions that help clarify the 
extent to which observed effects are driven by the extraction of emotional meaning from 
these stimuli, or their low-level visual characteristics (such as contrast, or luminance). 
  The experiments in this thesis investigated whether emotional faces are granted 
preferential access to awareness and which properties of face stimuli drive these effects. 
A control stimulus was developed to help dissociate between the extraction of emotional 
information and low-level accounts of the data. It was shown that preferential 
processing of emotional information is better accounted for by low-level characteristics 
of the stimuli, rather than the extraction of emotional meaning per se. Additionally, a 
robust ‘face’ effect was found across several experiments. Investigation of this effect 
suggested that it may not be driven by the meaningfulness of the stimuli as it was also 
apparent in an individual that finds it difficult to extract information from faces. 
  Together these findings suggest that high-level information can be extracted from 
visual stimuli outside of awareness, but the prioritisation afforded to emotional faces is 
driven by low-level characteristics. These results are particularly timely given continued 
high-profile debate surrounding the origins of emotion prioritisation (e.g. Tamettio & de 
Gelder, 2010; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Is emotional information prioritised over non-emotional information? 
 
 
From an evolutionary perspective, humans require defence systems that ensure 
survival and procreation (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Crucial in these defence systems is the 
ability to locate quickly and respond flexibly to danger or threat (Ohman & Mineka, 2001; 
LeDoux, 2000). Due to capacity limits, the brain cannot process all information in the visual 
scene in parallel and therefore needs to select important information for further processing 
(Posner & Peterson, 1990). Adaptive behaviour would demand that selection processes filter 
information for further processing based on current task demands, but also that potentially 
dangerous stimuli are prioritised (LeDoux, 2000).  
  Compton (2003) suggests that there are two mechanisms involved in prioritising 
emotional information for further processing. The first evaluates emotional content of the 
scene ‘automatically’, and the second prioritises information deemed as emotional by the 
preferential allocation of attention towards that information. Operational definitions of 
automaticity have included a number of different characteristics; automatic processing 
should be fast, involuntary, independent of context, capacity free, and can operate outside of 
awareness (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, Bargh, 1992; Schneider & Chein, 2003). Attentional 
allocation (selective attention) towards emotional information has been investigated using a 
range of paradigms from experimental cognitive psychology and neuropsychology.   
  Automatically processing, and selectively attending to, biologically relevant 
emotionally significant information would have great adaptive value (Ohman & Mineka, 
2001). What constitutes an emotionally significant stimulus? Many definitions of emotion 
are based on the concept of goal-relevance, whereby a stimulus that is “relevant to the major 
concerns of the organism” is considered emotional (Scherer, 2005, p. 697). These goals can      
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be based on survival (e.g. avoiding danger), or be more complex (e.g. based on social 
behaviour; Compton, 2003). The threat-superiority hypothesis suggests that threat-related 
stimuli should be prioritised over other emotional information, due to the increased 
importance of threat-related information on survival (Ohman & Mineka, 2001; Fox et al., 
2000). An opposing view is that all emotional information is prioritised over neutral 
information, so long as it is appraised as being sufficiently important; characterising the 
emotionality hypothesis (Martin, Williams & Clark, 1991).  
  One type of stimulus that has been used extensively in emotion processing research is 
the facial expression (see Ohman, 2002). It has been proposed that the processing of faces 
may be ‘special’; an area in the fusiform gyrus has been reported to respond selectively to 
faces (Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997). There have been suggestions that the human 
face has evolved as a mechanism for social communication (Ohman, 2002). Indeed, 
emotional facial expressions display complex messages that we are expert at decoding 
(Ohman, 2002). Emotional faces signal an individual’s motivation. That motivation may be 
towards harm (e.g. anger), potential danger (e.g. fear), or happiness (Ohman, 2002). The 
threat-superiority hypothesis would predict that only threat-relevant emotional expressions 
are prioritised, whereas the emotionality hypothesis would suggest that all emotions are 
prioritised over neutral expressions. Early research into emotional face processing suggests 
that there are six basic emotions: happiness, fear, anger, surprise, disgust, and sadness 
(Ekman, & Friesen, 1971; Ekman, 1992). Cross-cultural studies show that isolated cultures 
can correctly match the expression of a person in a story with a posed Western emotional 
face photograph (Ekman & Friesen, 1971), suggesting a universality of emotional face 
processing which may be due to evolution (Darwin, 1872; as cited in Ekman & Friesen, 
1971). 
This thesis is concerned not only with whether the prioritisation of emotional 
expression exists, but also which visual information is used to drive this prioritisation. In the 
visual system, information that loses the competition for attention may never reach 
consciousness (Mack & Rock, 1998). There are particular characteristics of visual 
information that may increase the likelihood of winning this competition; these can be based 
on top-down (‘goal driven’) and bottom-up (‘stimulus-dependent’) factors (Wolfe, Butcher, 
Lee & Hyle, 2003; Itti, Koch & Niebur, 2002). The extracted emotional meaning of a 
stimulus can be described as a top-down factor, as it is a characteristic of the stimulus that is 
informed by the observer. Bottom-up factors are those that are independent of the observers’ 
knowledge, and can be described as low-level visual characteristics of the stimulus. Some      
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such characteristics that are important in visual processing, and will be discussed in this 
thesis are: luminance (the amount of light emitted by a surface), contrast (the difference in 
luminance across a surface), colour (wavelength and intensity of light emitted from a 
surface), and spatial frequency (the spatial scale of luminance deviations).  
Dissociating the visual effects that are due to top-down, high-level factors (i.e. 
factors due to the extracted emotional meaning), and those effects due to bottom-up, low-
level factors (i.e. contrast) has attracted investigation recently (e.g. Wolfe et al., 2003). 
Indeed, it is impossible to show that high-level characteristics are causing variations in 
visual processing unless low-level characteristics are controlled for. For example, in a 
detection task, an emotional face may be responded to faster than a neutral face; however, 
whether this effect is due to high-level (the emotion of the face and its theorised 
evolutionary relevance; Ohman & Mineka, 2001), or low-level (differences in contrast 
between the emotional and neutral face) characteristics, is impossible to ascertain without 
adequate controls (of course, it is also possible that effects are driven by both high-level and 
low-level characteristics). To dissociate these possibilities within emotion processing 
research, it is necessary to explore apparently emotion-based effects with control stimuli. In 
face identity processing research, these control stimuli have generally consisted of inverted 
faces, as rotating a face through 180 degrees severely disrupts identity processing 
(Valentine, 1991). In emotion processing research, experiments that control for low-level 
characteristics using inverted faces will be highlighted in the upcoming review, with 
particular emphasis on their findings.   
  This review is concerned with the prioritisation of emotional face processing. Firstly, 
anatomical evidence for the prioritisation of emotional information will be reviewed. 
Evidence will then be reviewed regarding whether attention is allocated preferentially to 
emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli. A discussion of studies that have examined automatic 
and pre-attentive processing of emotion will follow. This will include discussions of the 
visual characteristics that may be responsible for the effects, and an indication of whether 
they are driven by emotional content or low-level visual properties. A detailed conceptual 
review of differences between varied operational definitions of automaticity used to date 
(and related terms often used interchangeably e.g. preattentive processing) is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. However evidence from paradigms that have examined whether emotion 
processing occurs rapidly, without drawing on attentional resources, and outside of 
awareness (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Bargh, 1992) will be reviewed. These 
characteristics, if found for emotional and not neutral stimuli, would suggest that emotional      
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information incurs privileged processing, and is prioritised over neutral information. 
Dysfunction in the emotion processing system is central to models of emotional disorders, 
including individual differences in anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Bishop, 2007), and so 
the effect of anxiety on these processes will then be introduced.  
 
1.1. Anatomical evidence for prioritised processing of emotional information 
  Over the last 20 years, neural mechanisms that might underlie adaptive emotion 
processing have been delineated through functional and structural imaging and evidence 
from lesion studies in animals and brain injury in humans. The amygdala has been purported 
to be a hub of fear learning and expression (LeDoux, 2000). The amygdala is situated in the 
medial temporal lobe with widespread connections to many other brain regions (LeDoux, 
2000). There is evidence that it receives information through two distinct pathways: one 
cortically, the other subcortically mediated (LeDoux, 2000). The cortical pathway consists 
of projections from the retina to the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus (LGN), then 
on to the primary visual cortex (V1), and through extrastriate visual areas (Polyak, 1957). In 
primates, the amygdala has rich connections with extrastriate visual processing regions 
(Amaral, Price, Pitkanen & Carmichael, 1992). The alternative, subcortical pathway may 
carry visual information from the visual thalamus directly to the amygdala (via the superior 
colliculus and pulvinar nucleus), bypassing the visual cortex (LeDoux, 2000). Animal lesion 
research has indicated the existence of such a subcortical processing pathway for auditory 
and visual information in rats (Doron & LeDoux, 1999). However, conclusive evidence for a 
retinal-collicular-pulvinar-amygdala pathway for visual information in primates has not yet 
been found (Pessoa, 2005). 
  Due to the rich connections between the amygdala and visual processing regions 
(Amaral et al., 1992) it has been suggested that the amygdala may modulate perceptual 
processing of emotional stimuli (Vuilleumier, 2005). Evidence for this modulation comes 
from correlations between amygdala activation and enhanced responses to emotional stimuli 
in visual cortex (Vuilleumier, Armony & Dolan, 2003). Additionally, amygdala lesions 
abolish the enhanced processing of fearful faces in cortical visual processing regions 
(Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2004), impair enhanced perception of 
emotionally salient events (e.g. Anderson & Phelps, 2001), and impair recognition of 
emotional facial expressions (Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, 2001). Therefore, the enhanced 
perceptual processing of emotional information may result from direct feedback from the      
  5   
amygdala to visual regions such as the fusiform and extrastriate cortices (Vuillemier et al., 
2004). 
Input to the amygdala is dominated by magno cells (Miller, Pasik & Pasik, 1980), 
which are fast responding cells with large receptive fields (De Valois & De Valois, 1980; 
Shapley & Lennie, 1985). The large receptive fields of the magnocellular pathway allow 
only coarse, or low-spatial frequency, visual information to be processed, such as global 
information about shape (Livingston & Hubel, 1988). In contrast, parvocellular channels 
project along the cortical pathway (Livingston & Hubel, 1988), with slow responses over 
small receptive fields, and tend to process high spatial frequency information (that 
represents abrupt spatial changes in the image, such as detail). Therefore, neurobiological 
models of emotion processing predict that low spatial frequency information drives the 
prioritisation of emotional information (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2003) 
through the proposed subcortical pathway (LeDoux, 2000). 
 
1.2. To what extent is emotional information preferentially attended? 
As the visual system is capacity limited, information has to be selected for further 
processing. Generally, the fate of unattended stimuli is poor; they are perceived less 
accurately than stimuli that are attended (Mack & Rock, 1998; Rock & Guttman, 1981). A 
large body of neuroimaging research suggests that attention mechanisms can modulate 
sensory processing by boosting the neural representation of attended information, at the 
expense of unattended information (see Driver, 2001). Allocating attention to a stimulus 
suggests that it has been prioritised at the expense of other information in the visual scene. 
The dot-probe task and exogenous cueing task have been used to investigate the extent to 
which attention is allocated to emotional information. Additionally, observations from brain-
damaged patients have provided evidence regarding the extent to which attention is allocated 
to emotional information.
1 
  Models have highlighted the distinction between different components of attention, 
such as shifting, engagement and disengagement (Posner & Peterson, 1990). When an 
individual attends to a stimulus, attention must first be shifted to the stimulus. For the time 
                                       
1 The emotional Stroop task may also address the question of whether attention is preferentially 
allocated to emotion (McLeod, 1991). The emotional Stroop task consists of presenting a word (either 
emotional or neutral) and recording RTs to name the colour of the word (the lexical content of the word is 
always irrelevant; for a review, see McLeod, 1991). The emotional stroop task does not provide an 
unambiguous measure of attention, e.g. it is unclear whether colour-naming interference reflects 
competition at attentional (input), or at the response selection (output) stage (Macleod, 1991). Therefore, 
the emotional Stroop literature will not be reviewed here.       
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that that stimulus is attended, attention is engaged on the stimulus. Before attention can be 
allocated elsewhere, it must be disengaged from its current focus (Posner & Peterson, 1990). 
The specific attentional component that is measured is thus very important. Evolutionary 
theory suggests that attention will be preferentially drawn towards threatening stimuli, as 
fast and accurate orienting to potential danger is important for survival (Ohman & Mineka, 
2001). However, biases can occur without threatening information drawing attention, i.e. by 
delayed disengagement (Fox, Russo & Dutton, 2002).  
 
1.2.1. Evidence from the visual-probe task. Originally configured by Posner, Snyder and 
Davidson (1980), the visual-probe task is based on the reasoning that quicker responses will 
be produced to a probe presented in a currently attended location, relative to a currently 
unattended location. On emotional visual-probe tasks, critical trials consist of an emotional 
stimulus presented in one location, and a neutral stimulus in another (Armony & Dolan, 
2002). Prioritisation of emotional information would be indexed by faster reaction times to 
subsequent probes presented in the same spatial location as emotional stimuli. Faster 
reaction times have been found when probes are preceded by fearful faces (Pourtois, 
Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2004; Pourtois, Schwartz, Seighier, Lazeyras & 
Vuilleumier, 2006), and angry faces (Cooper & Langton, 2006; Holmes, Bradley, Nielsen & 
Mogg, 2009), relative to probes preceded by neutral stimuli. However, none of these visual-
probe studies controlled for low-level stimulus differences between the different emotional 
expressions (i.e. they did not use inverted faces as a control). Instead, two of the studies 
compared low-level differences between the stimuli (including average pixel luminance, 
luminance contrast, face size, and central spatial frequency), and suggest that there are no 
measurable low-level differences between them (Pourtois et al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2006). 
Although the global low-level properties between emotional faces were not statistically 
different (e.g. Pourtois et al., 2004), it is possible that local differences between stimuli 
could be driving the emotion effects.  
Armony and Dolan (2002) circumvented the issue of potentially confounding low-
level visual characteristics by presenting conditioned angry faces in a visual-probe 
paradigm. It has been argued that threat processing, and the acquisition of fear through 
conditioning, share a common brain circuitry (Bishop, 2007). In fear conditioning, a 
conditioned stimulus (CS) generates a conditioned fear response (CR) due to repeated 
association with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US). Armony and Dolan presented a 
different angry face on each side of a screen, one of which (the CS) was conditioned to a      
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loud burst of white noise (US) to elicit a CR. It was found that when the probe was 
presented on the same side as the CS, responses were faster, indicating a prioritisation of the 
fear-conditioned angry face.  
In a recent study, Holmes, Green and Vuilleumier (2005) attempted to elucidate the 
visual characteristics that drive the prioritisation of emotional faces in the visual-probe task. 
They presented neutral and fear faces that contained either high or low spatial frequency 
information (HSF and LSF respectively). Responses to probes replacing LSF fearful faces 
were faster than to LSF neutral faces. However, there was no difference between responses 
to probes replacing HSF fearful compared to HSF neutral faces. There was no difference 
between responses to probes replacing LSF fear compared to LSF neutral faces when they 
were inverted. These results suggest that attentional prioritisation is driven by the LSF 
content of faces.  
  Overall, there is some inconsistency in whether threatening stimuli are preferentially 
attended in the visual-probe task (for example see Bradley, Mogg, Falla & Hamilton, 1998). 
This could be attributed to the visual-probe task only sampling attention when the probe is 
presented and thus not profiling attention allocation throughout stimulus processing (Fox, 
Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001). However, by manipulating the duration between onset of 
the emotional stimulus and the probe, specific attentional mechanisms (i.e. shifting vs. 
engagement) can be tapped (Cooper & Langton, 2006). For example, Cooper and Langton 
(2006) found a trend for threatening faces to elicit quicker responding than neutral faces 
when probed at 100ms, a pattern that was reversed when probed at 500ms. These results 
suggest that threatening stimuli elicit faster shifting, but attention may not be maintained to 
threatening relative to neutral stimuli.  
A more sensitive version of the visual-probe task has also been used, where instead 
of responding to the location of the probe, observers to respond to its visual characteristics. 
Phelps, Ling and Carrasco (2006) presented a brief fearful or neutral face followed by a 
probe. Observers were required to indicate whether the probe was tilted clockwise or anti-
clockwise, and the contrast of the probe was varied across trials, so that sometimes it was 
easy to perform the tilt task (i.e. the probe had high contrast), whereas at other times, it was 
far more difficult (i.e. the probe had low-contrast). Participants were better at the tilt 
discrimination when the task followed a fearful face, than when it followed a neutral face 
(i.e. they were more accurate at the tilt task at a lower contrast following fearful compared to 
neutral faces). There was no difference in task performance between the fear and neutral      
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faces when they were inverted, thus suggesting that it is the emotional content of the fearful 
faces that enhances contrast sensitivity.  
In a recent study, Bocanegra and Zeelenberg (2009) explored the visual 
characteristics of the probe even further, by varying its spatial frequency content. When 
a fearful face preceded a low spatial frequency visual-probe, it facilitated perception, so 
participants were better at the tilt discrimination task compared to when the visual-probe 
was preceded by a neutral face. On the other hand, when the fearful face preceded a 
high spatial frequency visual-probe, it impaired perception, so participants were worse 
at the tilt discrimination task compared to when the visual-probe was preceded by a 
neutral face. This suggests that fearful faces selectively facilitate low spatial frequency 
information, and they impede high spatial frequency information compared to neutral 
faces. 
   
1.2.2. Evidence from the exogenous cueing task. The exogenous cueing task is similar to the 
visual-probe task, but only one stimulus is presented per trial. This means it does not 
measure selection between competing stimuli directly, as emotional and neutral stimuli are 
never competing for attention. Rather it examines the extent to which stimulus content 
(emotion) modulates shift and disengage components of attention. 
  In the original exogenous cueing paradigm, the participants’ task was to detect a 
target presented on the left or right of fixation (Posner, 1980). On most trials (e.g. 80%), a 
stimulus precedes the target at the same spatial location, thus acting as a valid cue. On the 
remaining trials (e.g. 20%), the cue is presented in an alternative spatial location to the 
target, and therefore acts as an invalid cue. Generally, valid cueing results in shorter reaction 
times to the target (Posner, 1980), particularly when the temporal separation between the cue 
and target is less than approximately 200ms (if separation is longer, responses are slower at 
valid locations due to inhibited re-processing of a previously attended location; known as 
inhibition of return, Posner & Peterson, 1990). The allocation of attention to the cued 
location tends to occur regardless of cue validity consistent with peripheral stimuli 
exogenously cueing attention to their spatial location (Jonides, 1981).  
  In the modified emotion task, the emotional content of the cue varies, and thus allows 
investigation of attentional shift and disengage components of attention as a function of cue 
validity. A bias in the initial shift component of attention allocation to threat would be 
indicated with faster RTs to the target when the cue is threat-related on valid trials. In 
contrast, delayed disengagement of attention to threat would be indicated by slower RTs to      
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the target when the cue is threat-related (relative to neutral) on invalid trials. Several studies 
using this method have found no evidence for a bias in the shift component (i.e. initial 
orienting of attention; Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Indeed, a recent study 
reported the opposite effect, as attention was directed to the valid target faster following a 
neutral face than an emotional face (Koster, Verschuere, Burssens, Custers & Crombez, 
2007). Additional evidence has shown greater maintenance/delayed disengagement for 
threatening compared to neutral stimuli (Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001; for 
contrary findings using aversively conditioned cues see, Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, 
Verschuere & De Houwer, 2004). However, in these studies, RTs were generally very fast 
towards targets that were validly cued, therefore the lack of an attentional shift towards 
threat may be due to a ceiling effect (Fox et al., 2001).  
 
1.2.3. Evidence from observations with brain-damaged patients. Neuropsychological 
observations of brain-damaged patients have also provided evidence that attention is 
preferentially allocated to emotional information. Brain damage, particularly to the inferior 
parietal lobe in the right hemisphere, can cause hemispheric neglect (Driver & Vuilleumier, 
2001). Neglect is defined by a lack of awareness of the contralateral space (e.g. on the left 
side following a right lesion), which may be the result of a deficiency in directing attention 
towards stimuli presented on that side (Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001). For example, although 
neglect patients rarely fail to perceive a single light when it is presented anywhere in the 
visual field, when two lights are presented it is common for them to only report perceiving 
the light located in the ipsilesional space (e.g. following a right lesion, only reporting the 
stimulus furthest right; Bender & Tueber, 1946). This phenomenon is called extinction, as 
the additional source of information has ‘extinguished’ the source in the contralesional space 
(Driver & Vuilleumier, 2001).  
  Extinction is less likely to occur for schematic faces compared to scrambled faces and 
geometric shapes (Vuilleumier, 2000). Schematic faces are cartoonised facial stimuli 
consisting of eyes, mouths and eyebrows (occasionally omitted). They are simplified 
versions of facial expressions, differing from each other in the orientation and curvature of 
feature lines. Schematic faces are easier to match on their low-level visual properties than 
photographs of faces. Vuilleumier and Schwartz (2001) used happy, angry and neutral 
schematic faces to probe residual emotion processing in neglect patients. They found that 
when compared to neutral faces, both happy and angry schematic faces are less prone to 
extinction (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001).       
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1.2.4. Summary. Investigating attentional allocation to emotional stimuli has been 
problematic; paradigms such as the visual-probe and exogenous cueing paradigm cannot 
completely differentiate between different attentional mechanisms. It is possible that 
inconsistencies using the visual-probe task (Fox et al., 2001; Koster et al., 2004) arise from 
stimulus and methodological differences across studies. However, both the visual-probe and 
the exogenous cueing task do provide some evidence that emotional (specifically threat-
related) information is prioritised over neutral information in some circumstances (Koster et 
al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2004). Additionally, there is some suggestion that these effects may 
be due to the LSF content of the faces (Holmes et al., 2005). 
Evidence from the attention tasks in normal participants supports the threat-
superiority hypothesis of emotion processing (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Observations from 
brain-damaged patients suggest that emotional (including both positive and negative) faces 
are preferentially allocated attention compared to neutral faces (Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 
2001). These observations from patients support the emotionality hypothesis of emotion 
processing (Martin, Williams & Clark, 1991): that all emotional information is prioritised 
over neutral information.  
Very little of the research investigating attentional prioritisation of emotional faces 
has adequately controlled for low-level visual differences between the stimuli (with 
exception of Armony & Dolan, 2002; Holmes et al., 2005; Phelps et al., 2006; and 
Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). Thus making it difficult to tell whether effects are due to 
the emotional content of the faces, or low-level visual properties. 
 
1.3. Does emotional face processing demand attentional resources? 
If emotion processing demands no attentional resources, it should experience no 
disruption from competing stimuli. Visual search tasks have been used extensively to 
discover the extent to which emotion processing is independent of attentional resources (i.e. 
unaffected by the number of distractor stimuli). Monitoring neurological activation to 
stimuli when they are unattended has also been used to test whether emotional face 
processing demands attention.  
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1.3.1. Evidence from the visual search task. The visual search task has been used to explore 
the extent to which visual information can be processed without attentional resources, or 
preattentively (i.e. whether aspects of the scene can be rapidly evaluated before attention is 
deployed; for a review, see Wolfe, 1998).  
  Typically a target stimulus is presented within a field of distractors, and the participant 
is asked to find the target as quickly and accurately as possible. If the target has a perceptual 
feature that can be detected before attentional processing has been initiated, target 
identification is independent of the number of distractors in the display (set size); this is 
labelled ‘pop-out’. On the other hand, if target detection is impaired by increasing set size, 
then it is assumed that the stimuli are processed serially. Whether a target ‘pops-out’ is 
based on its top-down (goal directed) and/or bottom-up (stimulus-driven) saliency. ‘Pop-out’ 
has been found for stimulus characteristics including colour, size, orientation and spatial 
frequency (Wolfe, 1998). Even if a stimulus does not pop-out (i.e. target identification is 
dependent on set size), it may be processed more efficiently compared to other stimuli. The 
search efficiency of a stimulus can be calculated by computing the slope of the linear 
relationship between set size and latency. 
  In an initial study with faces, Hansen and Hansen (1988) displayed matrices of 
individual faces and asked participants to detect whether the faces all had the same 
emotional expression, or whether one facial expression (target) differed from the others. 
Angry faces were found significantly faster than happy faces, and the speed at which the 
angry faces were found did not depend on set size (as it did for happy faces), consistent with 
them ‘popping-out’. However, it has since been noted that in this original experiment a low-
level visual confound made the angry faces easier to detect (Purcell, Stewart & Skov, 1996). 
To find whether the effects of emotion are due to low-level characteristics, some 
experimenters have investigated visual search with inverted emotional faces (Williams & 
Mattingley, 2006; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). However, results have been mixed, with 
some finding the emotion effect disappears with inversion (Williams & Mattingley, 2006), 
and others finding a reduction, but not elimination of the effect (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 
2008), thus it is impossible to conclude whether results are due to the extraction of 
emotional meaning from the faces, or low-level characteristics.  
Although some visual search experiments suggest that angry faces are detected faster 
than other expressions, and are therefore consistent with a threat-prioritisation account of 
visual processing (Williams & Mattingley, 2006), a large number of experiments have found 
that happy faces are prioritised in search (Calvo & Marrero, 2009; Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson      
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& Ohman, 2005; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). Calvo and Marrero (2009) presented all 6 
basic expressions as targets (in an array of neutral distractors), and found that happy 
expressions were detected fastest, followed by surprise, disgust, fear, then angry, and finally 
sad faces. They were particularly interested in the visual characteristics responsible for these 
effects, and therefore computed average low-level visual properties (including luminance, 
RMS contrast, energy, colour and texture) for each of the emotions and covaried them in the 
analysis. The covaried results suggested that speeded responses to happy targets were not 
caused by global low-level visual properties. However, they also conducted an image 
analysis by rating regions (or features) of change between emotional and neutral faces. 
When these ratings were covaried with the search performance, the effect of emotion 
disappeared. In particular, the feature with the greatest contribution to search performance 
was the visibility of the upper teeth, which was consistently and only associated with the 
happy expression. This suggests that the visual search advantage for some expressions is 
caused by the presence of particular features that are consistently associated with them. 
What this study does not address is whether the difference in features that is driving the 
effect of facilitated search involves emotional processing or simply low-level visual 
processing. 
Another approach to try to counteract the low-level explanation for prioritisation in 
search has been to simplify the emotional face stimuli by using schematics (Fox et al., 2000; 
Ohman, Lundqvist & Esteves, 2001; Calvo, Avero & Lundqist, 2006).  
  Fox et al., (2000) presented an angry or happy target with neutral distractors in an 
imaginary circle around a fixation point. They found that schematic angry faces were 
detected more efficiently than happy faces when paired with neutral distractors. Using a 
different set of schematic stimuli, and a different stimulus arrangement (in a 3 x 3 matrix), 
Ohman, Lundqvist and Esteves (2001) constructed a similar visual search experiment. 
Although, again, no ‘pop-out’ effect was found, they reported consistently faster search 
times for angry versus happy faces.
2 Recently, the schematic emotional face studies above 
have been replicated; Horstmann (2007) used the same stimuli as in three original 
experiments (Ohman, et al., 2001; White, 1995; Fox et al., 2000) but used the same method 
across all three experiments. Overall, Horstmann (2007) found no evidence of ‘pop-out’ for 
                                       
2 Similar results have also been found with other biologically relevant stimuli when compared to neutral 
objects, including snakes and spiders (Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001).      
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angry faces, but there was an indication of more efficient search for angry faces compared to 
happy faces in all studies (although to different degrees depending on the stimuli). 
  Although low-level differences between emotions in schematic stimuli are more 
controlled than their photographic counterparts, differences do still exist. Therefore, to show 
that effects of emotion in schematic visual search are due to the emotional content, as 
opposed to low-level properties of the stimuli, control stimuli are still required. Fox et al., 
(2000) presented both upright and inverted face stimuli, and found that the emotion effect 
found in the upright schematic faces (faster detection of angry) disappeared when they were 
inverted. However, some studies using schematics have reported the same angry effect in 
both upright and inverted faces (Ohman et al., 2001; White, 1995). 
  In a recent study, Coelho, Cloete and Wallis (2010) investigated the visual 
characteristics that were responsible for the angry prioritisation in visual search with 
schematic faces. They used oriented lines contained within a circle (which were rated as 
non-emotional), and found the same effect: the abstract shape that had the same orientation 
of lines as the angry face was detected faster than that of the abstract shape with the same 
orientation of lines as the happy face. Over three experiments, Coelho et al. showed that the 
orientation of the internal lines relative to the edge of the surrounding circle is crucial to 
detection times, and can account for all of the variance between happy and angry schematic 
faces in visual search. Thus, their paper suggests that emotion is not driving the angry 
prioritisation found with schematic stimuli, but the effects are due to low-level 
characteristics of the stimuli. 
  The visual search paradigm has been criticised on several grounds, including its 
inability to separate the attentional effects of the targets from the distractors (Koster et al., 
2004), or to disassociate different aspects of attention (Fox, 2007). Schematic faces have 
been used frequently in the visual search paradigm to reduce low-level visual confounds 
(e.g. Ohman et al., 2001; Horstmann, 2007). However, the use of schematics has been 
questioned due to their low ecological validity (Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). Also, facial 
expressions represented by schematics have been limited to angry, happy, sad and neutral 
expressions (e.g. Ohman et al., 2001). This could be because it is difficult to represent 
additional emotions with good validity and reliability using schematics. This is particularly 
important, given that the threat-superiority hypothesis would suggest that fearful faces 
should also induce preattentive processing (Ohman & Mineka, 2001).  
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1.3.2. Evidence from neurological activation to emotional faces without attention. It is well 
documented that unattended stimuli are perceived less accurately than stimuli that are 
attended (Mack & Rock, 1998; Rock & Guttman, 1981). Neurological data indicate that 
information that is unattended evokes reduced activation compared to attended stimuli in 
relevant processing areas (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman & Peterson, 1990). The 
processing of emotional information outside the current focus of attention would suggest 
that emotion processing does not demand attentional resources. 
  Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, and Dolan (2001), presented two faces and two houses 
arranged in vertical and horizontal pairs whilst measuring local cerebral blood volume and 
flow using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). On 50% of trials, the houses 
were identical, and on the other half of trials they were different. The faces were 
manipulated in the same way, with either the same, or different identities being presented. 
Crucially, the emotional expression of the faces was also manipulated; the two faces either 
both had fearful expressions, or both had happy expressions. Participants were instructed to 
make same/different judgements on either the faces (based on identity) or the houses after 
250ms stimulus presentation. The expression of the faces was entirely irrelevant, as 
participants were not asked to perform any emotion-related task. The fMRI data showed that 
faces produced a marked increase in activation of the fusiform gyri when they were at the 
attended locations compared to unattended locations. However, critically, amygdala 
activation towards fearful faces was not modulated by spatial attention. This suggests that 
the subcortical processing of fearful faces does not demand attentional resources.   
  Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, and Gabrieli (2003) also investigated amygdala 
activation to unattended emotional (fear, disgust and neutral) faces using fMRI. Instead of a 
spatial location manipulation, Anderson et al., (2003) superimposed a face and a scene by 
creating semi-transparent images and overlaying them. Object-based attention was 
manipulated by asking participants to make a gender judgement (attend to the faces), or a 
location judgement (attend to the place). On each trial, the face and scene were coloured, 
one was tinted red, the other green. During the condition in which faces were attended, fear 
faces evoked significantly greater amygdala activation than the neutral and disgust 
expressions. When faces were unattended, amygdala activation did not significantly change 
to fear faces, but did significantly increase to disgust faces. These findings show that without 
attention, the amygdala response to fear is maintained, and in addition, the amygdala loses 
specificity to fearful faces and seems to respond more generally to any potential threat-
relevant stimulus (e.g. disgust).      
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  Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez and Ungerlieder (2002) also explored the extent to which 
emotional faces can be processed without attention. A fearful, happy or neutral face was 
presented at fixation for 200ms, whilst one bar was presented in the left, and another in the 
right periphery (at 5.7 eccentricity). On attend trials, participants were asked to judge the 
gender of the face. On unattended trials, participants had to discriminate the orientation of 
the two peripheral bars, where they were either similar (both horizontal or vertical), or 
dissimilar (one horizontal, one vertical). Using fMRI, Pessoa et al., (2002) found that 
amygdala activation was eliminated when participants were not attending to the emotional 
faces. This is in direct opposition to the studies presented above (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; 
Anderson et al., 2003). How can Pessoa et al.’s findings be reconciled with the evidence 
above? Pessoa et al.’s task was harder than Vuilleumier et al., and Anderson et al.’s tasks 
(accuracy: 64% compared to 86% and 87%, respectively). Arguably, Vuilleumier et al.’s, 
and Anderson et al.’s results were caused by the distractor task not exhausting perceptual 
load demands (Lavie, 2005), therefore allowing attention to ‘spill’ over on to the emotional 
faces (Pessoa et al., 2004).  
  Perceptual load is related to the number of different-identity items in the scene that are 
required to be perceived (Lavie, 2005). The load theory of attention suggests that perceptual 
processing is automatic, but it is limited by perceptual capacity (Lavie, 1995). Under 
conditions of low perceptual load (e.g. when the target task is perceptually undemanding), 
spare capacity will spill over to distractors. However, under conditions of high perceptual 
load, there are no spare resources with which to process distractors, and therefore they go 
unprocessed. Empirical support for this theory has been found with a number of different 
paradigms and stimuli; as perceptual load increases, the extent to which distractors are also 
processed (and therefore interfere with current goals) is reduced (see Lavie, 2005 for a 
review). Therefore, the processing of ‘unattended’ stimuli is not necessarily all-or-none. By 
diverting attention somewhat, it is still possible that distractor items are processed to some 
degree. To eliminate all processing, the distractor task must be sufficiently demanding on 
attentional resources. 
   
1.3.3.  Summary. Results from visual search using emotional faces suggest that threat-related 
faces are not entirely processed without attention; emotional targets have not been found to 
‘pop-out’. However, threat-related faces are processed more efficiently than neutral or 
positive faces (Ohman, Lundqvist & Esteves, 2001; Hortsmann, 2007). Recent studies 
investigating visual search with both phototographic and schematic stimuli have suggested      
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that effects are due to low-level visual characteristics (Calvo & Marrero, 2009; Coelho et al., 
2010). 
  Sustained neural activation to unattended fear and disgust faces in emotion processing 
regions suggest that threat-related faces can be processed without complete attention 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2003). However, when attention is fully 
distracted, threat-related faces are no longer processed (Pessoa et al., 2004). This suggests 
that although emotional face processing may depend on fewer resources than neutral face 
processing, it is not capacity free. Overall, research from both behavioural and neuroimaging 
paradigms, suggests that emotional information can be detected more efficiently, and can be 
processed with less attention than neutral information. However, it is unclear whether these 
results are due to the extracted emotional meaning of the faces, or low-level visual 
properties. 
 
1.4. Can emotional faces be processed unconsciously?  
Unconscious processing is defined as the stimuli not being perceived, despite being 
physically presented on the retina in a non-degraded state. Various methods have been used 
to manipulate conscious awareness of visual stimuli, including backward masking, 
crowding, bistable figures, motion-induced blindness, inattentional/change blindness, 
attentional blink, and binocular rivalry (for a review see Kim & Blake, 2005). These 
methods vary in the extent to which they successfully render a stimulus outside of 
awareness, and the generality of stimuli they are able to render outside of awareness. In 
emotion processing research, backward masking procedures, and binocular rivalry have been 
exploited due to their effective suppression of emotional stimuli.  
 
1.4.1. Evidence from backward masking. Backward masking consists of presenting a brief 
‘target’ stimulus followed by a ‘mask’. Observers characteristically report never having seen 
the target, as long as its presentation is sufficiently brief (<40ms; Esteves & Ohman, 1993). 
Investigators have used backward masking and measured the effects of the (unreported) 
stimulus on physiological responses, neurological events, or behavioural tasks. 
  Early research using emotional backward masking investigated skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) to masked threatening stimuli (Esteves, Dimberg & Ohman, 1994). SCRs 
are a measure of physiological arousal and are often used to index arousal-based emotion 
processing (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley & Hamm, 1993; Bauer, 1998). Autonomic arousal 
causes increased moisture levels of the skin and the resultant changes in the electrical      
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conductance of the skin (Wallin, 1981) can be measured using electrodes. Esteves et al. 
(1994) aversively conditioned SCRs to nonmasked presentations of angry or happy faces. 
During the conditioning phase, one emotional face was repeatedly paired with aversive 
electric shocks, which resulted in elevated SCRs to that emotional face. The test trials 
consisted of masked emotional faces. In these test trials, conditioned SCRs were maintained 
when they were paired with the angry face, but were abolished when paired with the happy 
face. Therefore elevated SCRs to conditioned stimuli are maintained when those stimuli are 
fear relevant (e.g. angry faces), but are not maintained if they are fear irrelevant (happy 
faces). This suggests that the conditioned threat had been analysed outside of awareness.
3  
Morris, Ohman and Dolan (1998) studied the neural mechanisms underlying the 
maintenance of physiological arousal to aversively conditioned masked stimuli. They 
measured neural activity using positron emission tomography (PET) to backward masked 
angry faces, one of which had been previously classically conditioned to an aversive burst of 
white noise. Replicating Esteves et al.’s findings, elevated SCRs were found to the 
presentation of the conditioned angry expression, both when it was unmasked and masked. 
Additionally, PET results showed significant amygdala activation in response to the masked 
conditioned angry face (Morris, Ohman & Dolan, 1998).  
  In the same year, a different group also investigated neurological activation in 
response to backward masked emotional faces (Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff et al., 1998). Whalen 
et al. (1998) presented happy or fearful target faces for 33 msec, subsequently replacing 
them with a neutral mask (presented for 167 msec). Out of the 10 participants tested, eight 
subjectively reported not having seen an emotional face on any of the trials, and were 
therefore included in the analysis. Amygdala activation was increased in response to masked 
fearful faces compared to masked happy faces. Other brain regions that were active with 
unmasked emotional faces, such as the fusiform gyrus, were not found to be active with 
masked versions of the same expressions.  
The majority of studies investigating unconscious emotional face processing using a 
backward masking paradigm paired with neuroimaging techniques have focussed on fearful 
faces (e.g. Whalen et al., 1998; Liddell, Brown, Kemp, et al., 2005; Williams, Liddell, 
Rathjen et al., 2004; Williams, Das, Liddell, et al., 2006; although see Critchely, Mathias & 
Dolan, 2002, for further evidence that conditioned angry faces elicit amygdala activation 
                                       
3 The same pattern of results with SCRs has been found with flowers as fear irrelevant, and snakes as 
fear relevant stimuli (Ohman & Soares, 1993).      
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when presented unconsciously, and Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2004, for evidence that 
masked happy faces also do).   
In an attempt to discover which visual characteristics of an unconsciously presented 
fearful face are responsible for the sustained amygdala activation towards them, Whalen, 
Kagan, Cook, et al. (2004) conducted a study using only the eye region of emotional faces. 
They removed all information from the fearful and happy face stimuli, except for the visible 
part of the eye-ball (eye whites). These stimuli were then presented for 17ms, before being 
masked with a whole neutral face. In a control condition, the luminance contrast of the eye 
region for each expression was reversed, so that the pupil was white, and the scleral field 
was black. The results showed greater amygdala activation in response to masked fearful 
compared to masked happy eye whites; there was no difference between the expressions in 
the control condition. These results suggest that the amygdala activation associated with 
unconscious processing of fearful faces may be due to the large size of the white scleral field 
in this emotion. The lack of an emotion effect in amygdala activation for the negative 
luminance eye region indicates that this is not simply a contrast effect, or due to the outline 
of the eye.  
  Some researchers have paired the backward masking procedure with tasks that probe 
attention, therefore measuring potential behavioural biases towards unconsciously presented 
threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Carlson, Reinke & Habib, 2009). 
Mogg & Bradley (1999) used a masked version of the visual-probe task to investigate 
attentional biases to emotion outside of awareness. In this paradigm, a briefly presented (e.g. 
14 ms) emotional face was presented outside of awareness by immediately masking it with a 
jumbled face. RTs were measured to probes presented in the same location as the masked 
emotional face, compared to a masked neutral face on the other side of fixation. It was found 
that probes replacing masked threat faces were responded to significantly faster than those 
replacing masked neutral or masked happy faces.  
Carlson and Reinke (2008) also used a masked visual-probe technique, and found 
that RTs were significantly faster when the probe was preceded by a masked fearful face 
compared to when it was preceded by a masked neutral, or happy face. In this experiment, a 
phase-scrambled face was used as a control. Phase scrambling means the resultant image has 
the same amplitude spectrum as the original image, but without recognisable structure and 
clear contours (Thomson, Foster, & Summers, 2000). Although recent research has shown 
that observers are biased in orienting towards phase-scrambled images containing faces 
rather than cars (Honey, Kirchner, & VanRullen, 2008), the effect of phase-scrambling on      
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emotional face processing is unknown. In Carlson and Reinke’s study, participants 
responded to probes following masked fearful faces faster than when they followed masked 
phase-scrambled faces.  
  Recently it has been suggested that there are individual differences in the extent to 
which backward masking renders the target face invisible (Pessoa, Japee, & Ungerlieder, 
2005). As a result, investigation has turned to the criterion that is set to evaluate visual 
awareness (Pessoa, et al., 2005). Subjective awareness is measured by asking participants 
whether they saw the target face; if their response is negative, it is taken to indicate that they 
were unaware of the target. This subjective criterion assesses the conscious experience of the 
participant, however, it may be influenced by differences in response criteria. On the other 
hand, objective awareness is measured by an alternative forced choice paradigm, where at 
the end of each trial participants are required to indicate the expression of the target. With 
the objective criteria, signal detection theory (SDT) can be used to provide a measure of 
sensitivity that is independent of possible response biases (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). 
Whilst measuring awareness using a forced choice design and analysed with SDT, Pessoa et 
al. (2005) found large individual differences in the extent to which the target emotion of the 
masked face could be reliably detected. Using the objective criterion, they found that 
approximately 60% of participants could reliably detect a target emotion when it was 
presented for 33ms before it was masked. This finding is particularly important because 
targets have been presented for 33msec in backward masking experiments that have not used 
awareness checks (e.g. Carlson & Reinke, 2008), as this duration has been linked with 
unconscious perception in the past (Esteves & Ohman, 1993).  
  The importance of an objective awareness criterion has been demonstrated by Pessoa, 
Japee, Sturman and Ungerlieder (2006). They measured amygdala activation using fMRI to 
masked emotional faces. Those people that were objectively unaware (measured by forced 
choice and analysed using SDT) did not show significant amygdala activation to masked 
fearful faces. However, those that were subjectively unaware (reported not having seen a 
fearful face), but performed above chance on the objective awareness check, did show 
significant amygdala activation to masked fearful faces. This suggests that when participants 
are subjectively unaware of the target expression, amygdala activation to masked fearful 
faces depends on objective awareness.  
  One study that used backward masking to present stimuli unconsciously used a 
stringent, objective awareness check, and thus provides evidence that not all emotion effects 
are eliminated when such checks are used (Whalen et al., 2004; this study was described in      
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detail above). Additional studies (e.g. Williams et al., 2006; Liddell et al., 2005) have 
presented masked stimuli for a duration lower than has previously been found to support 
unconscious presentation measured by an objective awareness check (Williams et al., 2004). 
However, as individual differences have been found in the detection of masked emotion 
(Pessoa et al., 2005), the only way to ascertain whether the masked expression does not 
reach awareness for each participant tested is to examine emotion classification using an 
objective awareness check after each experimental trial. 
 
1.4.2. Evidence from observations with brain-damaged patients. Neuropsychological 
observations with brain-damaged patients have also provided evidence suggesting that 
emotional stimuli are processed outside of awareness (de Gelder, Vroomen & Pourtois, 
2001). The primary visual cortex is organised according to a retinotopic map of the visual 
field, lesions to this area cause blindness to corresponding parts of the visual field (Driver & 
Vuilleumier, 2001). However, under some conditions, stimuli presented to the blind field 
can be accurately identified or located, despite not being consciously perceived (Barbur, et 
al., 1980); this has been termed ‘blindsight’. The phenomenon of blindsight may be 
mediated by subcortical processing via the visual thalamus and superior colliculus (Barbur, 
Ruddock, & Waterfield, 1980), and has been found to occur with simple geometric patterns 
(Weiskrantz, 1996). 
  Recent experiments have shown that a patient with occipital lobe damage can correctly 
discriminate (by ‘guessing’) different emotional expressions presented in his blind field (de 
Gelder, Vroomen, & Pourtois, 2001)
4. The subcortical amygdala pathway has been 
implicated in the residual processing of emotional information in blindsight (Morris, 
DeGelder, Weiskrantz & Dolan, 2001). In this experiment, Morris et al., (2001) found that 
faces presented to a patient’s blind field do not evoke the striate, fusiform, or dorsolateral 
prefrontal responses that were found when they were presented to the undamaged hemifield. 
Nevertheless, there was increased amygdala activation in response to fearful compared to 
happy expressions when the faces were presented to the patient’s blind field. Similar 
amygdala activation was also recorded to perceived fearful faces presented in the 
undamaged hemifield. This pattern of activation shows considerable resemblance to findings 
with normal individuals to backward masked emotional faces (e.g. Whalen et al., 1998). 
                                       
4 Successful fear conditioning to simple visual stimuli (schematic objects) has also been found in an 
individual with complete cortical blindness (Hamm, Weike, Schupp et al., 2003).      
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  Taking advantage of the finding that humans mimic others’ facial expressions 
(Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1994), Tamietto, Castelli, Vighetti et al. (2009) presented 
emotional faces to the blind field of patients with unilateral occipital lobe damage whilst 
measuring their facial reactions. Facial movements were measured using electromyography 
(EMG), to record muscle activity. It was found that patients showed significant patterns of 
synchronised facial movement even when faces were presented in the blind field. 
Additionally, these facial EMG responses were faster when the stimuli were presented in the 
blind field compared to the undamaged hemifield. This suggests that unconsciously 
processed emotional faces can cause physical variations in muscle activity associated with 
emotional perception. 
      
1.4.3. Evidence from binocular rivalry. First empirically explored in 1838 (Wheatstone), 
binocular rivalry is a perceptual phenomenon in which different stimuli are presented to each 
eye; and conscious perception switches between the stimuli, despite unchanging retinal input 
(see Blake, 1989). Early theories of binocular rivalry proposed that competition for 
dominance occurs between the two eyes, and is resolved by inhibitory connections in 
monocular processing channels early in the visual system where eye of origin information is 
available (Blake, 1989). Low-level characteristics of the stimuli, such as contrast, motion 
and colour impact significantly on dominance proportions in binocular rivalry (Alais & 
Blake, 2005). However, evidence now suggests that both images are processed beyond the 
site of binocular interactions before dominance is resolved (Kovacs, Papathomas, Yang & 
Feher, 1996; Logothetis, Leopold & Sheinberg, 1996). Some higher-level characteristics of 
the stimuli can influence dominance in binocular rivalry, including coherent organisation 
(Yu & Blake, 1992) and spatial context (Graf & Adams, 2008). Such effects may well be 
mediated via feedback to early visual areas (e.g. V1; Watson, Pearson & Clifford, 2004), 
suggesting that competition between representations may be occurring at early visual areas. 
Binocular rivalry has been employed in different ways to explore unconscious emotion 
processing; it has been has been coupled with neuroimaging techniques to measure brain 
activity to suppressed emotional stimuli, and used as a behavioural tool. 
Binocular rivalry has been used and modified in various ways: 1) Classic binocular 
rivalry paradigm, When a different image is presented to each eye, instead of a fusion of the 
two images, observers perceive alternations between them. The time that each stimulus is 
dominant is recorded, and a dominance proportion is calculated. Increased salience of one 
image due to low-level properties (e.g. luminance, contrast) is associated with higher      
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dominance proportions (Mamassian & Goutcher, 2005); 2) Initial percept paradigm, where 
one stimulus is presented to one eye and a different stimulus is presented to the other. The 
observer indicates the stimulus initially dominant and the trial ends. An initial dominance 
proportion can then be calculated from the number of trials that each stimulus was perceived 
first. Previous research (Mamassian & Goutcher, 2005) has found that increased salience of 
one image due to low-level properties is also associated with higher probability of initial 
dominance. Initial dominance measures allow the study of unconscious processing without 
contamination from subsequent evaluation of the stimuli during dominance periods; 3) 
Continuous flash suppression (CFS), CFS is a variant of binocular rivalry used to render 
stimuli invisible for extended periods of time (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). A stimulus is 
presented to one eye, and in the other, random, highly salient, dynamic noise is continuously 
flashed at approximately 10 Hz (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). The random dynamic noise 
renders the stimulus invisible for long periods of time, typically a couple of minutes 
(Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy & Blake, 2006). It also provides stronger suppression than 
conventional rivalry (Tsuchiya et al., 2006), making it an optimal technique to use whilst 
investigating unconscious processing mechanisms. 
Neurological Evidence. Two of the first experiments that combined the binocular 
rivalry paradigm with measures of brain activation were conducted in 2004. Williams et al. 
presented fearful, happy or neutral faces to one eye whilst presenting a house to the other 
eye for 500ms. They found that differential activation to faces (compared to houses) in the 
fusiform gyrus was dependent on seeing the face. However, activation in the amygdala was 
larger for fearful than neutral faces, and this was true whether or not the faces were 
suppressed in rivalry. Additionally, when happy faces were presented, there was no 
difference in amygdala activation (compared to neutral faces) when they were consciously 
viewed, but there was an increase in amygdala activation to happy faces when they were 
suppressed. Pasley et al. presented either a fearful face, or a chair in one eye, and a house in 
the other. In a paradigm similar to CFS, they ramped in the contrast of the face/chair whilst 
‘jittering’ the position of the house. This caused the house to be dominant for the length of 
the trial (approximately 1.5 seconds). They found increased activation in the amygdala in 
response to the suppressed fearful faces compared to the suppressed chairs.  
  Jiang and He (2006) used fMRI to measure activation in response to fearful and 
neutral faces presented consciously and unconsciously using CFS. They constructed an 
objective awareness check; participants were at chance in this control task. Consistent with 
backward masking studies (Morris et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998), Jiang and He found      
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equally strong amygdala activation in response to fearful faces irrespective of whether or not 
they were consciously perceived. In contrast, amygdala activation in response to neutral 
expressions was reduced when they were not consciously perceived. The main conclusion 
from these neurological studies is that amygdala activation in response to fearful faces 
occurs independently of visual awareness (Williams et al., 2004; Pasley et al., 2004, Jiang & 
He, 2006). In contrast, activation of high-level visual processing regions, such as the 
fusiform gyrus, are modulated by visual awareness, and therefore reflect conscious 
perception (Williams et al., 2004). 
Behavioural Evidence. Using the classic binocular rivalry paradigm, several studies 
have reported higher dominance proportions for emotional compared to neutral faces (Alpers 
& Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman, Milders, De Gelder & Sahraie, 2008; Yoon, Hong, Joormann 
& Kang, 2009)
5. Alpers and Gerdes investigated the dominance of photographic emotional 
faces in rivalry (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007, Experiment 1). Happy and angry faces were found 
to dominate perception significantly more than neutral expressions. However, several 
methodological issues with this experiment call the interpretation of the results in terms of 
unconscious biases towards emotional information into question. Firstly, the stimuli were 
large (8.6 x 9.5 of visual angle; where optimal presentation size for binocular rivalry is 
under 1; Blake, O’Shea & Mueller, 1992). Having large stimuli increases the probability of 
piecemeal rivalry (not seeing one image exclusively; Blake, O’Shea & Mueller, 1992). 
Piecemeal rivalry may have caused biased responses in Alpers and Gerdes (2007) 
experiment, as participants may have responded ‘emotional’ when one emotional feature 
was dominant, but the rest of the dominant features were neutral. Secondly, it is possible that 
the faces were not rivalling at all. This is because binocular rivalry only occurs between 
dissimilar images; fusion of the two eyes’ input is always preferred over rivalry when 
possible (Blake, 1989). As the only difference between the faces presented to each eye was 
the emotional expression of the face, there was unlikely to be enough dissimilarity between 
the faces to cause rivalry. Any rivalry that did occur is likely to have been between local 
                                       
5 A limited number of studies have also looked at the predominance of emotional pictures (Alpers & Pauli, 
2006), and aversively conditioned gratings in binocular rivalry (Alpers, Ruhleder, Walz, Muhlberger & Pauli, 
2005). Emotional scenes were found to dominate perception more than neutral scenes (Alpers & Pauli, 2006). 
However, as low-level stimulus characteristics were not controlled in this experiment, it is impossible to tell 
whether the results are due to the emotional content of the pictures or systematic differences in these low-level 
properties between emotional and neutral images. In a subsequent study, Alpers and colleagues (2005) 
controlled for the low-level characteristics of the stimuli by aversively conditioning participants to a vertical or 
horizontal grating. Results showed a tendency for the aversively conditioned grating to dominate perception, 
although the findings were not conclusive (results were marginally significant). 
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regions of the face, where information differs across emotion (e.g. mouth; eyes). Therefore 
the results may be the outcome of participants perceiving a composite of the emotional and 
neutral features, with this composite appearing emotional. And lastly, there was no control 
for the low-level visual characteristics of the stimuli, suggesting that results could be due to 
the emotional faces having more salient low-level properties than neutral faces. 
  In a second experiment, Alpers and Gerdes (2007; Experiment 2) attempted to address 
the issue of confounding low-level stimulus properties by presenting schematic faces. Both 
angry and happy schematic faces were found to dominate over neutral schematic faces. 
However, this experiment did not address the issues regarding piecemeal rivalry or fusion, 
which are arguably more likely to be responsible for effects when schematic faces are used. 
  Another recent publication has explored the extent to which emotional faces 
predominate over neutral faces in binocular rivalry. Bannerman et al. (2008) aimed to study 
the effects of emotion on binocular rivalry by instructing observers to report the dominance 
of centrally presented oblique gratings, whilst emotional faces were presented in the 
background of the display. Results showed that a grating presented to the same eye as the 
fearful and happy faces tended to dominate over the grating presented to the same eye as the 
neutral face. While the authors interpreted this as evidence of a significant influence of the 
emotional background on perception, again, methodological issues raise questions about the 
mechanisms that are responsible for this effect. These issues are largely the same as directed 
to Alpers and Gerdes (2007). Firstly, the face stimuli were large (9.8 x 13.2 of visual 
angle) which may have led to piecemeal rivalry. Secondly, the only difference between the 
faces presented to each eye was the emotional content, therefore it is highly probable that all 
but a few local regions of the face were fused. And lastly, there was no control for the low-
level characteristics of the stimuli. The impact of these issues is discussed above. To address 
the second (fusion) and third (confounding low-level characteristics) issues raised here, 
Bannerman et al. (2008; Experiment 3) presented fear, happy and neutral faces paired with 
houses, with an upright and an inverted condition. They recorded dominance of the faces 
over the houses, and then compared the different emotional expressions, both when upright 
and inverted. A main effect of emotion (fear and happy dominating over neutral) was present 
when the faces were presented upright, but eliminated when the stimuli were presented 
upside-down. This suggests that it is not the low-level characteristics of the stimuli driving 
this effect. As large stimuli were used it is improbable that exclusive rivalry was obtained, 
although this is less of an issue as a non-face, neutral object (a house) was presented to the 
other eye.      
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  As both stimuli alternate in awareness in a classic rivalry trial, is it impossible to tell if 
these emotion effects are due to unconscious processing of the stimuli, or contamination 
from subsequent evaluation of the stimuli during dominance periods. One way to control for 
this is to use the initial percept paradigm, where only the initial percept is recorded for many 
short trials. Gray, Adams, and Garner (2009) recorded initial dominance of emotional faces 
that were equalised for some low-level visual characteristics (matched for mean luminance 
and root mean square (RMS) contrast), with an additional inverted face condition to 
ascertain if results were due to visual properties, rather than emotional content. Faces (fear, 
happy, angry and neutral) were oriented 30 from 0 in the upright condition, and 30 
from 180 in the inverted condition. Tilting the faces induced clear rivalry (eliminating 
fusion) by disrupting the featural alignment across the two faces. Observers responded as 
soon as one of the faces became dominant. To eliminate potential response biases, 
participants indicated the orientation of this initial dominant face (left vs. right tilt) via a key 
press.  
Gray et al. (2009) found that happy and fearful expressions were initially dominant 
more frequently than angry and neutral expressions. It is unclear whether the comparative 
dominance proportion between the expressions was driven by low-level characteristics of 
the stimuli, or emotion processing, as the main effect of emotional expression was reduced 
when the faces were inverted, but the reduction was not statistically significant. This may 
suggest that emotion continued to modulate selection, even when the faces were presented 
upside-down. This may reflect residual effects of emotion processing (even fully inverted 
faces do retain some emotional energy; Prkachin, 2003) particularly as the images were 
rotated 150 (as opposed to a full 180 inversion).  
When random, highly salient, dynamic noise is presented to one eye, and another 
stimulus (e.g. a face) is presented to the other eye, the time it takes for the stimulus to 
overcome suppression is indicative of its salience (Jiang, Costello & He, 2007; Tsuchiya & 
Koch, 2004). Similarly to initial dominance paradigms, CFS also has the advantage of being 
uncontaminated by prior evaluation of the conscious stimulus that might influence overall 
dominance in the classic rivalry paradigm. 
  In a recent study, CFS was used to investigate emotional face processing outside of 
awareness by analysing the latencies for different expressions to overcome CFS suppression. 
Yang, Zald and Blake (2007) presented fearful, happy or neutral faces to one eye, and 
random dynamic noise to the other. To control for low-level stimulus characteristics,      
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inverted faces were also presented. In the first experiment, participants were instructed to 
respond when they had detected a face, and on 30% of trials (‘catch trials’) no face was 
presented. The second experiment used an alternative forced-choice procedure, where 
participants were required to respond to the location of the face (out of 4 possible locations). 
In both experiments, there was an effect of emotion, whereby fearful expressions overcame 
suppression faster than happy or neutral expressions. However, the same pattern of results 
occurred in both the upright and inverted tasks. In addition to the emotion effect, RTs to 
upright faces were significantly quicker than RTs to inverted faces. This suggests an overall 
cost of inversion, and suggests that low-level stimulus properties of the fearful face (rather 
the extraction of emotional meaning) could have caused it to emerge from suppression faster 
than neutral and happy expressions. 
  Additionally, CFS has proved useful in measuring afterimages without awareness (e.g. 
Adams, Gray, Garner & Graf, 2010). Adams et al., found that adaptation to emotional faces 
(i.e. a perceptual shift away from a previously presented emotion) does still occur when the 
adapting faces are presented unconsciously under CFS suppression. Participants classified 
the emotion of a test face, after being presented with an adapting face that was either 
suppressed using CFS, or clearly visible. Adaptation under suppression was found for all 
three emotions tested: fear, happy, and angry. Furthermore, an objective awareness check 
indicated that when the face was not reported as seen, participants were at chance at 
classifying emotion; indicating that the results were not due to objective awareness of the 
emotion. This provides further evidence that the emotional expression of a face can be 
processed unconsciously, to the extent that it can bias subsequent perception of emotion. 
Indeed, recent evidence has suggested that this is not the case for identity adaptation 
(Moradi, Koch, & Shimojo, 2005), or race and gender adaptation (Amihai, Deouell & 
Bentin, 2010). 
  
1.4.4. Summary. Various experimental paradigms have been used to study the extent to 
which emotional information can be processed without awareness, including backward 
masking, evidence from patients, and binocular rivalry. One important issue that affects 
most of these methods is the criterion of awareness (subjective vs. objective; Pessoa et al., 
2004). Backward masking has been used considerably more than other paradigms in this 
area of research. However, due to issues with awareness that blight backward masking 
research (Pessoa et al., 2004), converging evidence from different techniques is required to 
validate these results.       
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  Binocular rivalry has only recently been applied to the area of emotion processing. 
Neurological activation in response to stimuli that are presented unconsciously using 
binocular rivalry/CFS has suggested that fear expression processing can occur outside of 
awareness (Pasely et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004; Jiang & He, 2006).  Neurological 
research from both backward masking and rivalry paradigms can be criticised on their lack 
of control for the low-level characteristics of the stimuli.  
The experiments that have used binocular rivalry as a behavioural tool to investigate 
the relative predominance of emotional over neutral faces have shown that emotional faces 
(both threatening and positive) are prioritised; however, they suffer from major experimental 
flaws (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman et al., 2008). Using the initial dominance 
paradigm with well-controlled stimuli, it has been found that happy and fear faces dominate 
over angry and neutral faces, although the extent to which this effect is due to high- or low-
level characteristics is unclear (Gray et al., 2009). Presenting a face in CFS and measuring 
the time it takes to overcome suppression ensures that results are due exclusively to the 
unconscious processing of that stimulus. However, only one study has used this method to 
date (Yang et al., 2007), and their results are inconclusive regarding the origin of the effect 
(the extraction of emotional meaning vs. low-level characteristics). 
 
1.5. Individual differences 
  Although not key to this thesis, individual differences in anxiety may significantly 
impact on emotion processing (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Symptoms of anxiety typically 
include extensive rumination and worry, intrusive negative thoughts, apprehension towards 
certain situations and a general enhanced perception of threat when evaluating stimuli 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Individual differences in anxiety can be seen as the 
predisposition to respond anxiously to a situation (or trait anxiety; Spielberger, Grosuch, 
Luchene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). Anxiety disorders are at the extreme end of the individual 
difference scale, and develop when the intensity and duration of anxious feelings are 
disproportionate to the risk associated with the current situation or stimulus (Bishop, 2007). 
  Information processing biases towards threat in anxious individuals are central to 
cognitive theories of anxiety (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1997; Beck & Clark, 1997). These processing biases have been found to primarily 
affect the interpretation of ambiguous information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Richards, 
et al., 2002), and the deployment of attention (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Eysenck, 1992). 
Biases in early stages of stimulus processing are also fundamental to evolutionary      
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considerations of anxiety (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). More recent neurocognitive models of 
anxiety propose that the interpretative and attentional biases result from dysfunctional 
subcortical-prefrontal circuitry (Bishop, 2007; Bishop, Duncan, Brett & Lawrence, 2004). 
Both hyper-responsivity of the amygdaloid complex, and reduced recruitment of prefrontal-
cortical control leads to the maladaptive threat-related processing biases found in anxiety 
(Bishop, 2007; Bishop, Duncan, Brett & Lawrence, 2004). 
  Indeed, anxiety has been found to modulate attention on the emotional dot-probe task 
(Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998, Mogg & Bradley, 1999b; Bradley, Mogg, White, 
Groom & de Bono; 1999; Bradley, Mogg & Millar, 2000; Fox, 2002), the disengagement 
component of attention in the exogenous cueing task (Fox et al., 2001; Fox, Russo & 
Dutton, 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005), performance in visual search tasks (Byrne & Eysenck, 
1995; Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa & Amir, 1999; Juth, Lundqvist, Karlsson & Ohman, 2005), 
and modulate neurological activation in the amygdala outside the focus of attention (Bishop, 
Duncan & Lawrence, 2004; although when under high perceptual load, this modulation 
disappears, Bishop, Jenkins & Lawrence, 2007). In unconscious viewing, anxiety has been 
found to modulate amygdala activation in response to backward masked fearful faces (Etkin 
et al., 2004), behavioural responses to masked visual-probes (Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Fox, 
2002), and in binocular rivalry paradigms, anxiety has been found to modulate the selection 
of the initially dominant facial expression (Gray et al., 2009). Individual differences in 
anxiety are therefore an important variable to consider when investigating emotional face 
processing.  
 
1.6. Summary and conclusions 
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that emotional information may be 
preferentially processed over neutral information. There is evidence to suggest that the 
neural architecture can support such prioritisation via a fast, coarse subcortical processing 
pathway (LeDoux, 2000). It has been shown that attention is preferentially allocated to 
emotional stimuli (e.g. Armony & Dolan, 2002; Pourtois et al., 2004, Koster et al., 2004), 
largely independently of attentional resources (e.g. Vuilleumier et al., 2001), largely 
capacity free (Hortsmann, 2007), can be processed independently of conscious awareness 
(e.g. Williams et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2006; Jiang & He, 2006), and may facilitate 
perception (Phelps et al., 2006). Individual differences in anxiety may also contribute to the 
size of the emotion-related effects (e.g. Bradley et al., 1998; Byrne & Eysenck, 1995).       
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Fitting with neurological theories of prioritisation of emotion (Vuilleumier et al., 
2003), there is some suggestion that these effects may be due to the LSF content of the faces 
(Holmes et al., 2005; Vuilleumier et al., 2003). Additionally, the eye region of a fearful face 
may be particularly important in its prioritisation, and unconscious processing (Whalen et 
al., 2004; Feng et al., 2009).   
Very little of the research investigating attentional prioritisation of emotional faces 
has adequately controlled for low-level visual differences between the stimuli. As discussed 
previously, it is impossible to indicate that results are exclusively due to the extraction of 
emotional meaning, if low-level characteristics are not adequately controlled for. By 
applying rigorous control to these high-level stimuli, it can be found whether results are 
indeed caused by emotion processing. This is important, as if the apparent emotion effects 
do not depend on emotional recognition, this would suggest that our physical facial 
expressions have evolved to be salient to low-level visual processes. This means that any 
stimulus that excites these early visual processes will be prioritised, irrespective of 
emotional meaning. This can be contrasted with the notion that we have evolved to 
preferentially process stimuli with emotional meaning, as has been previously suggested 
(Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Recent studies investigating visual search with both photographic 
and schematic stimuli have suggested that emotion effects (i.e. prioritisation of threat) are 
due to low-level visual characteristics (Calvo & Marrero, 2009; Coelho et al., 2010). It is yet 
to be seen if the same can be said of emotional research using other experimental paradigms. 
Notwithstanding their substantial contribution to theories of emotion processing, 
some limitations (described in detail above) have been associated with the visual-probe, 
exogenous cueing, visual search, and backward masking paradigms. The present work 
attempts to overcome these limitations and investigate unconscious processing of emotional 
faces using a modified binocular rivalry paradigm. The binocular rivalry technique has only 
been applied to emotion processing research relatively recently, and investigations using it 
have been significantly flawed (e.g. Alpers & Pauli, 2007; Bannerman et al., 2008; Yang et 
al., 2007).  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion categorisation of normal and manipulated faces 
 
2.1. Introduction 
  To accurately dissociate between low-level (bottom-up) and high-level (top-
down) effects of a stimulus, it is critical to control one (i.e. keep it constant) whilst 
varying (i.e. manipulating) the other. Low-level stimulus attributes, such as luminance, 
contrast and spatial frequency are processed at an early stage in the visual system. High-
level stimulus attributes on the other hand, such as meaning, require evaluation of the 
stimulus. In some circumstances it is impossible to vary high-level attributes whilst 
holding low-level attributes constant: for example, sometimes simply by varying the 
high-level content of a stimulus, changes also occur in the low-level characteristics. 
This problem occurs within emotional face processing research, as different emotional 
faces have different low-level characteristics. How is it possible, then, to control for 
low-level characteristics, and still be able to tell with confidence that effects are caused 
by the extraction of emotional content from the face? A control set of stimuli is needed. 
These stimuli need to match the original images on one of the attributes (either high-
level, or low-level), whilst disrupting the other. If the same effects are found in both the 
original, and control stimuli, they are likely to be caused by the attribute that is held 
constant across the two sets of stimuli. For example, as different emotional faces vary 
on both their high-level and low-level properties, control stimuli can be employed 
which have the same low-level characteristics as the original faces, but are manipulated 
so their high-level attributes are disrupted. If similar effects are found in both the 
original and control stimuli, they are likely to be due to low-level visual characteristics, 
as they are held constant across the two sets of stimuli. On the other hand, if a different 
pattern of effects is found between the original and control stimuli, the effects found in      
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the original stimuli are likely to be due to their high-level attributes. In face identity 
processing research, inverted faces have been used as a control, as they contain the same 
low-level characteristics as an upright face, but identity recognition is severely impaired 
(i.e. they still vary on their high-level content; Valentine, 1991).  
Investigations into emotional face processing have often overlooked the issue of 
controlling for low-level visual characteristics (e.g. colour, luminance, contrast, spatial 
frequency) between emotional faces. In a well-cited, early study, using visual search to 
investigate the prioritisation of emotional information, Hansen and Hansen (1988) 
reported finding a ‘pop-out’ effect for angry faces. However, this effect was later found 
to be due to a black mark on the angry face that made it very easy to detect (Purcell, 
Stewart & Skov, 1996). Some studies have tried to limit differences in low-level visual 
properties by using schematic face stimuli (Fox et al., 2000; Ohman et al., 2001; 
Horstman, 2007). However, despite partially controlling for low-level characteristics of 
the stimuli, schematic faces have reduced ecological validity compared with 
photographic faces (Horstmann & Bauland, 2006).  
Emotional face processing research has also borrowed the control used in face 
identity research, by using inverted emotional faces as a control (e.g. Yang et al., 2007; 
Gray et al., 2009; Bannerman et al., 2008, Phelps et al., 2006). However, there has been 
inconsistency in whether high-level or low-level properties are implicated by the results: 
some studies have found that effects with upright faces disappear when the faces are 
inverted (suggesting that the effects found with the upright faces are caused by 
extraction of emotional meaning from the faces and not low-level factors; e.g. 
Bannerman et al., 2008; Phelps et al., 2006), whereas other studies have found the same 
effects in both upright and inverted emotional faces, suggesting the results are caused by 
low-level characteristics (e.g. Yang et al., 2007; Gray et al., 2009). In the latter case, it 
is possible that no difference is found because inversion may not be an adequate control 
for emotional expression (i.e. some emotion processing may still occur after spatial 
inversion). Indeed, it is unclear of the extent to which face inversion disrupts emotion 
processing, and therefore adequately controls for emotion. 
 
2.1.1. The effect of inversion 
  The Face Inversion Effect (FIE) is defined as a larger decrease in performance 
for faces than for other objects when presented upside-down (Yin, 1969). There is 
consensus that the FIE for identity is caused by disruption of configural processing,      
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which is defined as the processing of relations between features (e.g. Maurer, Le Grand 
& Mondloch, 2002). Maurer et al. describe three types of configural processing: “1) 
sensitivity to first-order relations – seeing a stimulus is a face because its features are 
arranged with two eyes above a nose, which is above a mouth; (2) holistic processing – 
glueing together the features into a gestalt; and (3) sensitivity to second-order relations 
– perceiving the distances among features.” (Maurer et al., 2002; p. 255). It has been 
suggested that inversion of a face interferes with all three types of configural processing 
for identity recognition (see Maurer et al., for a review). Researchers have employed 
different tasks to assess the contribution of the three types of configural processing on 
the FIE. However, definition of each type of configural processing has been 
problematic, and they have been operationalised in different ways (Tanaka & Sengco, 
1998). Therefore, the present chapter will simply describe tasks and results, which type 
of processing that is considered disrupted by inversion is not important for the purposes 
of this thesis. 
  Using ERPs, it has been found that the N170, which is an electrophysiological 
response that is elicited by faces more than other objects (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez 
& McCarthy, 1996; Eimer, 1998), is delayed in inverted faces (e.g. Bentin et al., 1996). 
  With the composite face task, different faces are combined, so that the bottom 
half of one identity is paired and the top half of a different identity (Young, Hellawell, 
& Hay, 1987). When faces are presented in these composites, RTs to name the identity 
of either half are considerably longer than RTs to the same face halves when the 
mismatched components are not aligned (Young et al., 1987). This difference is 
eliminated when the faces are inverted (Young et al., 1987). 
  The effect of inversion on identity processing has also been investigated in a 
behavioural paradigm where the spatial distances between features are manipulated (e.g. 
by shifting the eyes sideways or up/down by a few pixels). Using stimuli that had been 
manipulated in this way, Freire, Lee and Symons (2000) found that participants were 
reasonably good at discriminating identical faces from those differing in configuration 
(with 81% accuracy on a 2AFC task). However, when the same faces were inverted, 
accuracy plummeted to near chance levels (55%; Freire et al., 2000).  
  The FIE research above has specifically investigated the effects of face inversion 
on identity recognition and consistently revealed diminished recognition of inverted 
compared to upright faces. The impact of face inversion on emotion recognition has 
been investigated far less. Early theories of face processing suggested that emotion and      
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identity are processed separately, where emotion recognition can be considered as the 
effect of variant features on invariant identity recognition (Bruce & Young, 1986). More 
recent neuroimaging evidence has also supported the notion that emotion and identity 
are processed separately (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Andrews & Ewbank, 2004; Jiang & 
He, 2006). There are three bilateral regions in the extrastriate cortex that appear to be 
particularly important in face processing: the fusiform gyrus (FFA), the inferior 
occipital gyri (IOG), and the superior temporal sulcus (STS; Kanwisher et al., 1997). 
There is evidence to suggest that identity processing relies heavily on the FFA 
(Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Sergent et al., 1992), whereas emotion processing relies 
more on the STS (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Jiang & He, 2006) and limbic structures, 
such as the amygdala (LeDoux, 1996). 
The dissociation between emotion and identity processing has been supported by 
recent behavioural research, as adaptation to emotional expression can occur even 
whilst processed unconsciously (Adams, Gray et al., 2010), whereas adaptation to 
identity requires conscious processing (Moradi et al., 2005). Distinct processing of 
facial identity and emotion has also been investigated in patients with brain damage. 
Prosopagnosia is a selective inability to recognise people from their faces (Bodamer, 
1947), and in the acquired form, is a consequence of lesions to occipito-temporal brain 
regions. Patients who show severe impairments on identity recognition, can still 
recognise emotional expressions (Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1988). However, it has 
been suggested that the methods used by Tranel et al., to measure emotion processing 
may have over-estimated the ability of the prosopagnosic patient to recognise facial 
expression (Calder & Young, 2005).  
Calder and Young (2005) argue that fully separable visual pathways for emotion 
and identity processing are not entirely supported by empirical data. However, they do 
suggest that significant differences exist between the neural pathways for emotion and 
identity (Calder & Young, 2005). Therefore disruption of identity processing by 
inversion does not necessarily mean that inversion will also disrupt emotion processing. 
Is emotional face perception disrupted by inversion? There is indication from the 
face composite task that expression recognition is disrupted by inversion (Calder et al., 
2000). When different emotional faces are combined, it takes longer to name the 
expression of either half when aligned than when they are not aligned (Calder et al., 
2000). This effect disappears when the stimuli are inverted (Calder et al., 2000), 
mirroring the effect found with identity recognition (Young et al., 1987).       
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  Limited research has compared recognition of upright with inverted emotional 
faces (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). Prkachin (2003) studied the effect of inversion 
on emotion recognition by measuring sensitivity to six emotional expressions when they 
were upright, and again when they were inverted. Each face was presented for 100ms, 
after which participants were given a 6 AFC to select the emotional expression 
presented. Disruption of emotion processing was measured using signal detection theory 
(SDT), which provides a measure of sensitivity that is independent of potential response 
biases (MacMillan & Creelman, 1991). Results showed that inversion did significantly 
reduce sensitivity to all expressions. However, inversion affected sensitivity of the 
emotions differently: the recognition of happy, sad and surprised expressions was 
disrupted significantly less than angry, disgusted and fearful. And for all of the 
emotional faces, recognition remained well above chance. When viewed for 15 seconds, 
McKelvie (1995) found increased errors with inverted compared to upright faces when 
classifying their emotion (for all emotions aside from happy). Although, again, 
recognition of emotion in inverted faces remained well above chance.  
Recall that some studies found that emotion effects were eliminated with 
inversion, whereas others did not. The evidence that inversion may not fully disrupt 
emotional face recognition goes some way to explaining the inconsistent effects of 
inversion in emotion processing research. It also suggests that inversion is not a good 
control for emotional faces, as although it satisfies one of the criteria (low-level 
differences remain constant), it does not satisfy the other (that they do not vary on the 
observer’s ability to extract the emotional meaning). Therefore, a different control 
stimulus must be sought. Luminance polarity negation produces an image similar to a 
photographic negative (see Figure 2.1.c). With luminance polarity negation, each pixel’s 
deviation in luminance from mean luminance is multiplied by -1. Critically, luminance 
negation retains the low-level characteristics of a stimulus (Kemp, McManus & Pigott, 
1990). In identity processing research, there has been some preliminary evidence to 
suggest that the effects of luminance negation and inversion are additive (i.e. when 
combined, they reduce recognition further than either manipulation alone; Kemp, 
McManus & Pigott, 1990). Therefore, the effect of luminance negation will be explored 
on emotional face processing.  
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2.1.2. The effect of luminance polarity negation 
  Luminance negation disrupts face processing for identity (Kemp, McManus & 
Pigott, 1990; Nederhouser, Yue, Mangini, & Blederman, 2007; White, 2001; Galper, 
1970). Theories pertaining to why negated faces are hard to recognise include the 
disruption of shape-from-shading information (Liu & Chadhuri, 1998; Kemp, Pike, 
White & Musselman, 1996), and the production of unusual pigmentation (Bruce & 
Langton, 1994; Russell, Sinha, Biederman & Nederhouser, 2006). However, these 
theories cannot account for all empirical data (e.g. Bruce et al., 1991; Kemp et al., 
1996). Recent research has suggested that the difficulty in recognising luminance 
negated faces is caused by the destruction of consistent luminance polarity relationships 
found in the eye region of a normal face (Gilad et al., 2009). Gilad et al. (2009) found 
face identification was similar to normal faces when they used a stimulus in which the 
whole face was presented in negative luminance polarity apart from the eye-region, 
which was presented in positive luminance polarity. As eye-based information is 
particularly important for emotion recognition (e.g. Vuilleumier, 2005), negation may 
significantly disrupt emotion recognition by making it difficult to extract information 
from the eye region.  
  When composite identity faces were presented with negative luminance polarity, 
responses to aligned faces were longer than misaligned faces (Hole, George & 
Dunsmore, 1999), replicating the effect found with positive faces (Young et al., 1987). 
More recently, Calder and Jansen (2005) conducted a composite emotional face task. 
They found that the composite effect (longer RTs to aligned compared to misaligned 
faces) was disrupted with inversion (consistent with Calder et al., 2000), but not with 
luminance negated faces (consistent with identity processing, Hole et al., 1999). 
However, Calder and Jansen (2005) found that responses were generally slowed to 
negative luminance polarity emotional faces compared to the other face conditions, 
suggesting that negating a face does make it more difficult to process emotional 
information.   
  Kemp et al. (1990) presented 3 faces alongside each other, and asked participants 
to indicate which of the 2 faces matched the third. The identity of one face was 
manipulated by shifting the eyes vertically or horizontally. They found that accuracy 
was reduced for both inverted and negated faces compared to normal faces. There was 
no difference in accuracy between inverted and negative faces.      
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Very limited research has investigated the effect of luminance polarity negation 
on emotional face recognition. In fact, I have located only one study, and it does not 
support the idea that luminance negation disrupts emotion recognition (White, 2001). In 
this study, two faces, differing on identity or emotional expression, were presented 
alongside each other for two seconds and participants were required to indicate whether 
the faces were the same or different (White, 2001). Participants were either allocated to 
an ‘identity condition’, where they responded to the identity of the model (and ignored 
the expression of the face), or an ‘emotion condition’, where they responded to the 
emotion (and ignored the identity). When making same/different judgements, RTs were 
longer when judging the identity of negative faces compared to positive faces, but not 
when judging the emotion of negative faces compared to positive faces (White, 2001). 
However, using the same task difficulty across identity and emotion recognition is 
likely to result in ceiling effects for emotion recognition, or floor effects for identity 
recognition due to the differences in difficulty across these tasks. In White’s study, a 
same/different task on emotional expressions presented for two seconds may have made 
the task too easy, and responses could have been resolved using cognitive/matching 
strategies.  
 
2.1.3. The combination of spatial inversion and luminance polarity negation 
  The relationship between orientation and luminance polarity on identity 
recognition has been explored, with evidence suggesting that the combination of the two 
manipulations makes faces significantly harder to identify than either manipulation on 
its own (Kemp et al., 1990; McMullen, Shore & Henderson, 2000; Bruce & Langton, 
1993). In their composite face task, Kemp et al. (1990) presented faces that were both 
inverted and negated. It was found that when the two manipulations were combined, 
accuracy was reduced even further than each manipulation alone. However, even in this 
combined condition, accuracy remained well above chance. 
  McMullen et al. (2000), trained participants to recognise the identities of eight 
individuals. After training, participants were given 10 seconds to identify a test face. 
The test face was manipulated in terms of its orientation (upright or inverted), and its 
luminance polarity (positive or negative). There was a cost of inversion and a cost of 
negation in recognition accuracy. When the two manipulations were combined, 
recognition accuracy was reduced even further. The effects were additive; there was no 
statistically significant interaction between orientation and luminance polarity,      
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suggesting that inversion and negation disrupt separate processes in identity recognition 
(Kemp et al., 1990; McMullen et al., 2000). 
 
2.1.4. The current experiment 
Given the combined effects of inversion and negation on identity recognition 
(Kemp et al., 1990; McMullen et al., 2000), it is possible that these two manipulations 
might also independently disrupt emotion processing.  
  The primary aim of this experiment was to find a good control for low-level 
characteristics of emotional face stimuli. Therefore, the effects of face orientation and 
luminance polarity on the categorisation of facial expression were examined. The two 
manipulations (orientation and polarity) have been examined separately (e.g. Prkachin, 
2003; White, 2001), but not together with respect to their effect on recognition of 
emotional expression. Evidence to date suggests that inversion does impair emotion 
recognition, but the effect may be limited (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). The effect 
of negation has been explored on the recognition of identity (Gilad et al., 2009), but 
only to a limited degree on recognition of emotion (White, 2001).   
  In the present study, angry, happy and fearful facial expressions were manipulated 
using spatial inversion and luminance polarity negation. These expressions were chosen 
from the set of seven basic emotions (including happy, fear, angry, surprise, disgust and 
sad; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Fearful and angry expressions are both considered 
negative because they signal danger; fearful faces signal ambiguous danger (viewing a 
fearful face suggests that a threat is located elsewhere in the environment), whereas 
angry faces signal direct danger (Whalen et al., 1998). To tell if any threat-related 
effects dissociate these two types of threat (i.e. ambiguous versus direct), both fearful 
and angry expressions will be used throughout this thesis. Additionally, to find out 
whether effects are threat-specific, or whether they can be caused by any arousing 
stimulus, the positive expression of happy will be tested throughout this thesis. 
Neutral expressions were not included in the current experiment. The emotional 
intensity of the faces was manipulated, to increase the sensitivity of the task. Two 
different emotion ‘strengths’ were made by morphing each emotional face with a 
neutral face to make expressions that varied in emotional intensity. If the neutral 
expression was also included, the increased number of neutral face presentations may 
have confounded responses. It was predicted that the emotional faces that were not      
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morphed with neutral (high emotional intensity) would be easier to categorise than the 
emotional faces that were morphed with neutral (low emotional intensity). 
When presented upright and with positive polarity, fear, angry and happy 
expressions tend to be recognised to the same extent (Prkachin, 2003). However, it has 
been found that when inverted, happy expressions tend to suffer less disruption than fear 
and angry expressions (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). Given the limited research 
investigating the recognition of negative luminance polarity emotional faces, it is 
unclear whether some expressions are more disrupted than others by negation.  
  As individual differences in anxiety can contribute to emotion processing (e.g. 
Bishop, 2007), general and social anxiety were measured using standardised 
questionnaires.  
 
Key Hypotheses 
1)  Inversion will disrupt emotion processing 
2)  Luminance polarity negation will disrupt emotion processing 
3)  Combining inversion and luminance polarity negation will be additive (i.e. 
there will not be a statistically significant interaction between orientation and 
polarity) 
4)  High emotional intensity faces will be recognised better than those with low 
emotional intensity 
5)  Happy expressions may be less impaired by inversion than fear and angry 
expressions. 
 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
  Twenty-one postgraduate and undergraduate students at the University of 
Southampton participated in the study (undergraduates participated in exchange for 
course credit). The mean age was 25.43 years (SD=8.59), 8 were male. All observers 
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.  
 
2.2.2. Ethics 
  The experiment was approved by the University of Southampton, School of 
Psychology’s ethics committee. Informed consent was obtained from each participant at 
the start of the experiment, and they were also made aware that all information would be      
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treated confidentially, and all questionnaire measures would be retained securely. On 
completion of the experiment, participants were given a debriefing form that outlined 
the purpose of the experiment, and gave contact details of the experimenter. This 
procedure was followed for all studies in this thesis.  
 
Questionnaires 
  Participants completed the state and trait versions of the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983), the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; 
Watson & Friend, 1969), and the Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson 
& Friend, 1969). Participants also completed a short form of the Social Desirability 
Scale (SDS; Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972), this was used to measure the extent to which 
participants gave socially desirable responses (and therefore possibly invalidating the 
questionnaire measures).
6  
 
2.2.3. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  Four male models were selected from the NimStim face set (models 20M, 21M, 
33M, 36M; Tottenham, Borscheid, Ellertsen, Marcus & Nelson, 2002), each displaying 
fear, happy, and angry expressions. The models were chosen due to their high emotional 
validity, assessed using standardised ratings
7. Participants classified each face as one of 
three emotions (fear, happy or angry) in a 3 alternative forced choice (AFC). The 
morphs were produced by creating an intermediate shape between the two faces using 
interpolation based on triangulation (by defining corresponding feature points; the same 
technique has previously been used to create emotional face morphs; Adams, Gray et 
al., 2010). After the specified morph was interpolated, the pixel luminance values were 
cross-dissolved, giving each pixel the required weighted average luminance between the 
two images. The low morph intensity faces were 50% neutral: 50% emotion. The high 
                                       
6 Although anxiety measures were taken, the impact of anxiety on emotional face processing is not 
directly addressed in this thesis, and therefore will not be described in great detail. The STAI measures 
anxiety with 20 questions presented on a 4-point Likert scale. The state measure (STAI-S) asks 
participants to rate how they feel ‘at this moment’, whereas the trait version of the scale (STAI-T), asks 
them to rate how they ‘generally feel’. STAI scores can range from 20-80. The FNE presents 30 true or 
false questions related to a participant’s expectation, apprehension, and avoidance of being negatively 
evaluated. FNE scores can range from 0-30. The SADS presents 28 true or false questions related to the 
extent to which a participant feels anxious in, and avoids, social situations. SADS scores range from 0-28. 
The SDS consists of 10 statements; participants are required to decide whether each statement is true or 
false for them. The statements focus on socially desirable, or undesirable behaviour. 
 
7 These are supplied with the NimStim face set, see http://www.macbrain.org/resources for details.       
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morph intensity faces were 100% emotion (i.e. the original expression, and therefore not 
morphed).   
  Stimuli were prepared and presented using Matlab (The MathWorks, USA), with 
PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The faces were scaled, cropped and 
displayed within a black elliptical mask, removing any external features (see Figure 
2.1). They were also matched for mean luminance and root mean square (RMS) 
contrast
8, and presented at 3.5 x 2.5 of visual angle (viewing distance = 65cm). There 
were four manipulation conditions (see Figure 2.1): a) On upright positive trials, faces 
were presented upright and with normal luminance polarity; b) On inverted positive 
trials, faces were rotated by 180, and retained normal luminance polarity; c) On upright 
negative trials, faces were presented upright but with reversed luminance polarity; d) On 
inverted negative trials, stimuli were rotated by 180˚ and had reversed luminance 
polarity.  
 
Figure 2.1. Example stimuli from the four stimulus conditions: a) Upright Positive, b) 
Inverted Positive, c) Upright Negative, d) Inverted Negative.  
 
2.2.4. Procedure 
On each trial a fixation cross was presented for 500ms, followed by a face (see 
Figure 2.2). To ensure that participants were not using cognitive strategies to infer the 
emotion of the face, such as trying to determine the curvature of the mouth, the face was 
presented briefly (100ms), and followed immediately by a noise mask (consisting of 
different sized ellipses with various luminance values). The mask remained visible until 
observers responded by selecting one of the three emotion labels displayed at the 
bottom of the screen. Participants used arrow keys to toggle through the possible 
options and selected their response using the space bar. There were 384 trials, (2 
                                       
8 RMS contrast is the standard deviation of the luminance values, and does not depend on the spatial 
frequency content or spatial frequency distribution of the image (Peli, 1990; Bex & Makous, 2002).       
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orientations x 2 polarities x 3 emotions x 2 emotion strengths x 4 models x 4 
repetitions) in a single session lasting approximately 20 minutes. At the end of the 
testing session, participants completed the anxiety questionnaires.  
 
   
Figure 2.2. Schematic representation of a single trial from Experiment 1. 
 
2.2.5. Design 
  Sensitivity (A) scores were the dependent variable, and were entered into a 3 x 2 
x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with emotional face (angry, happy, fear), 
orientation (upright, inverted), luminance polarity (positive, negative), and morph 
strength (low, high) as within subject independent variables (IVs).  
 
2.2.6. Data Analysis 
  Signal detection theory (SDT) was used to analyse the data. For each emotion, e.g. 
fear, a hit was defined as correctly identifying the emotion when it was presented (e.g.  
selecting the fear response when a fearful face was presented). A false alarm was 
defined as incorrectly identifying another emotion (e.g. happy or angry) as the target      
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emotion (fear). The hits (H) and false alarms (FA) were converted into proportions, and 
then into A a non-parametric measure of sensitivity, which is given as 
                                                                (2.1)
 
 
If the proportion of hits was lower than the proportion of false alarms, a different 
formula was used (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), where 
 
                                                               (2.2)
 
 
  A was used to index sensitivity because, as a non-parametric measure, it does not 
assume a normal distribution of scores. As the false alarm rates were calculated across 
two distributions, it is unlikely that this assumption would have been met. A scores 
vary from 0-1, where 1 is maximum sensitivity, and chance is 0.5 (Snodgrass & 
Corwin, 1988). There was no indication that parametric assumptions were not met for 
the A scores (K-S tests, p>.1). 
When using a SDT framework, and considering sensitivity, it can also be useful 
to examine bias (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Bias gives an indication of whether 
participants are systematically more liberal or conservative in their emotion judgements 
in particular conditions. Non-parametric bias data (B; Grier, 1971) are not relevant to 
the present research questions; namely to examine whether orientation and luminance 
polarity manipulations impair the recognition of emotional expressions. However, the 
bias data do show that participants used different criteria across conditions, and are 
therefore included in Appendix A. 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to discover if there were any 
differences between sensitivity for different emotions and conditions. Significant main 
effects were investigated using pairwise comparisons (using Bonferroni correction
9), 
and significant interactions were analysed with post-hoc ANOVAs and (Bonferroni-
corrected) paired t-tests.  
                                       
9 Where applicable, Bonferroni correction was applied by multiplying the given p-value by the number 
of comparisons made. Therefore the alpha-level for all comparisons is 0.05.      
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2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Sample Characteristics 
On each of the questionnaire measures there was a normal range of scores (see 
Appendix B), and correlations with performance measures were non-significant (see 
Appendix C).  
 
2.3.2. Recognition of Emotional Expression 
  Group data are shown in Figure 2.3. Both spatial inversion and luminance polarity 
reversal significantly impaired emotion recognition. As expected, discrimination was 
better for the upright than the inverted faces (upright: M=.74, SD=.06, inverted: M=.64, 
SD=.05; F(1,20) = 48.37, p<.001) and also better for positive than negative faces 
(positive: M=.84, SD=.07, negative: M=.55, SD=.05; F(1,20) = 257.99, p<.001). This 
shows that inverting, or negating the luminance of an emotional face disrupts emotion 
recognition. However, these two manipulations differed in their ability to disrupt 
emotion recognition; negation had a larger effect on discrimination than inversion 
(effect sizes:  p
2 =.93 and p
2 =.73 for negation and inversion, respectively).  
Also, as predicted, there was a main effect of morph strength, sensitivity was 
higher in the high (M=.73, SD=.05) compared to the low (M=.66, SD=.05) emotional 
morph intensity, F(1,20) = 51.05, p<.001.  
  Additive disruptive effects of inversion and luminance negation on identity 
processing suggest that inversion and luminance negation affect independent 
mechanisms (Kemp et al., 1990). Therefore, it was predicted that there would be no 
statistical interaction between orientation and polarity on this emotion categorisation 
task. However, there was a significant orientation x polarity interaction, F(2,40) = 6.92, 
p<.05. There was a significant effect of polarity at both levels of orientation, where 
sensitivity was higher to the positive than negative faces when upright (positive: M=.91, 
SD=.04; negative: M=.58, SD=.09; t(20) = 18.66, p<.001), and inverted (M=.76, 
SD=.10; negative, M=.52, SD=.06; t(20) = 8.58, p<.001). However, although there was 
a significant effect of orientation on sensitivity in the positive faces (discrimination for 
upright > inverted: t(20) = 11.06, p<.001), the orientation effect on sensitivity was not 
significant in the negative faces (t(20) = 1.93, p>.05). Therefore, the orientation x 
polarity interaction is due to the lack of an orientation effect on sensitivity in the 
negative polarity faces. Given that the mean sensitivity to the negative faces is not far      
  45   
above chance (M=.55, SD = .05; chance = .50), it is possible that this orientation x 
polarity interaction is driven by a floor effect in the negative polarity data. 
  In accord with this suggestion, there was also a significant polarity x morph 
interaction, F(1,20) = 84.46, p<.001, whereby sensitivity was not affected by morph in 
the negative faces (p>.05), but was in the positive faces (sensitivity for high-intensity > 
low-intensity: t(20) = 11.46, p<.001).  
  There was a main effect of emotion, F(1,20) = 3.70, p<.05, subsumed under a 
significant emotion x morph interaction F(2,40) = 3.26, p<.05. Post hoc comparisons of 
the interaction suggest that the emotion effect was marginal as none of the pairwise 
comparisons reached significance when Bonferroni corrections were applied. However, 
sensitivity was marginally higher to fear than happy in the 50% morphs (t(20) = 2.54, 
p=.06), and marginally higher to fear than angry in the 100% morphs (t(20) = 2.50, 
p=.06). 
  Previous research has found that expressions differ in their resilience to inversion 
(Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). In the present experiment sensitivity to all 
expressions were similarly resistant to the orientation manipulation (emotion x 
orientation interaction, p>.05). Similarly, there was no emotion x polarity interaction 
(p>.05). This suggests that sensitivity to all three emotions were equally disrupted by 
the orientation and polarity manipulations (emotion x polarity x orientation, p>.05). All 
other effects were non-significant.        
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Figure 2.3. Sensitivity as a function of emotional expression and emotion strength for a) 
Upright Positive, b) Inverted Positive, c) Upright Negative, and d) Inverted Negative 
faces. Scores that are significantly different from chance are denoted with *=p<.05 and 
**=p<.01. 
 
  To examine whether performance differed from chance the different emotions (in 
the different manipulation conditions) were analysed using one-sample t-tests, and were 
tested against chance performance (0.5; see Figure 2.3.). Importantly, these results show 
that when the two manipulations are combined (i.e. faces are both inverted and 
negated), facial expression categorisation is impossible in this task.  
 
2.4. Discussion 
  Recognition of emotional faces that were manipulated in terms of their orientation 
and luminance polarity were explored using SDT. Both inversion and negation 
disrupted emotion face recognition. The significant detrimental effect of inversion is      
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consistent with previous research that has found that inversion reduces 
sensitivity/accuracy in categorising emotional expressions (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 
1995). Despite inversion significantly reducing performance, its effect was limited (as 
can be seen from Figure 2.3). Previous reports investigating the effect of inversion on 
emotion processing have also found that categorisation stays well above chance for 
inverted faces (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). The results of the current experiment 
suggest that inversion is not a good control for emotion processing, as emotional 
information can be extracted from inverted faces.  
Negation had a larger, and substantial effect on discrimination. This was 
surprising given that one previous report suggested that negation had no effect on 
emotion recognition (White, 2001). As noted above, White presented faces for a 
relatively long period of time and observers reported the identity as well as the 
emotional expression of the face. With long presentation durations, it is possible that 
judgements were based on cognitive reasoning (e.g. trying to determine the curvature of 
the mouth), rather than the perceptual attributes of the face. Therefore, White’s results 
may not reflect perceptual processes, but more likely cognitive strategies. On the other 
hand, with a short presentation duration, results from Experiment 1 of this thesis show 
that there is a larger detrimental effect of luminance polarity negation compared to 
inversion on emotion processing. 
Gilad et al. (2009) found that activation in the right FFA was reduced for fully 
negative faces, but was close to normal levels for their contrast chimeric stimuli (faces 
presented in negative luminance polarity with exception of the eyes). From this study it 
was concluded that luminance polarity relationships are critically important for face 
recognition, and destruction of these highly consistent ordinal relationships leads to 
poor recognition. Only the eye region of the face was tested in Gilad et al.’s study, but it 
was able to account for most of the variability in identity recognition performance. The 
eye region of a face is the only place in which a luminance change reflects a pigment 
change (i.e. irrespective of any change in lighting, the luminance relationship of the 
pupil, iris and eye white will not change order). The rest of the face (other than the 
small change for lip colour) can be explained in terms of shape-related shading. It is 
possible that the eye region is also critical to emotion recognition. This would explain 
the large detrimental effect of luminance negation on emotion recognition found in the 
current experiment.      
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Neither manipulation on its own was sufficient to reduce performance to chance 
in the task. When they were combined, it was predicted that they would combine 
additively, as evidence from identity processing suggests that inversion and luminance 
negation work through independent mechanisms (Kemp, et al., 1990; McMullen et al., 
2000). However, results of the present experiment indicated an interaction between the 
two manipulations. Exploration of the results suggest that this is because negative 
luminance polarity faces were very difficult to correctly recognise, and were 
approaching chance levels. This suggests that it is likely that the manipulations may be 
combined additively, but the task sensitivity was not able to discern this.  
Critically for the aims of the present study, performance was reduced to chance 
when inversion and luminance negation were combined. This suggests that combining 
these two manipulations produces an ideal control for emotional faces, as high-level 
(the extraction of emotional content) processing is disrupted, yet low-level 
characteristics are unchanged from the normal (upright positive) faces. 
  Accuracy was marginally better for some emotions that others, and this varied by 
morph strength. Sensitivity was slightly higher to fear expressions than happy when 
presented in low-emotional intensity, and angry when presented in high-emotional 
intensity. These results are counter to the predicted direction, given previous reports of 
happy expressions being recognised better than other expressions (including fear and 
angry; Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). However, the effect found in the present 
experiment was small, and there is a need to replicate it given the lack of consensus 
with previous findings. 
  Previous reports have found that emotions are differentially affected by spatial 
inversion, whereby happy face categorisation has been found to survive inversion better 
than fearful and angry faces (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 1995). In the present 
experiment all three emotions were equally affected by the orientation and polarity 
manipulations. This is important, as it suggests that combining these two manipulations 
is an ideal control for all three of the emotional expressions tested here. 
  To conclude, findings from Experiment 1 indicate that both orientation and 
polarity impair emotional face categorisation. The effect of inversion is limited, 
suggesting that it is a poor control for emotional faces. A far superior manipulation that 
retains the low-level characteristics of an emotional face, but eliminates accurate 
emotional face categorisation is a combination of both inversion, and negation. Future 
studies investigating emotional face processing should employ such stimuli as a control.      
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotion categorisation of normal and manipulated faces with different spatial 
frequency components 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Naturally occurring images contain information over many different spatial 
scales, from fine grain to coarse grain (Morrison & Schyns, 2001). Analysis of the 
spatial frequency (SF) spectrum of an image is an early step in visual processing (De 
Valois & De Valois, 1988; Morrison & Schyns, 2001). Complex luminance changes 
over different spatial scales would be difficult to analyse optimally with one filter, 
therefore it has been suggested that images are decomposed by spatial filters in the 
visual system that simplify the luminance contrasts for analysis (Marr & Hildreth, 
1980). SF bands convey different information of an image; high spatial frequencies 
(HSFs) represent abrupt spatial changes in the image, and generally correspond to 
detail, whereas low spatial frequencies (LSFs) represent global information about the 
shape of the stimulus (Livingston & Hubel, 1988)
10. Attentional prioritisation of fearful 
faces may be driven by their LSF content (Holmes et al., 2005), and there is evidence 
that the increased amygdala activation towards fearful faces is driven by their LSF 
components (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). Given this evidence, SF appears to be an 
important variable in the investigation of threat prioritisation, and will be explored more 
in this thesis (see Chapter 5). In order to ascertain whether LSF vs. HSF emotion effects 
are caused by the evaluation of emotional content, and/or low-level visual 
characteristics, it is important to have adequate control stimuli. Therefore, the effect of 
                                       
10 There has been some variation in the spatial frequency thresholds used for low, middle and high 
spatial frequencies. For the present thesis, the following thresholds are considered as indicative for each 
band: low spatial frequency =  less than 6 cycles per image; high spatial frequency = greater than 24 
cycles per image; and middle spatial frequency = 8-16 cycles per image.      
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inversion and luminance polarity reversal on emotion recognition will be investigated in 
HSF and LSF faces in the present chapter.  
A large number of studies have aimed to identify the critical SF bands that 
support face processing (Costen, Parker & Craw, 1994; 1996; Fiorentini, Maffei & 
Sandini, 1983; Gold, Bennett & Sekuler, 1999; Hayes, Morrone & Burr, 1986). Results 
from these experiments suggest that the important information for identity recognition is 
contained in the middle spatial frequency (MSF) range (e.g. Costen et al., 1994; 1996, 
Gold et al., 1999, Nasanen, 1999). There is some disagreement about which exact SF 
bands below or above which identity recognition deteriorates (e.g. Fiorentini et al., 
1983; Costen et al., 1994, 1996; Gaspar, Sekular & Bennett, 2008), however, this may 
be due to early research not controlling for contrast across the different spatial scales 
(Costen, et al., 1996).  
  HSF and LSF information may be processed somewhat separately, via 
parvocellular and magnocellular visual channels, respectively (see Section 1.1; 
Livingston & Hubel, 1988). This evidence for dissociable routes in processing HSF and 
LSF information has triggered research investigating the role of different SF 
components in face processing. There have been a number of conflicting findings 
regarding HSF and LSF processing in faces, with some suggesting that HSF information 
is particularly important for encoding identity (Fiorentini et al., 1983; Vuilleumier et al., 
2003), whereas others suggest that LSFs are more important (Goffaux et al., 2003; 
Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Goffaux et al., 2005). It has been suggested that HSFs are 
critical for extracting information about facial features, (Sergent, 1986; Shulman & 
Wilson, 1987), as HSF information contains the small variations in luminance that are 
important for processing slight differences between features. On the other hand, it has 
been suggested that LSFs are critical for extracting configural information from a face 
(Sergent, 1986). Fiorentini et al. (1983) found that LSFs were not useful for identity 
recognition when presented on their own, whereas faces containing only HSFs were 
well recognised.  
The suggestion that configural processing is supported largely by LSF 
information is controversial (Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Cheung, Richler, Palmeri & 
Gauthier, 2008; Wegner & Townsend, 2000; Boutet et al., 2003; Goffaux et al., 2005). 
Goffaux et al. (2003) compared ERPs between broad spatial frequency (BSF), HSF and 
LSF faces and chairs, and found a face specific N170 in BSF, and LSF faces, but not for 
HSF faces. However, recently it has been found that BSF, LSF and HSF faces elicit the      
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N170 to a similar extent (compared to cars; Flevaris, Robertson & Bentin, 2008). In a 
recent behavioural experiment, Goffaux and Rossion (2006) used the composite face 
paradigm with filtered faces. They replicated the effect found for BSF faces: that 
accuracy is lower for aligned, compared to misaligned faces (Young et al., 1987). In 
addition, Goffaux and Rossion found the effect size was greatest for LSF faces, 
followed by BSF faces, and finally HSF faces. However, recently this evidence has been 
challenged (Cheung, Richler, Palmeri & Gauthier, 2008). Cheung et al. replicated the 
findings of Goffaux and Rossion, but looking closely at the data, they found that 
differential response biases explained the results. When these biases were accounted for, 
the composite effect did not differ between the HSF and LSF faces. 
Although historically HSF components have been implicated in featural 
processing, and LSF components in configural processing (Sergant, 1986), findings to 
date have been inconsistent. Rather than being fixed, there may be a bias in favour of 
the spatial scales which are task relevant, so the scale used may be flexible and 
determined by the usefulness of that cue for the specific task (Schyns & Olivia, 1999; 
Morrison & Schyns, 2001; Sowden & Schyns, 2006). Although this finding may 
account for various findings across tasks, it cannot account for the inconsistent effects 
within a given task. 
In emotional face processing research there have been several studies suggesting 
that LSF and HSF information is processed differently across expressions and brain 
locations (Vuilleumier et al., 2003; Winston, Vuilleumier & Dolan, 2003; Pourtois, 
Dan, Grandjean, Sander & Vuilleumier, 2005). Winston et al. (2003) presented hybrid 
faces, which consisted of complimentary SF information from models with different 
genders and expressions; on each trial, both genders were represented, one in HSF and 
the other in LSF. So, for example, one hybrid stimulus might have been composed of a 
HSF neutral female component and a LSF fearful male component. Participants had to 
report the gender of the face they perceived. As both genders were represented in the 
hybrid stimuli, the participants’ gender report indicated which of the SFs they were 
attending to. Faces containing the LSF ‘fear’ component were associated with increased 
activation (compared to those containing the LSF neutral component) in the FFA, and in 
the amygdala. This was true for both the FFA and amygdala, irrespective of the gender 
that was reported. However, brain activation (in the FFA and amygdala) in response to 
fear vs. neutral faces did not differ when the emotions were conveyed by HSF      
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information. This indicates that LSF fearful faces modulate FFA and amygdala 
activation, even when these faces are not explicitly reported.  
Behavioural results from Pourtois et al. (2005)’s study showed that participants 
were faster to judge gender in fearful and neutral faces for BSF compared to HSF, or 
LSF faces, but that there was no difference between the two types of filtered faces. 
ERPs were also recorded, and results showed that fearful faces selectively increased 
amplitudes at P1 latency for BSF and LSF faces, but not for HSF faces (Pourtois et al., 
2005). Taken together these findings suggest that LSF fearful faces are associated with 
increased brain activation (compared to LSF neutral, and HSF fearful faces), despite not 
being particularly informative for the tasks in hand.  
The studies described above (e.g. Vuilleumier et al., 2003; Winston et al., 2003; 
Pourtois et al., 2005), used only neutral and fearful faces. This poses the question of 
whether the same effects will also be found for different expressions compared to 
neutral, or whether they are fear-specific. Additionally, the studies above show that the 
LSF and HSF information contained in faces are processed differently depending on the 
expression of the face (or that the LSF and HSF information differs across expressions). 
However, these studies do not address which SFs are important for explicit emotion 
recognition.  
Gosselin and Schyns (2001) created a novel paradigm to investigate the SF 
components that are important for object recognition. In this ‘Bubbles’ technique, a 
stimulus is filtered into separate SF bands, and then a proportion of information from 
each SF band is selected and combined. By randomly sampling a part of the image from 
each SF band on each trial, after a number of trials, it is possible to discern the 
information that is important for the recognition of the stimulus (Gosselin & Schyns, 
2001). Using the Bubbles technique, Smith et al. (2005) found that LSFs are more 
important when categorising happy and angry expressions, whereas HSFs are more 
important when categorising fearful expressions.  
In a recent experiment, Goren and Wilson (2006) used synthetic faces to probe 
recognition of happy, sad, fear and angry faces. Their synthetic faces were derived from 
photographs of faces, but digitized using a series of feature-based points. On a 2AFC 
matching task, they found discrimination of emotion from neutral was impaired for LSF 
fear and happy expressions, but not LSF angry expressions (compared to MSF bands). 
For HSF faces, discrimination of all emotions did not differ in comparison to MSF      
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faces. This suggests that LSFs are useful for angry recognition, whereas HSFs are 
important for angry, happy and fear recognition. 
Schyns and Oliva (1999) help to explain these conflicting results. Using hybrid 
stimuli (faces comprising of HSF information taken from one emotion, and LSF 
information taken from another expression), they found that when asked to indicate 
whether a face was expressive or not, participants were biased to use HSF information, 
whereas in a categorisation task (‘which emotion is it?’), participants were biased to use 
LSF information. However, these biases were not fixed (initial bias transferred to a 
subsequent task, and learning influenced the bias). This suggests that the spatial scale 
used in the categorisation of emotional expression is based on the usefulness of the scale 
cues in a particular task. 
It should be noted that although research suggests LSFs may be used to 
preferentially process emotional faces (e.g. Vuilleumier et al., 2003), the present study 
is investigating the effect of SF on emotional recognition. It is possible that visual 
information may be explicitly recognised very poorly, but still undergo preferential 
processing. Therefore, previous research citing the importance of LSF information on 
emotional face prioritisation should not be taken as an indication that LSF information 
will be particularly helpful in recognising emotion. Holmes et al., (2005) conducted a 
series of behavioural studies investigating the prioritisation of fearful expressions, and 
in particular, the involvement of LSF information in this prioritisation. They provide 
evidence that the LSF components of a fear face promote selection within a visual-
probe task. However, Holmes et al., (2005; Experiment 4) found that when participants 
were asked to categorise ‘which face is fearful’ out of a pair of HSF or LSF faces, they 
were marginally better at discriminating fear in the HSF faces. This suggests that HSF 
information may be useful for explicit recognition of emotion, whereas LSF information 
plays more of a role in involuntary appraisal mechanisms that boost salience and direct 
attentional resources towards it. 
 
3.1.1. The effect of inversion 
There is some controversy over which SF components support configural 
processing (e.g. Goffaux et al., 2003; Goffaux & Rossion, 2006; Goffaux et al., 2005; 
Cheung et al., 2008; Wenger & Townsend, 2000; Boutet et al., 2003). Therefore, it is 
unclear whether inversion will disrupt processing of HSF and LSF faces to a similar      
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extent. This is the first study to investigate the recognition of inverted emotional faces 
with different SF profiles. 
 
3.1.2. The effect of luminance polarity negation  
  Luminance polarity negation does not equally impair identity recognition in HSF 
and LSF faces (Hayes, Morrone & Burr, 1986). In faces containing LSFs, polarity 
negation impairs recognition; however, in faces that contain only HSFs, polarity 
negation has little effect on recognition of identity (Hayes et al., 1986). This suggests 
that the effect of polarity negation on BSF faces is due to the effect it has on the LSF 
information. To date, no experiment has looked at the effect of polarity negation on the 
emotional recognition of faces with different spatial frequency profiles. 
 
3.1.3. The combination of inversion and luminance polarity negation  
There has been no study to date that has investigated the combination of 
inversion and luminance polarity reversal on faces with specific SF components. This is 
true for both identity and emotion processing research.  
 
3.1.4. The current Experiment 
The primary aim of the present study was to identify a control stimulus that can 
be used with HSF and LSF filtered faces, as well as BSF faces (Experiment 1).  
The present experiment aims to examine the effects of orientation and luminance 
polarity on the recognition of facial expressions with HSF, LSF, and BSF content. In 
identity processing, it has been suggested that LSF information is important for 
configural processing, whilst HSF information is important for featural processing 
(Sergent, 1986). However, recent research suggests that both SFs may be used for 
configural processing (e.g. Cheung et al., 2008). Importantly, there is some indication 
that the spatial scale used is task dependent, and flexible (Sowden & Schyns, 2006). 
  In emotion research, there has been imaging (Vuilleumier et al., 2003) and 
behavioural (Holmes et al., 2005) evidence to suggest that LSFs are important for the 
prioritisation of fearful emotional expressions. The prioritisation of LSF fear faces may 
not necessarily correlate with better overt recognition of LSF over HSF fearful faces. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the SF bands that are important for recognition 
of emotion differ across emotions (Smith et al., 2005; Goren & Wilson, 2006). 
Therefore, a possible SF by emotion interaction is predicted, although the direction of      
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this effect is not clear, as there have been inconsistencies in the SF information 
implicated for each expression (Smith et al., 2005; Goren & Wilson, 2006). It is 
possible that these inconsistent results reflect that the importance of each SF band may 
be flexible and change across tasks (Schyns & Olivia, 1999). 
  In the present experiment it is predicted that inversion and luminance polarity 
negation will reduce sensitivity to emotional faces in each of the SF bands. Due to the 
possibility that HSF faces are less affected by polarity negation than BSF and LSF faces 
(Hayes et al., 1986), an interaction between SF and polarity is predicted: the recognition 
of HSF faces is predicted to be impaired less by luminance polarity negation than the 
recognition of LSF and BSF faces. 
  As with Experiment 1, morph strength is also manipulated in the present 
experiment. There were a number of interactions involving morph strength that emerged 
in Experiment 1. Over all SFs it is predicted that sensitivity will increase as morph-level 
increases.  
   
Key Hypotheses 
1)  Inversion will disrupt emotion processing for faces in each SF. 
2)  Luminance negation will disrupt emotion processing for each SF, but this 
effect will be reduced in HSF compared to LSF or BSF faces. 
3)  Combining inversion and luminance negation will be additive (i.e. there will 
not be a statistically significant interaction between orientation and polarity) 
in the BSF and LSF faces. 
4)  Combining inversion and luminance negation will be interactive in the HSF 
faces, due to the reduced effect of negation on HSF information.  
5)  High emotional intensity faces will be recognised better than those with low 
emotional intensity within each SF, orientation and polarity.  
 
3.2. Method 
3.2.1. Participants 
  Nineteen undergraduate students (3 males) at the University of Southampton 
participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The mean age was 25.1 
(SD=8.38). All observers had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. All gave 
informed consent.  
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3.2.2. Questionnaires 
  The same questionnaire measures were administered as in Experiment 1, 
including the: STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983), FNE (Watson & Friend, 1969), SADS 
(Watson & Friend, 1969), and SDS (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). 
 
3.2.3. Apparatus & Visual Stimuli 
  Apparatus and visual stimuli were identical to Experiment 1, with the exception 
that in the current experiment, HSF, LSF and BSF faces were used. Images were filtered 
to contain only particular SFs. This is done by transforming an image from the spatial 
domain into the frequency domain, using a Fourier transform. The Fourier transform is 
a way of decomposing a signal into its constituent sine and cosine frequencies (Nixon & 
Aguado, 2008). A raised cosine filter was applied using the Image Processing Toolbox 
for Matlab (The Mathworks) to extract either the HSF or the LSF content of the image 
before using an inverse Fourier transform. SF is the measure of over how many pixels a 
cycle of repeating intensity variations occurs, and can be measured in cycles per degree 
(cpd), cycles per image (cpi), or in face processing research, cycles per face (cpf; which 
is the same as cpi, when the face fills the image). For this thesis, SF will be described in 
cpf where possible, as cpf is an absolute, stimulus-based measure of the SFs contained 
in an image (Sowden & Schyns, 2006). HSF faces contained information greater than or 
equal to 24 cpf (8 cpd), whereas LSF faces contained information less than or equal to 6 
cpf (2 cpd); similar cut-off values have been used in previous experiments (Winston et 
al., 2003; Vuilleumier et al., 2003; see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1. Examples of high emotional intensity happy faces from each condition in a) 
broad spatial frequency, b) high spatial frequency, and c) low spatial frequency. 
 
3.2.4. Procedure  
  The procedure was also identical to Experiment 1, with the exception that the 
faces in the current experiment were displayed for 200ms (rather than the 100ms 
presentation duration used in Experiment 1). This increase in presentation duration was 
used to account for the possibility that HSF and LSF faces may be more difficult to 
categorise than BSF faces. There were 1152 trials (2 orientations x 2 polarities x 3 
emotions x 2 morph strengths x 3 spatial frequencies) with 16 repetitions per condition. 
The session lasted for approximately 1 hour.   
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3.2.5. Design 
  Sensitivity (A) scores were the dependent variable, and were entered into a 3 x 2 
x 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA, with emotional face (angry, happy, fear), 
orientation (upright, inverted), polarity (positive, negative), morph strength (low, high), 
and spatial frequency (BSF, HSF, LSF) as within subject IVs.  
 
3.2.6. Data Analysis 
The data were analysed using the same method as Experiment 1. As previously 
suggested, when considering sensitivity it can also be useful to examine bias (see 
Appendix D).  
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to discover if there were any 
differences between sensitivity for different emotions and conditions. Significant main 
effects were investigated using pairwise comparisons (using Bonferroni correction
11), 
and significant interactions were analysed with post-hoc ANOVAs and (Bonferroni-
corrected) paired t-tests.  
 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Sample Characteristics 
On each of the questionnaire measures there was a normal range of scores (see 
Appendix E), and correlations with performance measures were non-significant (see 
Appendix F).  
 
3.3.2. Recognition of Emotional Expression 
  There was a main effect of SF, F(2,36) = 330.80, p<.001, subsumed by a SF x 
polarity interaction, F(1.2,22) = 27.97, p<.001. There was a difference across SF in the 
positive faces (F(1.3,23.2) = 158.99, p<.001), as sensitivity was higher to both BSF and 
HSF faces than LSF faces (BSF compared to LSF, t(18) = 13.92, p<.001; HSF 
compared to LSF, t(18) = 12.59, p<.001), but sensitivity to HSF and BSF faces did not 
differ (p=.56). There was also a significant difference across SF in the negative faces 
(F(1.2,22) = 233.68, p<.001), whereby sensitivity was lowest to LSF faces (compared to 
BSF, t(18) = 9.76, p<.001; and HSF, t(18) = 20.66, p<.001), and sensitivity was higher 
                                       
11 Where applicable, Bonferroni correction was applied by multiplying the given p-value by the number 
of comparisons made. Therefore the alpha-level for all comparisons is 0.05.       
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to HSF than BSF faces (t(18) = 17.21, p<.001). This concurs with predictions that HSF 
faces would be less affected by polarity negation than BSF and LSF faces. 
  Given the research questions of the current experiment, and due to the main effect 
of SF, and the number of unpredicted interactions that contain the SF variable
12, it was 
deemed appropriate to split the remaining analyses by SF. The data were entered into 
three separate (3 emotions x 2 orientations x 2 polarities x 2 morph-strengths) repeated-
measures ANOVAs. 
  Broad spatial frequency. Group data are shown in Figure 3.2. As expected, both 
spatial inversion and luminance polarity reversal significantly impaired emotion 
recognition, replicating effects found in Experiment 1. Discrimination was better for the 
upright than the inverted faces (upright: M=.87, SD=.06, inverted: M=.78, SD=.08; 
F(1,18) = 77.93 p<.001) and also better for positive than negative faces (positive: 
M=.92, SD=.04, negative: M=.73, SD=.09; F(1,18) = 219.95, p<.001). This replicates 
findings from Experiment 1 and suggests that in BSF faces, inversion and luminance 
polarity negation disrupt emotion recognition. Also in agreement with Experiment 1, the 
orientation and luminance polarity manipulations differed in their ability to disrupt 
emotion recognition; negation had a larger effect on discrimination than inversion 
(effect sizes: p
2 =.92 and p
2 =.81 for negation and inversion, respectively, t(18) = 8.16, 
p<.001).  
As predicted, there was a main effect of morph strength, as sensitivity was 
higher to high (M=.85, SD=.06) than low (M=.79, SD=.08) emotional intensity morphs, 
F(1, 18) = 51.84, p<.001. 
  In contrast to the findings from Experiment 1, there was no orientation x polarity 
interaction (p=.11). However, there was a significant three-way orientation x polarity x 
morph interaction, F(1,18) = 9.49, p<.01, qualifying a two-way orientation x morph 
interaction, F(1,18) = 6.15, p<.05, and a polarity x morph interaction, F(1,18) = 14.97, 
p=.001. There was no orientation x polarity interaction in the low morph-strength 
condition (p<.05), but a significant interaction in the high morph-strength condition, 
F(1,18) = 16.08, p=.001, which in turn was caused by an effect of orientation 
(sensitivity to upright faces > inverted faces) in the negative faces (t(18) = 3.66, p<.01), 
                                       
12 Including: SF x Orientation x Polarity, F(2,36) = 15.24, p<.001; SF x Morph, F(1.2, 22.3) = 6.75, 
p=.012; SF x Orientation x Morph, F(1.5,26.5) = 14.45, p<.001; SF x Polarity x Morph, F(1.4,24.6) = 
12.70, p=.001; SF x Orientation x Emotion x Morph, F(2.4,42.5)= 4.12, p<.05; SF x Polarity x Emotion x 
Morph, F(4, 72) = 2.87, p<.05; SF x Orientation x Polarity x Emotion x Morph, F(2.4, 43.5) = 3.01, 
p=.051.      
  60   
but not in the positive faces (p>.05). This orientation x polarity x morph-level 
interaction indicates that when the faces are high in morph strength, and positive 
polarity, inversion does not disrupt emotional categorisation. 
Also in contrast to Experiment 1, there was no main effect of emotion (p>.05). 
This suggests that generally no emotional expression was more accurately categorised 
across all conditions. However, there was a significant orientation x polarity x emotion 
interaction, F(2,36) = 4.35, p<.05, where although there was no orientation x polarity 
interaction in the angry expression (p>.05) or happy expression (p>.05), there was a 
significant interaction in the fearful expression, F(1,18)  = 12.60, p<.01. In the fear 
expression, sensitivity was reduced with inversion in the positive faces (t(18) = 5.32, 
p<.001) and the negative faces (t(18) = 4.80, p<.001). There was a significant effect of 
polarity (sensitivity to positive > negative) in the upright faces (t(18) = 9.38, p<.001), 
but a slightly larger effect of polarity in the inverted faces (t(18) = 11.25, p<.001). This 
suggests that in the fear expression, the manipulations may interact and when combined 
reduce sensitivity further than the sum of their independent costs.  
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Figure 3.2. Sensitivity as a function of emotional expression and emotion strength for 
BSF a) Upright Positive, b) Inverted Positive, c) Upright Negative, and d) Inverted 
Negative. Average sensitivity for all conditions was significantly above chance (0.5; 
p<.001). 
 
  High spatial frequency. As predicted, both spatial inversion and luminance 
polarity reversal significantly impaired emotion recognition in the HSF faces. 
Discrimination was better for the upright than the inverted faces (upright: M=.93, 
SD=.05, inverted: M=.87, SD=.08; F(1,18) = 28.48 p<.001) and also better for positive 
than negative faces (positive: M=.91, SD=.06, negative: M=.89, SD=.06; F(1,18) = 
20.18, p<.001). The two manipulations differed in their ability to disrupt emotion 
recognition; inversion had a larger effect on discrimination than negation (effect sizes: 
p
2 =.61 and  p
2 =.53 for inversion and negation, respectively, t(18) = 2.85, p<.05). The 
interaction between orientation and polarity was not significant (p>.05), suggesting that 
the effects of the two manipulations were additive (see Figure 3.3).       
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  There was a main effect of morph, F(1, 18) = 87.25, p<.001, where sensitivity was 
higher in the high (M=.95, SD=.05) than the low (M=.85, SD=.08) morph-strength 
condition.    
There was a polarity x morph interaction, F(1,18) = 7.18, p<.05, due to a 
significant effect of polarity (sensitivity to positive > negative) in the low morph-
strength faces, t(18) = 4.20, p=.001, but a non-significant effect of polarity in the high 
morph-strength faces (t(18) = 2.11, p>.05). This suggests that in the full strength HSF 
emotional faces, there is no cost of negation on sensitivity.  
  There was a main effect of emotion, F(2,36) = 3.78, p<.05, qualified by an 
emotion x polarity interaction, F(2, 36) = 4.17, p<.05. The emotion x polarity effect was 
due to a difference in sensitivity between the emotions in the negative faces (F(2,36)= 
7.77, p<.01), but not in the positive faces (p>.05). In the negative faces, sensitivity to 
both angry and fear faces was higher than happy faces (happy compared to angry: t(18) 
= 3.96, p=.001; fear: t(18) = 3.14, p<.05). When looking at the effect of polarity on each 
emotion separately, it was found that for both happy and fearful faces, sensitivity was 
lower to the negative faces than the positive faces (happy: t(18) = 4.09, p<.01; fear: 
t(18) = 5.11, p<.001), but this was not the case in the angry expression (p<.05). These 
results suggest that the HSF emotional faces are differentially affected by the luminance 
polarity manipulation, with sensitivity to happy expressions being disrupted by negation 
to a greater extent than fear or angry. Indeed, sensitivity to angry expressions was not 
significantly disrupted by negation.  
There was also a significant orientation x emotion x morph interaction, F(2,36) 
= 24.12, p<.001 (qualifying significant emotion x morph, F(2,36) = 11.21, p<.001; and 
emotion x orientation, F(2,36) = 19.83, p<.001 interactions). At low morph-strength, 
there was a main effect of orientation, F(1,18) = 22.21, p<.001, a main effect of 
emotion, F(2,36) = 7.25, p<.01, and a significant orientation x emotion interaction, 
F(2,36) = 28.13, p<.001. In the low morph-strength faces there was an orientation effect 
(sensitivity to upright > inverted) in the angry expression, t(18)=3.81, p=.001, and the 
happy expression, t(18) = 6.25, p<.001, but not in the fear expression (p>.05). This 
suggests that when presented in the low morph-strength condition, inversion does not 
significantly disrupt sensitivity to fear faces, but does disrupt sensitivity to happy and 
angry expressions. In the high morph-strength condition, there was only a significant 
main effect of orientation (sensitivity to upright > inverted), F(1,18) = 14.89, p=.001, 
suggesting that all emotions were similarly disrupted by inversion.      
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  Sensitivity in the HSF faces was generally very high. The main aim of this 
experiment was to find stimuli that control for the extraction of emotional content in SF 
filtered faces. To test that high-level processing was significantly disrupted for all HSF 
emotions, paired t-tests were run between the positive upright faces, and their inverted 
negative counterparts. For all expressions and both morph-levels, sensitivity was 
significantly reduced in the combined manipulated faces, compared to the normal faces 
(ps<.01).  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Sensitivity as a function of emotional expression and emotion strength for 
HSF a) Upright Positive, b) Inverted Positive, c) Upright Negative, and d) Inverted 
Negative. Average sensitivity for all conditions was significantly above chance (0.5; 
p<.001). 
 
  Low Spatial Frequency. In the LSF faces, both spatial inversion and luminance 
polarity reversal significantly impaired emotion recognition (see Figure 3.4).      
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Discrimination was better for the upright than the inverted faces (upright: M=.62, 
SD=.08, inverted: M=.55, SD=.06; F(1,18) = 11.01 p<.01) and also better for positive 
than negative faces (positive: M=.65, SD=.10, negative: M=.52, SD=.05; F(1,18) = 
45.10, p<.001). The two manipulations differed in their ability to disrupt emotion 
recognition; negation had a larger effect on discrimination than inversion (effect sizes:  
 p
2 =.72 and p
2 =.38 for negation and inversion, respectively, t(18) = 3.69, p<.01). 
  With the LSF faces there was an interaction between orientation and polarity, 
F(1,18) = 15.86, p<.001; inversion significantly impaired sensitivity in positive faces, 
t(18) = 5.69, p<.001, but not in the negative faces (p>.05). There was also an effect of 
polarity (sensitivity to positive > negative) in the upright faces, t(18) = 6.50, p<.001, 
and a weaker (but still marginally significant) effect in the inverted faces (t(18) = 2.57, 
p=.076).  
  There was not a significant effect of morph-level (p>.05), however, there was a 
significant orientation x morph interaction, F(1,18) = 20.53, p<.001, and a significant 
polarity x morph interaction, F(1,18) = 18.42, p<.001. The orientation x morph 
interaction was due to an effect of morph (sensitivity to high-intensity > low-intensity) 
in the upright faces, t(18) = 3.74, p<.01, but not in the inverted faces (p>.05). Similarly, 
the polarity x morph interaction was characterised by the effect of morph (sensitivity to 
high-intensity > low-intensity) in the positive faces, t(18) = 3.70, p<.01,  but not in the 
negative faces (p>.05). These effects indicate that when the LSF faces are manipulated 
(i.e. they are inverted, or negated), there is no effect of emotional intensity.  
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Figure 3.4. Sensitivity as a function of emotional expression and emotion strength for 
LSF a) Upright Positive, b) Inverted Positive, c) Upright Negative, and d) Inverted 
Negative. Scores that are significantly different from chance are denoted with *=p<.05 
and **=p<.01. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
The present experiment investigated the extent to which orientation and polarity 
manipulations disrupted categorisation of emotional faces with different SF profiles. It 
was found that the SF of the face did affect sensitivity to emotional expression, with 
categorisation being very good in both BSF and HSF faces, but much worse in LSF 
faces.  
This corroborates findings from Goren and Wilson (2006), which showed that 
HSF emotional faces were recognised as well as MSF emotional faces. However, in this 
previous study, recognition was impaired for LSF fearful and happy faces, but not 
angry. In the present study, there was reduced recognition of all expressions that were 
presented at LSF compared to HSF or BSF. The results of the present study also concur      
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with evidence that fear is easier to discriminate when presented in HSF compared to 
LSF (Holmes et al., 2005).  
  In the BSF faces, recognition of emotion was impaired with inversion and 
negation. Even though the faces were displayed for twice the duration of the faces 
presented in Experiment 1, negation continued to have a larger effect on discrimination 
than inversion. Again, these results suggest that consistent luminance polarity 
relationships are important for emotion recognition, as with identity recognition (Gilad 
et al., 2009). Consistent with Experiment 1, there was an interaction between orientation 
and polarity, but in the present experiment, this was only in the high morph-strength 
condition. Inversion did not disrupt the recognition of intense expressions of emotion, 
highlighting that inversion alone is a poor control for emotion recognition. 
Data from the present experiment indicates that in BSF faces, no emotional 
expression was recognised more accurately in general. In Experiment 1, there was a 
small effect of emotion that was not in the predicted direction. Previous results have 
suggested that happy faces are better recognised than fear or angry faces (Prkachin, 
2003; McKelvie, 1995). However, in Experiment 1, fear was better recognised than 
happy in the low morph-strength and angry in the high morph-strength condition. The 
present results did not replicate this marginal emotion effect for BSF faces. This may be 
due to the longer presentation duration in the present experiment; alternatively, it may 
provide evidence to suggest the marginal effect found previously was unreliable, and 
non-replicable. 
In the BSF angry and happy expressions, there was an additive effect of 
orientation and polarity manipulations. In the fear expression, the orientation and 
luminance polarity manipulations were found to interact, as when they were combined, 
sensitivity was reduced further than the sum of their independent costs. This effect 
seems to be driven by particularly high recognition of positive inverted fearful faces 
(see Figure 3.2.). Overall, the findings from the BSF faces compliment the results from 
Experiment 1 well. Even when the faces were presented for double the period of time, 
orientation and luminance polarity negation had significant detrimental effects on 
emotional recognition.  
Emotional categorisation in the HSF faces was generally very high, suggesting 
that HSF information is more informative than LSF for recognition of emotion as well 
as identity (Fiorentini et al., 1983). However, it was found that even in faces only 
containing HSF information, orientation and polarity manipulations did reduce      
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sensitivity in an additive way. As predicted, and concurring with previous findings with 
identity recognition (Hayes et al., 1986), the HSF faces were less affected by luminance 
polarity negation than the BSF and LSF faces. Both spatial inversion and luminance 
polarity negation significantly impaired emotion recognition in the HSF faces, but the 
effect of negation was not significant in the high emotional intensity faces. This 
suggests that luminance polarity negation alone would not be a suitable control for HSF 
faces. In the HSF faces, inversion disrupted emotion processing more than luminance 
polarity negation.  
Recently it has been suggested that emotional information resides at different 
spatial frequencies across expressions (Smith et al., 2005; Smith & Schyns, 2009). Data 
from the present experiment indicates that there were no differences in the recognition 
of fear, happy and angry expressions when presented in HSF. This suggests HSF 
information is equally useful in the categorisation of the three emotional expressions 
tested here. 
The luminance negation and orientation manipulations affected the HSF 
expressions differently. Negation disrupted recognition of happy expressions more than 
fear and angry expressions. Indeed, anger recognition was not significantly impaired by 
negation. When presented with low emotional intensity, inversion did not significantly 
further disrupt sensitivity to fear faces, although it did for happy and angry expressions. 
Despite these interactions between the manipulations and emotional expressions, 
sensitivity was significantly reduced for each expression for each of the morph-levels in 
the inverted negative compared to the upright positive faces.  
Categorisation was much poorer in images with LSF profiles, in agreement with 
findings from identity recognition (Fiorentini, et al., 1983). Both neuroimaging 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2003) and behavioural (Holmes et al., 2005) data suggest that it is 
the LSF components of a fearful face that may drive its prioritisation. It is interesting 
that there is an apparent dissociation between the SF profiles used to attentionally 
prioritise emotional expressions (e.g. Holmes et al., 2005), and those used to explicitly 
categorise emotion. In the present experiment, LSF fearful faces were not recognised 
any better than LSF angry or happy faces.  
In the LSF faces, both spatial inversion and luminance polarity reversal 
significantly impaired emotion recognition. Recognition of LSF faces was impaired 
more by luminance polarity negation than inversion. This follows the same pattern of      
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results as the BSF faces, and suggests that consistent luminance polarity relationships 
are particularly important for the LSF components of expressive faces. 
  With the LSF faces there was an interaction between orientation and polarity, as 
there was an effect of orientation in the positive faces, but not in the negative faces. 
There was also an effect of polarity in the upright faces, and a weaker (but still 
marginally significant) effect in the inverted faces. These interactions were possibly due 
to the generally lower recognition rates in the upright positive LSF faces (relative to the 
upright positive BSF and HSF faces).    
  In summary, Experiment 2 largely replicated the results from Experiment 1 for 
BSF faces. Despite the faces being presented for 200ms (twice the presentation duration 
of Experiment 1), inversion and luminance polarity manipulations continued to 
significantly disrupt emotional face categorisation. In HSF faces, categorisation of all 
expressions was as high as BSF faces. Luminance polarity negation had a limited effect 
on HSF emotional face categorisation. However, when combined with inversion, 
categorisation was significantly impaired for all expressions compared to upright 
positive faces. In LSF faces, categorisation was generally quite poor, and there was no 
effect of emotion. Both inversion and luminance polarity reversal significantly impaired 
emotion categorisation. In conclusion, the processing of emotional information in BSF, 
HSF and LSF faces was disrupted by inversion and luminance polarity negation. This 
indicates that inverted negative faces will make good control stimuli for emotional faces 
in each of the SF bands.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unconscious processing of threat 
 
4.1. Introduction 
  Evolutionary-based theories of emotion processing suggest that emotional 
information, and particularly threat-relevant information, enjoys a processing advantage 
(Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Adaptive behaviour would demand that potentially 
dangerous stimuli are prioritised in the competition for attention (LeDoux, 1996). There 
is evidence to suggest that as well as being prioritised for attention (e.g. Pourtois et al., 
2004), threatening information can be processed unconsciously (e.g. Milders et al., 
2006), possibly via a subcortical processing route (LeDoux, 1996). However, the extent 
to which emotionally laden information enjoys preferential unconscious processing is 
controversial (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Pessoa, 2002).  
  Research investigating the unconscious processing of emotion has primarily used 
a backward masking technique. In backward masking, briefly presented emotional 
‘targets’ are replaced by a neutral ‘mask’ (see Section 1.4.1). Even under masking 
conditions reported to induce full suppression from awareness, using backward 
masking, the amygdala is activated in response to threat (Vuilleumier et al., 2001). 
However the extent to which backward masking reliably prevents conscious processing 
has been recently questioned (Pessoa et al., 2004, see Section 1.4.1). The current 
experiment uses a new methodology based on binocular rivalry, to further investigate 
emotional expression processing outside of awareness.  
  Binocular rivalry (see Section 1.4.3) has been used extensively to explore visual 
perception. Dominance epochs in binocular rivalry typically last only a few seconds, 
and are stochastic (Levelt, 1965). Early theories posited that the competition during 
binocular rivalry occurred between the eyes, in monocular processing channels early in      
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the visual system (Blake, 1989). If this were the case, then higher-level factors would 
have little effect on the resolution of binocular rivalry. However, it has since been 
convincingly shown that binocular rivalry is not exclusively resolved between 
monocular processing channels (Kovacs et al., 1996; Logothetis et al., 1996). In an 
elegant study, Kovacs et al., (1996) presented two complementary patchwork images to 
each eye. Instead of each patchwork image alternating in perception for the duration of 
the trial, as is predicted if binocular rivalry is resolved between the eyes, perceptual 
reversals occurred between two integrated images. Building on this finding, recent 
results show that binocular rivalry dominance can be affected by higher-level factors of 
the stimuli presented (Graf & Adams, 2008; Watson et al., 2004). 
Whilst measuring neurological activation to emotional faces and despite full and 
unambiguous suppression from awareness induced by binocular rivalry, amygdala 
activation is increased in response to fearful versus neutral facial expressions (Williams, 
et al., 2004; Pasley et al., 2004). These fMRI results suggest that fearful faces are more 
salient than neutral faces. In concurrence with this, behavioural studies have found an 
effect of emotion on dominance in binocular rivalry (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; 
Bannerman et al., 2008). Alpers and Gerdes (2007) found that happy and angry faces 
were more likely to dominate perception than neutral faces. Bannerman et al., (2008) 
found that happy and fearful faces had higher dominance over a house stimulus than the 
neutral expression. However, as these stimuli used binocular rivalry with periods of 
dominance and suppression of each stimulus, it is unclear whether these experiments 
have measured the effect of unconsciously processed emotion, or the saliency of the 
dominant, consciously evaluated image. Additionally, these studies suffer from 
experimental flaws that that make it impossible to discern whether the effects are driven 
by emotion, or other, confounding variables (e.g. low-level stimulus characteristics, or 
fusion; see Section 1.4.3).  
Continuous flash suppression (CFS) is a method of interocular suppression 
based on binocular rivalry that has been used to render highly salient stimuli invisible, 
and can do so for relatively long periods of time (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; also see 
p.22). In CFS, highly salient, dynamic noise is presented to one eye, which successfully 
renders stimuli presented in the other eye invisible. Suppression of a stimulus in CFS is 
effective and reliable for long periods of time (sometimes longer than 3 minutes; 
Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). Compared to binocular rivalry, and backward masking, the 
prolonged suppression afforded by CFS allows behavioural and neurological      
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investigations of longer-term unconscious processing. Additionally, CFS suppression is 
much stronger than binocular rivalry suppression, as has been shown using a probe 
detection task in the suppression phase of these two paradigms (Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy 
& Blake, 2006). For these reasons, and although it has only recently been devised, CFS 
has been used extensively to investigate unconscious processing (Tsuchiya & Koch, 
2005; Gilroy & Blake, 2005; Jiang & He, 2006; Jiang et al., 2007; Moradi et al., 2005; 
Yang et al., 2007; Adams et al., 2010).  
In CFS, the period of time a stimulus is suppressed is defined by its strength 
(e.g. a low contrast stimulus takes longer to emerge from suppression than a high 
contrast stimulus; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2004). Higher-level stimulus properties have also 
been found to modulate the duration of suppression by CFS (Jiang et al., 2007). Jiang et 
al. (2007) conducted two CFS experiments in which the meaningfulness of the 
suppressed stimulus was manipulated, and the time taken for the stimulus to emerge 
from suppression was recorded. In the first experiment, upright and inverted faces were 
used. They found that upright faces emerged from suppression more quickly than 
inverted faces. To account for the possibility that these results were due to differences 
between recognition speeds in the upright and inverted faces, a control condition was 
composed. In this control condition, the upright and inverted faces were blended into 
the random noise, and their contrast gradually increased. Both the face and the noise 
were presented to both eyes (i.e. there was no rivalry). There was no difference between 
detection rates in the upright and inverted faces in the control condition, suggesting that 
the difference between the conditions under CFS was due to a processing advantage for 
upright faces under suppression, leading to their faster emergence into conscious 
awareness.  
In their second experiment, Jiang et al., (2007) presented words under 
suppression. The stimuli were either Chinese characters or Hebrew words, and 
participants were Chinese speakers (could read Chinese, but not Hebrew), Hebrew 
speakers (could read Hebrew, but not Chinese) or English speakers (could read neither 
Hebrew, nor Chinese). Chinese characters emerged faster from suppression than 
Hebrew words for Chinese speakers, and the opposite was true for Hebrew speakers. 
Hebrew words also emerged faster for English speakers, but this may have been due to 
low-level properties of the stimuli (e.g. Hebrew words may be more salient because 
they extended a greater horizontal distance; Jiang et al.). From these two experiments,      
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Jiang et al. conclude that familiarity may enhance the salience of a stimulus even when 
it is being processed unconsciously. 
   Given the proposed subcortical pathway for emotion processing (LeDoux, 2000), 
and the responsiveness of the amygdala to emotional faces under suppression (Williams 
et al., 2004; Pasley et al., 2004; Jiang & He, 2006), an interesting question is whether 
emotional information enjoys preferential access to awareness over neutral information 
when presented in CFS. 
  Yang et al. (2007) applied the CFS method to emotion processing to discover if 
emotional facial expressions gained access to awareness faster than neutral faces. In two 
experiments, they found that fearful faces emerged from suppression faster than happy 
or neutral expressions. They included an inverted face to control for the low-level visual 
characteristics of the faces. However, even when inverted, the fearful faces were 
detected more quickly than the happy or neutral faces, and the magnitude of the effect 
was the same irrespective of face orientation. There are two plausible accounts for the 
lack of an inversion effect in these data: either low-level stimulus characteristics are 
driving the effect; or inversion does not allow for full control of facial expression (i.e. 
residual emotion processing accounts for the effect in both upright and inverted 
conditions). 
  The primary aim of the present experiment was to distinguish between the low 
and high-level accounts of previous findings concerning the effect of emotion on the 
speed with which faces overcome CFS (Yang et al., 2007). Experiment 1 of the present 
thesis showed that inversion did reduce sensitivity to emotion, but the effect was 
limited. Thus it is possible that fearful faces emerge faster than other emotions even 
when they are presented upside-down, due to residual emotion processing. However, it 
is also possible that Yang et al.’s results are due to low-level stimulus properties; low-
level characteristics, such as contrast, luminance, and colour are crucial in the resolution 
of perceptual dominance during binocular rivalry (Alais & Blake, 2005). Separating out 
these explanations (low- vs. high-level) is critical because if low-level stimulus 
properties account for the ‘fear advantage’ then such effects can be explained without 
reference to a subcortical emotion-sensitive pathway. This does not disprove the 
existence of such a pathway (see Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010, for related discussion), and 
indeed, there are a number of studies indicating differential neurological activation 
within this pathway to unconsciously presented fearful faces (Jiang & He, 2006; 
Williams et al., 2004; Pasley et al., 2004). However, a low-level explanation negates the      
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need to hypothesise the involvement of any mechanism that evaluates emotional content 
in the absence of awareness. 
  By both inverting and negating facial expressions, data from Experiment 1 
indicate that emotional categorisation is reduced to chance. Therefore, if the emotional 
content of the fearful face is driving its faster emergence from suppression, this faster 
emergence will be eliminated when faces are presented spatially inverted and with 
negative polarity. The fearful faces’ processing advantage should only be evident in the 
conditions in which emotional content is available (i.e. when the face is presented 
upright and in positive polarity, and perhaps to a lesser extent when it is spatially 
inverted and positive polarity). On the other hand, if the emotion in the fearful face is 
not driving its faster emergence from suppression, and instead low-level characteristics 
are responsible for the effect, the relative difference between the fearful face and the 
emotions will be upheld across all manipulation conditions. 
  Another possibility is that fearful faces are detected faster after emergence into 
conscious awareness, giving the impression that they emerge from CFS quicker. To 
overcome this possible confound, a control task similar to the control used by Jiang et 
al., (2007) was used to measure detection times. In this task the face and dynamic noise 
were presented to both eyes, but the contrast of the face was gradually increased, and 
participants indicated when they could see a face. Therefore, this control condition was 
used to capture whether the unconscious emergence effect can be explained by 
differential detection times to the stimuli when they are consciously perceived. In their 
study, Jiang et al., (2007) found no difference in the detection time of upright vs. 
inverted faces. However, the detection times of different expressions have not 
previously been measured using this method.  
 
Key Hypotheses 
1)  Fear faces will emerge from suppression faster than other expressions 
    And either: 
2)  Low-level visual differences between the stimuli account for the 
prioritisation (i.e. a similar ‘fear’ prioritisation will be seen for the inverted, 
negative polarity stimuli). 
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or: 
3)   The emotional content of the stimuli account for the prioritisation (i.e. fear 
faces will be prioritised in the upright, positive stimuli, but not in the 
inverted, negative polarity stimuli). 
 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
  Forty-one undergraduates (6 males) participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit. Their mean age was 21.05 (SD=5.35). All observers had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and gave informed consent. 
 
4.2.2. Questionnaires 
  The same anxiety questionnaires were administered as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
including the: STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983), FNE (Watson & Friend, 1969), SADS 
(Watson & Friend, 1969), SDS (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972).  
 
4.2.3. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  A mirrored stereoscope was used to present different images to each eye. Head 
movements were controlled using a chin rest. 
  The face stimuli were identical to the stimuli used in Experiment 1, apart from 
some minor changes: Firstly, only the 100% morph strength was used. Also, the size of 
the faces was reduced, so that they subtended 2.1 x 2.8 degrees of visual angle (DVA; 
viewing distance = 85cm). This reduction in size was used to make the stimuli 
comparable to the stimulus size used by Jiang et al., (2007). All four manipulation 
conditions were included in the current experiment (upright positive, inverted positive, 
upright negative, inverted negative). Both the upright positive and inverted negative 
faces were needed to answer the primary research question. In addition, the inverted 
positive condition was included to allow full replication of Yang et al., (2007). The 
upright negative condition was also included so each manipulation was presented an 
equal number of times to avoid potential problems of participants expecting particular 
stimuli (i.e. normal luminance stimuli), or asymmetric practice effects.   
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4.2.4. Procedure 
  In the CFS condition, a test face was presented to one eye, whilst random, 
dynamic noise was presented to the other (presented at approx. 10hz). The noise 
consisted of random sized ellipses each with a different, random luminance. The 
luminance range of the noise was reduced from 0-100% (to 25- 75%) after pilot work 
indicated that with this large range, the duration of suppression was unreasonably long. 
The left and right halves of the visual display were framed by a random-dot border (6.20 
x 4.75 DVA) to facilitate convergence of the two eyes’ images (see Figure 4.1.). A 
central fixation cross was always presented to both eyes, and participants were required 
to fixate at the cross for the duration of each trial. The contrast of the test face was 
ramped up linearly from 0 to 100% over the first 1 second of the trial, remaining 
constant until the observer responded. This was done to eliminate onset transients that 
may cause the face to gain immediate dominance (Jiang et al., 2007). On 99.8% of 
trials, the face was at full contrast before it entered awareness. Faces were presented 
randomly to one of four possible locations (of equal distance from the fixation cross), 
one in each quadrant of the visual field. Participants indicated which side of fixation the 
face appeared on using the left and right arrow keys. 
  As described above, a control condition was employed to indicate if any results 
found in the experimental condition could be explained by differences in detection 
speeds or biases in response criteria for the different stimuli. In the control condition, 
random dynamic noise was presented to both eyes and the contrast of the face stimulus 
(also presented to both eyes) was gradually increased. In this control condition (as in 
Jiang et al., 2007), the face was ramped in more slowly than in the rivalry condition, 
increasing by approximately 7% of full contrast per second, i.e. taking 15 seconds to 
reach full contrast. This stopped the faces being detected straight away (as would have 
been the case if they reached full contrast within 1 second). 
  There were 1024 trials (2 suppression conditions x 4 emotions x 4 stimulus 
manipulations) with 32 repetitions of each condition, balanced across eye of 
presentation, side of presentation, and identity of model. Sixteen of the repetitions were 
presented in a random order in the first session. The remaining 16 repetitions were 
randomised in the second session. State questionnaire measures were taken at the 
beginning of each session and trait measures were taken at the end of the first session. 
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Figure 4.1. Schematic representation of the experimental paradigm, including a) the 
CFS condition, and b) the control condition. Dashed circles represent the (other) 
possible locations the faces could appear. 
 
4.2.5. Data Analysis 
  RTs were computed on correct responses only. Four out of the 41 participants 
gave over 15% incorrect responses regarding the side of fixation that the face was 
presented, and were therefore excluded from the analyses (see Appendix G for a box-
plot of the incorrect response distribution).
 The mean error rate from the remaining 
participants was 1.8% (SD=1.29%). RTs below 250ms were removed, as these scores 
are unlikely to reflect emergence from noise, but are probably due to error. To reduce 
the effect of outliers and to normalise the distributions (Ratcliff, 1993), the reciprocal 
(1/RT) of the data was taken. Following the transformation, outliers were removed: 
scores more extreme than the mean 3SD within participant, emotion and manipulation 
were eliminated. The removed scores accounted for less than 0.5% of the data. 
According to Central Limit Theory, the shape of a sampling distribution (the 
distribution of sample means) will be normally distributed irrespective of the shape of 
the original distribution, given large enough samples. Therefore after the mean score 
was extracted from the reciprocal data, the means were transformed back into RTs. 
There was no indication that the parametric assumptions were not met for the mean RT 
data (K-S tests, ps>.1).      
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  Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to discover if there were any differences 
between the RTs for different emotions and conditions. Significant main effects were 
investigated using pairwise comparisons (using Bonferroni correction), and significant 
interactions were analysed with post-hoc ANOVAs and (Bonferroni-corrected) paired t-
tests.  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Sample Characteristics  
On each of the questionnaire measures there was a normal range of scores (see 
Appendix H), and anxiety did not predict any of the dependent measures (see Appendix 
I).  
 
4.3.2. CFS condition 
  Firstly, exploration of the CFS condition showed a replication of the effects found 
by Yang et al. (2007; see Figure 4.2.). There were significant main effects of emotion, 
F(3, 108) = 55.36, p<.001, p
2=.61, and manipulation, F(3,108) = 51.55, p<.001, 
p
2=.59, and an interaction between emotion and manipulation, F(9, 324) = 4.94, 
p<.001, p
2=.12. Critically, in the upright positive condition fear faces were responded 
to significantly faster than all other emotions (Bonferroni corrected t-tests of each 
emotion vs. fear: angry, t(36)=8.09, p<.001; happy, t(36)=3.79, p<.01; neutral, t(36) 
=4.31, p<.001). This result suggests that when the faces were presented normally, 
fearful faces were unconsciously prioritised. These results are directly comparable to 
those found by Yang et al. (2007), with the exception that they found significantly faster 
responses to the neutral face than the happy face. In the present results, there was no 
difference in response time between the neutral and happy faces (p>.05; see Figure 
4.2.).  
  Critically, the prioritisation of fear was also shown in the other manipulation 
conditions; the fearful face was responded to faster than all other expressions in the 
inverted positive condition (Bonferroni corrected t-tests of each emotion vs. fear: angry, 
t(36) = 7.08, p<.001; happy, t(36) = 5.04, p<.001; neutral, t(36) = 5.22, p<.001; 
replicating Yang et al., 2007), the upright negative condition (angry, t(36) = 7.25, 
p<.001; happy, t(36) = 2.80, p<.01; neutral, t(36) = 6.47, p<.001), and the inverted 
negative condition (angry, t(36)=5.43, p<.001; happy, t(36) = 2.72, p<.05; neutral, 
t(36)=4.10, p<.001). This suggests that the observed prioritisation of fearful faces in the      
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current experiment (and perhaps other experiments, e.g. Yang et al., 2007) is due to 
low-level visual properties that are present whether the faces are recognisable or not. If 
recognisable emotional content did contribute to stimulus prioritisation, then the fear 
advantage (faster fear than neutral response times) would be larger in the upright 
positive condition, where expression was easily categorised, than in the inverted 
negative, unrecognisable, condition. On the contrary, the ‘fear advantage’ was 
marginally smaller in the ‘normal’ condition (Neutral – Fear (upright positive): 
=11msec; Neutral – Fear (inverted negative) =26msec). In other words, the presence 
of recognisable emotion does not add any emotion-based prioritisation for fear faces. 
  In summary, low-level visual characteristics can explain the apparent emotion 
effect in the CFS condition. It is interesting to note, however, that Yang et al. (2007), 
and Jiang et al. (2007) found that upright faces emerged faster than inverted faces. The 
main effect of manipulation in the present experiment showed that upright positive faces 
were responded to faster than all other manipulation conditions (inverted positive, t(36) 
= 8.67, p<.001; upright negative, t(36) = 8.57, p<.001; inverted negative, t(36) = 7.81, 
p<.001). Also there was a marginally significant difference between the two conditions 
that moderately disrupt emotion processing; inverted positive was responded to 
marginally faster than upright negative (t(36) = 2.85, p=.076). And, the inverted 
negative condition was responded to significantly slower than both the inverted positive 
(t(36) =4.86, p<.001) and upright negative (t(36) = 4.53, p<.001) conditions. The main 
effects were replicated in each of the emotional expressions. However, the difference 
between inverted positive and upright negative was only significant in the neutral 
expression (t(36)=3.51, p<.01). Also in the neutral expression the upright negative faces 
were not responded to any faster than the inverted negative faces (p>.05). 
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Figure 4.2. Mean response time (±1 SE) for each emotion as a function of manipulation 
condition.  
 
4.3.3. Control condition 
  Data from the control condition suggest that systematic response biases to visible 
stimuli may have affected the CFS data. The effects of emotion (F(3,108)=62.01, 
p<.001, p
2=.63), and stimulus manipulation (F(3,108)=36.86, p<.001, p
2=.51), were 
remarkably similar to the CFS data: fearful faces were detected significantly faster than 
all the other emotions (followed by happy, neutral, then angry faces; all pairwise 
comparisons significant, p<.001). In the control task, observers were also faster to 
detect ‘normal’ faces; upright positive faces were detected fastest, followed by inverted 
positive, then upright negative, and finally inverted negative (all pairwise comparisons 
significant, p<.001). To create an unbiased measure of emergence time, these response 
biases were subtracted from the CFS data. As variability across conditions was slightly 
higher in the control than the CFS data, each data set was first normalised using a zscore      
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transformation. Thus the unbiased measure of emergence time for each emotion and 
stimulus manipulation was given by CFS zscores – control zscores
13. 
 
4.3.4. Unbiased measure of emergence 
  The transformed difference scores were entered into a repeated-measures 
ANOVA. In this unbiased measure of emergence time, there were significant main 
effects of emotion, F(3,108) = 13.99, p<.001, p
2= .28, manipulation, F(3,108) = 9.45, 
p=.001, p
2= .21, and a significant emotion by manipulation interaction, F(9, 324) = 
2.44, p<.05, p
2= .06 (see Figure 4.3). Although there were significant emotion effects 
in each condition (One-way ANOVAs on emotion within each manipulation condition: 
upright positive, F(3,108) = 6.12, p=.001; inverted positive: F(3,108) = 11.43, p<.001; 
upright negative: F(3,108) = 5.99, p<.01; inverted negative: F(3, 108) = 6.53, p<.01), 
pairwise comparisons revealed that these emotion effects were generally caused by the 
angry expression emerging slower than the other expressions. In the critical upright 
positive condition, the angry expression emerged slower than all others (Bonferroni 
corrected t-tests of each emotion vs. angry: fear, t(36)=3.91, p<.001, happy, t(36) = 
6.36, p<.001, and neutral, t(36) = 6.70, p<.001), but no other comparisons were 
significant.  
  The same pattern of results was also found in the other manipulation conditions. 
In the inverted positive condition the angry expression emerged significantly slower 
than the other expressions (Bonferroni corrected t-tests of each emotion vs. angry: fear, 
t(36) = 3.90, p<.001; happy, t(36) = 3.10, p<.01; neutral, t(36) = 4.17, p<.001). In the 
upright negative condition, the angry expression emerged significantly slower than the 
fear, t(36) = 3.12, p<.01, and the happy, t(36) = 2.86, p<.01, but not the neutral 
expression (p>.05). And in the inverted negative condition, the angry expression 
emerged significantly slower than all expressions (fear, t(36) = 2.64, p<.05; happy, t(36) 
= 3.23, p<.01, neutral, t(36) = 3.46, p=.001). The slowed emergence of the angry 
expression across manipulation conditions suggests that this effect is due to low-level 
characteristics of the angry face, not the emotional content. 
  In the unbiased measure of emergence time, upright positive faces generally 
emerged faster than the inverted and negated faces. Upright positive faces emerged 
                                       
13 Parallel analyses using the difference between the raw scores, rather than z-scores produced almost 
identical results.      
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faster than inverted positive faces for fearful, t(36)=3.65, p<.01, angry, t(36)=3.92, 
p<.001, and happy expressions, t(36)=3.37, p<.01, although not for the neutral 
expression (p>.05). Generally, the upright positive condition also emerged faster than 
the upright reversed (angry, t(36) = 2.55, p=.06; happy, t(36) = 2.82, p<.01; neutral, 
t(36) = 3.05, p< .01; but not fear, p>.05), and the inverted reversed faces (angry, t(36) = 
2.78, p<.01; fear, t(36) = 4.93, p<.001; happy, t(36) = 2.35, p<.05; but not for neutral, 
p>.05). Thus, upright positive faces emerge from suppression faster than manipulated 
faces, even after response biases are controlled for. Importantly, both the analyses of (i) 
the CFS data and (ii) the ‘unbiased emergence times’ lead to the same key conclusion: 
the emotional content of visual face stimuli does not modulate their effective salience; 
recognisable emotional content does not lead to faster access to conscious awareness. 
   
 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean CFS corrected by control data (CFS-control) for each emotion as a 
function of manipulation condition (±1 SE).  
 
      
  82   
4.4. Discussion 
The present experiment used a well-controlled CFS procedure to explore the 
unconscious processing of different emotion expressions. Results from the present 
experiment replicated the unconscious fear prioritisation effect found previously in 
normal faces (Yang et al., 2007); fear faces emerged from CFS faster than neutral, 
happy or angry expressions. Additionally, this fear prioritisation was found when the 
faces were inverted, again, replicating previous findings by Yang et al. (2007). 
Critically, the fear prioritisation was also evident in the unrecognisable faces. Therefore 
the meaning, or emotional content of the faces were found to add nothing to the 
advantage afforded by basic image properties. Which low-level visual properties might 
cause the emotion effects found here? Although the stimuli were matched for mean 
luminance and contrast, there were a number of low-level properties that were not 
controlled for (including local contrast and luminance, spatial frequency). Particularly 
important to the fear prioritisation may be that fearful expressions contain a local region 
of high contrast around the eyes. Indeed, Yang et al. (2007, Experiment 3) presented 
only the eye region of faces under CFS and found that fear eyes were detected faster 
than happy or neutral eyes. It appears that the low-level image properties of a fear face 
(such as the high contrast eye region) enable it to emerge faster from suppression.  
Previously it has been suggested that a subcortical processing pathway can 
rapidly evaluate and prioritise emotional information for attention and awareness 
(Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). The results of the present experiment are particularly 
important because they indicate that the fear prioritisation effect can be explained 
without reference to a subcortical pathway specialised in threat detection. Recently, 
Pessoa and Adolphs (2010) have proposed a framework that redefines the role of the 
subcortical pathway in emotion processing. It suggests that the primary role of 
subcortical brain regions, including the amygdala and pulvinar, is to modulate the 
response driven by cortical networks. This description thus emphasises the role of 
cortical responses to emotional stimuli more than previous descriptions (see Tamietto & 
de Gelder, 2010). Results from the present experiment fit well within this framework 
and are consistent with the notion that our physical facial expression of fear has evolved 
to be salient to low-level visual processes. 
The present results suggest that fear prioritisation is due to the low-level 
properties of the stimuli. Recently, Tsuchiya, Moradi, Felsen, Yamazaki & Adolphs, 
(2009) used a similar method to that used by Yang et al., (2007) to investigate the      
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prioritisation of fearful faces in an individual with bilateral amygdala lesions. They 
found that upright fear faces emerged from CFS suppression faster than upright happy 
faces in control participants. Importantly, this was also found (to the same extent) in the 
amygdala lesion patient. This was taken as evidence that threat-related prioritisation is 
intact in the absence of the amygala (Tsuchiya et al., 2009). Results from the present 
experiment would predict this effect, as they indicate that threat-detection in a CFS 
paradigm is driven by low-level properties of a stimulus that are likely to be salient to 
early visual cortex, with little need for input from subcortical structures (such as the 
amygdala). Therefore, previous findings, such as those from Yang et al., (2007) and 
Tsuchiya et al., (2009) should be interpreted carefully.  
Response biases may have contributed to the CFS data, as suggested by the data 
from the control condition (e.g. faster responses to both recognisable and 
unrecognisable visible fear faces after emergence). The control condition was based on 
a similar control used in Jiang et al.’s (2007) experiment. However, in the control 
condition, the rate of stimulus contrast increase was arbitrary (despite Jiang et al. 
previously using this rate). Perceptually, the similarity between the control and CFS 
conditions is also slightly problematic. When stimuli emerge from rivalry suppression 
(or CFS), they do not tend to gradually appear, as if their contrast is being increased. 
Instead, it is far more of an ‘all or none’ process (it is possible that local patches may 
appear, rather than the whole stimulus, i.e. piecemeal rivalry). Therefore, extracting the 
biases found in the control condition from the CFS condition may be overly 
conservative.  
There is an additional problem with using this control paradigm in which the 
contrast of the stimuli is gradually increased. With this method there is a slightly 
different type of emergence effect (the stimuli are consciously detected when their 
contrast reaches threshold), as well as the button response effect that was postulated to 
occur in both the CFS and control conditions. Therefore, in calculating the ‘unbiased 
emergence times’ and effectively subtracting out the effects of the control condition, 
some of the emergence effect is being removed at the same time. Again, this suggests 
that extracting the biases found in the control condition may be overly conservative.  
Given that the control condition may include both emergence effects and effects 
due to conscious processing, what can be interpreted from the ‘unbiased emergence’ 
data? Despite the limitations described above, the measure of bias in the control 
condition is informative, as is the ‘unbiased emergence’ data that were calculated.      
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Although the data from the control condition may overestimate biases, any effects in the 
emergence data that withstand this overly conservative correction must be particularly 
robust. Therefore, the unbiased emergence data will still be discussed. 
Generally, the unbiased emergence times agreed with that of the CFS data, as 
angry expressions were found to take significantly longer to reach visual awareness than 
other expressions. This same response pattern across normal and unrecognisable angry 
faces, implicates low-level visual characteristics in its increased suppression. In 
addition, this effect must be particularly robust given that it survived the conservative 
bias correction. The low salience of angry faces (in both CFS and corrected emergence 
data), contrasts with the prioritisation of threat-related emotions proposed by 
evolutionary-based theories (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). It is consistent, however, with 
previous findings that happy and fearful faces dominate over neutral and angry faces on 
the initial percept in binocular rivalry (Gray et al., 2009).  
  Backward masking paradigms (presenting a brief emotional face, followed 
immediately by a neutral face ‘mask’) have been used to support the notion that facial 
emotion is processed outside of awareness. Backward-masked emotional faces elicit 
physiological responses (Esteves et al., 1994), and subcortical neural activation (Morris 
et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998). However, these findings have been questioned using 
more stringent, objective measures of awareness (Pessoa et al., 2005; Pessoa et al., 
2006). Selective amygdala responsivity to fearful faces (versus neutral faces, Jiang & 
He, 2006; Williams et al., 2004) and emotion aftereffects (Adams et al., 2010) have 
been found under rivalry and CFS suppression, suggesting relatively high-level 
processing of emotional faces without awareness. However, these studies do not imply 
recognition (either implicit or explicit) of unconsciously presented emotional faces. The 
results of the present experiment suggest that the higher-level emotional information 
displayed in the faces has no effect on whether they gain prioritised access to 
awareness. 
  Across emotion, it was found that normal (upright positive) faces emerge from 
suppression faster than inverted or negated faces, in agreement with previous work 
(Jiang et al., 2007). These results suggest that some face-related processing causes 
normal faces to appear more quickly than inverted and negated faces. This is true in 
both the CFS and the ‘unbiased emergence time’ data (suggesting that it is a robust 
effect that exists when the overly conservative response biases are accounted for). 
Given that the resolution of binocular rivalry has been suggested to be resolved over      
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multiple stages of the visual system (e.g. Nguyen et al., 2003), it is possible that the 
suppressed image is processed in the cortex to the extent that the difference between 
normal and manipulated faces can affect the time taken for them to emerge from 
suppression. This is particularly interesting, as it suggests that some high-level 
processing persists under suppression from CFS, in concordance with other studies (e.g. 
Jiang et al., 2007).  
Despite finding that recognisability of a face impacts on the time taken for it to 
emerge from CFS, the results from the present experiment show that emotion effects 
can be explained by low-level visual properties. The stimuli used in the present 
experiment were controlled, in terms of their low-level properties, as far as possible (for 
colour, mean luminance and RMS contrast). It has been suggested that the subcortical 
pathway processes low spatial frequency (LSF) information (Livingston & Hubel, 
1988), and prioritises threat-relevant expressions based on their LSF content 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2003). Thus, it would be interesting to investigate whether LSF 
emotional faces are prioritised for awareness using a CFS paradigm, and whether any 
emotion effects are due to low-level properties or the extraction of emotional meaning. 
Therefore Chapter 5 explores the effect of SF and emotion in a CFS paradigm. 
  In conclusion, CFS is an interesting method with which to study emotional 
processing outside of awareness, allowing for stimuli to be suppressed for greater 
periods of time than traditional methods (e.g. backward masking, binocular rivalry). The 
results of the present experiment suggest that emotion effects are caused solely by low-
level visual characteristics. This indicates that some effects that have been attributed 
unconscious emotion evaluation via a subcortical pathway (e.g. Yang et al., 2007) are 
more likely to be caused by low-level properties that are salient to the visual cortex.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigating the visual characteristics that contribute to unconscious emotion 
processing: spatial frequency 
 
5.1. Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 3, the spatial frequency (SF) content of an image is 
analysed early in visual processing (De Valois & De Valois, 1988; Morrison & Schyns, 
2001). High spatial frequency (HSF) and low spatial frequency (LSF) information may 
depend on somewhat separate neural pathways (Livingston & Hubel, 1988). HSF 
information tends to be processed by parvo cells, which have slow responses and small 
receptive fields, whilst LSF information tends to be processed via magno cells, which 
have fast responses but larger receptive fields (Campbell & Robson, 1968; De Valois & 
De Valois, 1988; Shapley & Lennie, 1985). LeDoux (2000) suggested that threat-
relevant information is preferentially processed via a subcortical processing pathway, 
which bypasses the visual cortex. The subcortical pathway is dominated by magno cells 
(Miller et al., 1980), and therefore should use LSF information to prioritise threatening 
stimuli (Vuilleumier et al., 2003).  
A seminal paper by Vuilleumier et al. (2003) showed that the increased 
amygdala activation found in response to fearful faces was due to their LSF 
components. In their study, Vuilleumier et al. presented faces that displayed fearful or 
neutral expressions and contained broad spatial frequency (BSF), HSF or LSF 
information. In the behavioural task, gender judgements were faster and more accurate 
when the face consisted of BSFs compared to HSFs and LSFs; there was no difference 
in judgement accuracy between the HSF and LSF faces. The neurological data showed 
increased amygdala activation in response to fearful compared to neutral faces. This 
effect held for the BSF and LSF faces, but not for the HSF faces. Following this      
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experiment, a number of studies have investigated brain activation in response to 
emotional faces with different SF profiles (Winston, Vuilleumier & Dolan, 2003; 
Pourtois et al., 2005; Holmes, Winston & Eimer, 2005; Vlamings, Goffaux & Kemner, 
2009). 
One criticism that can be levelled at Vuilleumier et al. (2003) is that their stimuli 
were not matched for contrast and luminance across the SF bands (although there was 
not a significant difference in mean luminance across stimuli). For natural images, there 
is less energy in HSFs compared to LSFs (Loftus & Harley, 2005). Thus, it is possible 
that there was relatively little HSF contrast energy in Vuilleumier et al.’s face stimuli, 
reducing the possibility of detecting emotion-specific responses in the HSF stimuli. This 
‘energy’ confound was inadvertently addressed by Winston et al. (2003) who used 
hybrid stimuli to investigate the effect of attention on brain activation in response to 
emotional faces with different SF profiles (described in Chapter 3). Winston et al. found 
that LSF fear faces were associated with increased activation compared to neutral faces 
in the FFA and amygdala, irrespective of the SF of the gender participants reported 
perceiving. 
Several studies have investigated the effects of SF on emotional face processing 
using ERPs as a dependent measure (Pourtois, et al., 2005; Vlamings et al., 2009; 
Holmes, Winston & Eimer, 2005). Pourtois et al. (2005) and Vlamings et al. (2009) 
found that fearful faces selectively increased ERP amplitudes at P1 latency for LSF 
faces (and BSF faces; Pourtois et al., 2005), but not for HSF faces. Holmes, Winston 
and Eimer (2005) also recorded ERPs in response to faces whilst manipulating SF and 
emotion. In contrast to Pourtois et al., a fear effect was only found in BSF faces (fearful 
faces displayed an enhanced positivity at 155-255ms post stimulus compared to neutral 
faces; no such effect was found in the HSF or LSF faces). These conflicting results 
suggest that using ERPs to investigate the effect of SF on emotion processing is not 
straightforward. Different methods were used to control stimulus energy over these 
experiments, but the impact of this is unclear (Pourtois et al. used hybrid stimuli with 
inverted faces as the non-target image, whilst Holmes et al. and Vlamings et al. 
equalised mean luminance and contrast across all faces).  
Do the findings from neuroimaging/electrophysiological studies translate into 
differences in behaviour elicited by LSF and HSF emotional faces? Recall that in 
Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.1) a study was described in which attentional prioritisation was 
shown for LSF fearful faces using a behavioural paradigm. Holmes, Green and      
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Vuilleumier (2005) conducted a series of experiments to investigate the importance of 
LSF and HSF components for the attentional prioritisation of fearful faces. In 
Experiment 1, they measured attentional bias to LSF and HSF fearful faces compared to 
neutral faces using a dot probe task. Participants were required to indicate the 
orientation of a probe presented after a briefly presented (30ms/100ms) emotional face. 
When faces were presented in LSF, probes following fearful faces were responded to 
significantly faster than those following neutral faces. This was not the case for HSF 
faces. To explore whether the results were caused by low-level visual characteristics, 
the experiment was replicated with inverted faces. When presented upside down, there 
was no difference in RTs to fear and neutral expressions irrespective of SF condition. 
As an additional control, Holmes et al. equalised mean luminance and contrast across 
the different SF bands, and repeated the original experiment. It is unlikely that low-level 
characteristics such as contrast or luminance would be driving the effect found in their 
first experiment, given the null result found with inverted faces. This proposition was 
confirmed, as the effect was still evident with these more controlled stimuli.  
In Chapter 3, it was found that conscious facial expression recognition is 
dramatically reduced for LSF compared to HSF or BSF faces (also found by Holmes et 
al., 2005). However, conscious recognition of emotion may be dissociated from 
subcortical neuronal activation, and unconscious prioritisation. Although Winston et al. 
(2003) showed increased amygdala activation to LSF fear faces even when they are 
unattended, no study to date has explored whether LSF emotional faces are 
preferentially processed when presented outside of awareness.  
A recent study investigated the impact of SF on unconscious identity processing 
using a priming technique. De Gardelle and Koudier (2010) required participants to 
make a fame judgement on normal faces (half were famous) that were preceded by a 
consciously or unconsciously presented prime face. Normal prime faces were either a 
full repetition of the target face (full priming), or a different face altogether (full 
baseline). They also presented hybrid primes so that LSF or HSF information could be 
selectively primed. Their hybrids consisted of LSF components from one identity, and 
HSF components from another. For example, to prime LSF, the LSF content of the 
image was the same as the target face, and the HSF content was taken from a different 
face. A baseline hybrid prime was also created, which consisted of HSF and LSF from 
different faces, neither of which was the target face. The response time (RT) to classify 
the target face as famous (or not) was recorded. Priming was calculated as the      
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difference in RT between baseline conditions and repetition conditions. There was 
significant priming for the BSF faces, and also significant priming for LSF and HSF 
components. This was true in both conscious and unconscious presentation methods (in 
the unconscious condition, backward masking was used with an objective awareness 
check). The amount of priming was associated with prime duration (more priming was 
found for increased prime durations) when the primes were BSF and HSF. However, no 
increase in prime effect was found with increased prime duration for LSF components. 
These results suggest that both HSF and LSF information contribute to unconscious 
vision, but that LSF information can be processed entirely independently from 
awareness. On the other hand, this result may be found because the priming from LSF 
information saturates more quickly. 
Although the subcortical pathway may predominately process LSFs 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2003), it has recently been argued that the amygdala both receives 
and uses HSF information to process expressions (see Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). There 
is evidence to suggest that the amygdala receives highly processed cortical input (via 
feedback from the visual cortex; Amaral, Price, Pitkanen & Carmichael, 1992), which 
may influence amygdala activation and help explain differential amygdala responses to 
fearful and neutral faces. HSF information does seem to be important for fear 
processing in the amygdala; in an amygdala lesion patient, impaired perception of fear 
has been attributed to reduced processing of HSF information around the eye region 
(Adolphs et al., 2005). These results indicate that HSF information is important in fear 
recognition and suggest that the amygdala has a role in this HSF processing. 
Nevertheless, studies have shown differential amygdala activation to LSF fear vs. LSF 
neutral faces, and no such difference between HSF emotional faces (e.g. Vuilleumier et 
al., 2003). However, it is unclear whether these results are caused by feedback to the 
amygdala from the visual cortex (see Pessoa &Adolphs, 2010), thus questioning the 
direction of the relationship between amygdala activation and prioritised visual 
processing.   
  In summary, there is both behavioural and neurological evidence suggesting that it 
is the LSF components of fearful faces that drive their prioritisation (e.g. Vuilleumier et 
al., 2003; Holmes, Green & Vuilleumier, 2005). In contrast, there is also evidence that 
HSFs provide input to the subcortical pathway, and are important for fear processing 
(see Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010, for a review). The present experiment will use a CFS      
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procedure to investigate whether the SF content of an emotional face modulates visual 
prioritisation as measured by emergence from suppression.  
If emotional prioritisation is found for the LSF faces, but not the HSF faces, it 
would indicate that LSFs are important for the unconscious processing of emotional 
faces. The results from Experiment 3 of this thesis suggest that the prioritisation of 
fearful expressions in gaining awareness can be explained by low-level visual 
characteristics rather than the extraction of emotional meaning. Both normal (upright 
positive) and manipulated (inverted negative) faces will be presented in the current 
experiment, and will allow an investigation into whether any SF effects are based on 
low-level characteristics, or the extraction of emotional meaning. Given the findings 
from Experiment 3, it is predicted that low-level characteristics will also explain any 
LSF emotion effects.  
Many researchers have investigated the prioritisation of fearful faces over 
neutral faces without also considering any other emotion. This is particularly true for SF 
investigations (e.g. Vuilleumier et al., 2003; Pourtois, et al., 2005; Vlamings et al., 
2009; Holmes, Winston & Eimer, 2005). In Experiment 3, the inclusion of additional 
emotional expressions was very informative, as they did not follow the pattern predicted 
by evolutionary-based theory (e.g. Ohman & Mineka, 2001); threat-relevant angry faces 
emerged from suppression slowest. In the present experiment, four emotions will again 
be tested (as in previous Experiments in this thesis), namely, fear, happy, angry and 
neutral expressions. It is unclear whether the additional expressions included in the 
present experiment will be granted prioritised access to awareness when presented in 
HSF and LSF. When presented in BSF, neither happy nor angry faces were 
unconsciously prioritised over neutral expressions (Experiment 3).  
Normal faces have consistently emerged faster from CFS suppression than 
inverted (Yang et al., 2007; Jiang et al., 2007) and manipulated faces (Experiment 3 of 
this thesis). This suggests that face-specific processes are engaged under suppression 
and more ‘face-like’ stimuli are prioritised. Therefore, a face effect is predicted in the 
present experiment for BSF faces. Using the present methodological design it will be 
possible to discover whether the face effect found in previous experiments exists in 
faces containing only HSF or LSF information. In this way we can assess which SF 
components are responsible for the unconscious prioritisation of normal faces. 
A control condition (similar to that used in Experiment 3, and Jiang et al., 2007) 
will also be included in the present experiment. Despite there being some      
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methodological issues with this control condition (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4), the 
inclusion of this condition will allow an approximation of conscious response biases 
that may be contaminating the CFS data.  
 
Key hypotheses: 
1.  BSF emotion effects will follow the pattern found in Chapter 4, with a 
significant prioritisation of fear faces. 
2.  For LSF faces, emotion effects will be at least as large as in the BSF 
condition 
3.  Emotion effects will be reduced in magnitude in HSF faces compared to 
BSF and LSF faces 
4.  Emotion effects will be explained by low-level visual characteristics, i.e. 
the emotion effect will be similar in both the normal, and manipulated 
faces 
5.  There will be a ‘face effect’, as normal faces will emerge faster than 
manipulated faces 
 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
  Eighteen undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of 
Southampton (2 males) participated in the study in exchange for course credit or 
payment. Their mean age was 21 years (SD=3.11). All observers had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and gave informed consent. 
 
5.2.2. Questionnaires 
  The same anxiety questionnaires were administered as in previous Experiments, 
including the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983), FNE (Watson & Friend, 1969), SADS 
(Watson & Friend, 1969), and SDS (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972). 
 
5.2.3. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  A mirrored stereoscope was used to present different images to each eye. Head 
movements were controlled using a chin rest. The same face stimuli were used as in 
Experiment 3 (i.e. 100% morph strength, presented at 2.1 x 2.8 DVA, viewing distance 
=85cm). ‘Normal’ faces (upright positive) and ‘manipulated’ (inverted negative) faces      
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were used in the current experiment. However, to address the current research 
questions, the faces were presented in BSF (unfiltered), HSF (>24cpf), and LSF 
(<6cpf). The faces were filtered using the same method as Experiment 2. 
 
5.2.4. Procedure 
  The procedure was broadly the same as Experiment 3. In the CFS condition, a 
face was presented to one eye, whilst dynamic noise was presented to the other (at 
approx. 10hz). The contrast of the test face was increased linearly from 0 to 100% over 
the first 1 second of the trial, remaining constant until the observer responded. Faces 
were presented randomly in one of four possible locations (of equal distance from the 
fixation cross), one in each quadrant of the visual field. Preliminary investigations
14 
indicated that the HSF faces were difficult to locate on the grey background, as they do 
not have a contour at the edge of the face (unlike LSF and BSF faces). To eliminate the 
influence of this potential confound, a random-dot ellipse ‘placeholder’ was presented 
in each of the four possible locations (see Figure 5.1). On every trial (irrespective of the 
face SF), four placeholders emerged at the same rate as the faces (to avoid onset 
transients), and the face was positioned in one of them. Participants indicated which 
side of fixation the face appeared by using the left and right arrow keys. 
  A control condition was used to determine whether results were influenced by 
differences in detection speeds or biases in response criteria. In the control condition, 
random dynamic noise was presented to both eyes and the contrast of the face stimulus 
(also presented to both eyes) was gradually increased. In this control condition, the face 
was ramped in more slowly than in the rivalry condition, increasing by approximately 
7% of full contrast per second, i.e. taking 15 seconds to reach full contrast (similarly to 
Jiang et al., 2007). This was done in order to stop the faces being detected straight away 
(as would have been the case if they reached full contrast within 1 second). The 
placeholders were also used in the control condition to eliminate the contour confound 
discussed earlier. In the control condition, the placeholders reached full contrast by 1 
second, therefore providing a full contrast contour from 1 second into each control trial. 
  There were 1536 trials (2 suppression conditions x 4 emotions x 4 stimulus 
manipulations x 3 SFs) with 32 repetitions of each condition, balanced across eye of 
presentation, side of presentation, and identity of model. Participants completed the 
                                       
14 I collected data with myself as an observer in the first instance.      
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experiment over 3 sessions. State questionnaire measures were taken at the beginning of 
each session and trait measures were taken at the end of the first session. 
 
Figure 5.1. Schematic representation of the experimental paradigm, including a) the 
CFS condition, and b) the Control condition.  
 
5.2.5. Data Analysis 
  The data were prepared in same way as Experiment 3. RTs were computed on 
correct responses only. The mean error rate was 1.41% (SD=1.15%). RTs below 250ms 
were removed. Following the reciprocal transformation (1/RT), outliers were removed: 
scores more than 3SD from the mean within participant and condition were eliminated. 
The removed scores accounted for less than 0.4% of the data. There was no indication 
that the parametric assumptions were not met for the transformed data (K-S tests, 
p>.05). In contrast to Experiment 3, the reciprocal scores were not transformed back 
into RTs (given the reduced sample size).  
  Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to discover if there were any differences 
between the transformed scores for different emotions and conditions. Significant main 
effects were investigated using pairwise comparisons (using Bonferroni correction), and 
significant interactions were analysed with post-hoc ANOVAs and (Bonferroni 
corrected) paired t-tests.  
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5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Sample Characteristics  
There was a normal range of scores on each of the questionnaire measures (see 
Appendix J), and anxiety did not predict any of the dependent measures (see Appendix 
K).  
 
5.3.2. CFS condition 
Firstly, in the CFS condition (see Figure 5.2), there were significant main effects 
of manipulation, F(1,17) = 105.36, p<.001, p
2=.86, and SF, F(2,34) = 3.31, p<.05, 
p
2=.16. There were also significant interactions between emotion and SF, F(6, 102) = 
2.34, p<.05, p
2=.12, and manipulation and SF, F(2,34) = 6.09, p<.01, p
2=.26.  
Decomposition of the main effect of SF suggests that HSF (M=.211, SD=.034)  
and LSF (M=.211, SD=.036) faces were responded to at a very similar rate (p=.97). BSF 
faces (M=.214, SD=.035), on the other hand, were responded to faster than HSF faces, 
t(17) = 4.59, p<.001, and marginally faster than LSF faces, t(17) = 2.00, p=.064.  
If unconscious emotion effects are driven largely by a magnocellular, subcortical 
pathway, there should be greater emotion effects in the LSF compared to HSF faces. 
However, there was only a marginal effect of emotion in the LSF faces, F(3,51) = 2.42, 
p=.08, where only one paired comparison was marginally significant; happy faces were 
responded to faster than angry faces, t(17) = 2.31, p=.07. There was no significant 
difference between fear and the other expressions, indicating no evidence for 
prioritisation of fear faces via their LSF content. In the HSF faces, there was also an 
effect of emotion, F(3,51) = 3.05, p<.05, as fear faces were responded to faster than 
happy faces (t(17) = 2.77, p<.05; no other comparisons were significant). Contrary to 
findings from Experiment 3, there was no effect of emotion in the BSF condition, 
(p=.64). This lack of an emotion effect in the BSF faces was unexpected, given results 
from the previous Chapter, where all pairwise comparisons between emotions were 
highly significant in the CFS condition.  
Normal (upright positive) faces (M=.216, SD=.035) were responded to faster 
than manipulated (inverted negative) faces (M=.207, SD=.035). This replicates the face 
advantage found in Experiment 3, and results from previous research (Yang et al., 2007; 
Jiang et al., 2007). This prioritisation of normal over manipulated faces was apparent in 
each of the SFs (Bonferroni corrected t-tests between upright positive and inverted      
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negative faces in each of the SFs: HSF, t(17) =4.11, p=.001; LSF, t(17) = 8.88, p<.001; 
BSF, t(17) = 7.29, p<.001). Interestingly, in the normal condition, BSF (M=.219, 
SD=.034) faces were responded to faster than HSF (M=.214, SD = .035), t(17) = 5.57, 
p<.001, and marginally faster than LSF faces (M=.214, SD =.035), t(17) = 1.98, p=.06, 
whereas there was no difference between the SFs in the manipulated condition (p>.1). 
This suggests that the faster responses towards BSF faces over HSF and LSF faces is 
not due to the low-level visual characteristics of the BSF stimuli.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Mean reciprocal score (±1 SE) from the CFS condition for each emotion as 
a function of manipulation condition and spatial frequency profile of the face. Note that 
a higher reciprocal score is indicative of a faster response. 
 
5.3.3. Control condition 
  Data from the control condition suggest that, once visible, the different stimuli 
might have taken different times to be detected / responded to (although it may not only 
be conscious biases that are captured using this control condition, see Section 4.4). 
There was a significant main effect of manipulation (F(1,17) = 90.20, p<.001, p
2=.84), 
and SF (F(1.15, 19.54) = 141.96, p<.001, p
2=.89), and an interaction between 
manipulation and SF (F(2,34) = 20.49, p<.001, p
2=.55). The HSF components of the 
faces seemed to aid conscious detection as LSF faces (M=.165, SD=.023) were detected 
more slowly than both BSF (M=.202, SD=.023; t(17) = 11.79, p<.001, and HSF faces 
(M=.200, SD=.025; t(17) = 12.32, p<.001). However, there was no difference between 
the detection times of BSF and HSF faces (p>.1).  
Under the assumption that the CFS and the control data were subject to similar 
response biases (Jiang et al., 2007), they can be combined to estimate unbiased      
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emergence times. In Chapter 4, the value of the control condition in measuring response 
bias was discussed (Section 4.4), and it was concluded that the control data measure 
both an emergence effect and a conscious response bias. However, the data are 
interesting nonetheless, as only the most robust effects would withstand the 
conservative correction. Therefore an unbiased measure of emergence time was 
calculated by subtracting the control responses from the CFS data. As variability across 
conditions was slightly higher in the CFS than the control data, each data set was first 
normalised using a z-score transformation. Thus the unbiased measure of emergence 
time for each emotion and stimulus manipulation was given by CFS z-scores – control 
z-scores
15. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean reciprocal score (±1 SE) from the control condition for each emotion 
as a function of manipulation condition and spatial frequency profile of the face. 
 
5.3.4. Unbiased measure of emergence  
  The transformed unbiased emergence data were entered into a repeated-measures 
ANOVA. Analysis of these emergence times reveals a main effect of SF, F(1.3, 22.16) 
= 219.98, p<.001, p
2=.93, where LSF faces emerged from suppression significantly 
faster than both HSF (t(17) = 16.61, p<.001), and BSF faces (t(17) = 14.77, p<.001; 
there was no difference between BSF and HSF faces, p>.9).  
There was also evidence of a SF x manipulation interaction, F(2,34) = 5.07, 
p<.05, p
2=.23. The advantage for ‘normal’ (upright positive) faces apparent in the CFS 
data was not also present in the unbiased emergence data. There was no difference 
between the upright and manipulated faces when presented in HSF (p>.6), or BSF 
                                       
15 Parallel analyses using the difference between the raw scores, rather than z-scores produced very 
similar results.      
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(p>.2), and the marginal effect of manipulation in LSF faces was caused by manipulated 
faces emerging faster than normal faces, t(17) = 2.83, p=.011.  
   
 
Figure 5.4. Mean CFS corrected by control data (CFS-control) for each emotion as a 
function of manipulation condition (±1 SE) and spatial frequency profile of the face. 
 
5.4. Discussion 
The present experiment used a CFS procedure to investigate the unconscious 
processing of emotional faces with different SF profiles. SF is a low-level visual 
property that is extracted at an early stage of visual processing (De Valois & De Valois, 
1988). LSF fearful faces are associated with increased amygdala activation (Vuilleumier 
et al., Winston et al., 2003), and are prioritised in the competition for attention (Holmes, 
Green & Vuilleumier, 2005). Results from the present experiment do not provide 
evidence that unconscious prioritisation of emotion is driven by the LSF content of an 
emotional face. In the CFS data the effect of emotion was smaller in the LSF compared 
to the HSF faces. This is in direct conflict to experiments that have reported preferential 
processing of fearful faces when presented in LSF, but not HSF (Vuilleumier et al., 
2003; Winston et al., 2003; Pourtois et al., 2005; Vlamings et al., 2009; Holmes, Green 
& Vuilleumier, 2005). However, the majority of these studies have measured 
neurological activation, and thus do not indicate any behavioural advantage for the LSF 
fearful faces. The one exception to this is the study by Holmes, Green and Vuilleumier 
(2005) in which LSF fearful faces were prioritised in a dot-probe paradigm. In Holmes, 
Green and Vuilleumier’s study, the non-masked face stimuli preceding the probe were 
presented consciously for a minimum of 30ms. Indeed, the previous research cited here 
(from both neurological and behavioural paradigms) has investigated the SF      
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components responsible for conscious fear prioritisation. Only one experiment has 
investigated unconscious processing of faces with different SF components, but with 
facial identity, not emotion (De Gardelle & Koudier, 2010). Therefore, it is possible that 
the LSF fear prioritisation effect does not exist in unconscious processing.  
The limited emotion effects in the present experiment can be explained by low-
level characteristics, rather than extraction of emotional meaning, as the same effects 
were found in both the normal and manipulated faces. This is in agreement with 
findings from Experiment 3, which indicated that the fear prioritisation effect was fully 
accounted for by low-level characteristics of the stimuli.  
In Experiment 3 there was clear fear prioritisation (albeit explained by low-level 
properties). The present experiment failed to replicate this effect in the BSF faces, as 
well as the LSF or HSF faces. The size of the emotion effect measured in Experiment 3 
was large (p
2=.61), and so should have been detectable given the power in the present 
experiment. There were several methodological differences between Experiment 3 and 
the present experiment: 1) placeholders were used to eliminate the contour confound 
found between the HSF and LSF/BSF faces; 2) HSF and LSF faces were also included. 
The inclusion of HSF and LSF trials may have affected results, as observers were 
responding to stimuli that on average (most of the trials were of HSF or LSF faces) 
appeared less face-like, and thus, may have changed the search strategy used. 
Although there were only limited effects of emotion in the CFS condition, there 
were robust effects of manipulation. In each of the SFs, normal faces emerged from 
suppression faster than manipulated faces. This replicates the face effect found in 
Experiment 3, and concurs with previous evidence that normal faces emerge from 
suppression faster than inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007). Results 
from the CFS data in the present experiment extend these previous findings, as they 
show that BSF faces are prioritised when presented unconsciously, compared to LSF 
and HSF faces. Importantly, this prioritisation is not based on their low-level 
characteristics (there was no difference between the three SF conditions when the faces 
were manipulated). This suggests that high-level processing does exist for face stimuli 
under CFS, and it is specific for BSF faces. Evidence indicates that the most important 
SF band for face processing is the MSF range (Costen et al., 1994; 1996, Gold et al., 
1999, Nasanen, 1999); the only stimuli that contained information from this band in the 
present experiment were the BSF faces.       
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Response biases may have contributed to the CFS data. However, it is unclear 
whether the control condition accurately measures bias (as discussed in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4). When control data were subtracted from the CFS data in the present 
experiment, the emergence data were not consistent with the CFS data. In the 
emergence data, there was no effect of manipulation, which is incompatible with 
findings from the CFS condition (in this experiment), and with previous findings (from 
Experiment 3). Also, LSF faces were found to emerge faster than HSF and BSF faces. It 
is possible that this effect is due to the SF distribution of the CFS masking stimulus (i.e. 
if the dynamic noise used to suppress a stimulus has more HSF information, LSF 
stimuli may emerge faster). Note that there was no effect of emotion in the LSF 
emergence data, indicating no advantage for any particular LSF emotion. Overall, it is 
possible that that pattern of effects found in the present experiment in the ‘unbiased 
emergence’ data was driven by the liberal estimation of bias taken from the control 
condition (which may have measured both emergence and conscious bias). When the 
effects measured in the control condition were removed from the CFS data, the 
remaining ‘unbiased emergence’ responses may have underestimated the CFS 
emergence effect.  
Overall, the results from both the CFS and emergence data are inconsistent with 
a subcortically driven unconscious emotion-processing pathway that is sensitive to LSF 
components of a face, extracts emotional meaning from the face, and preferentially 
processes faces that are attributed with threat-related value. It is clear that subcortical 
brain structures, including the amygdala, are activated by emotional faces whilst under 
binocular suppression (Williams, et al., 2004; Pasley et al., 2004). Furthermore, LSFs 
have been implicated in subcortical threat processing (Vuilleumier et al., 2003). So why 
does this not translate into behavioural prioritisation? Face-related processing effects 
were evident in the CFS data. Given that emotional information is argued to be an 
important, adaptive cue (as suggested by Ohman, 2002), response times should also 
have been modulated by emotion. It is possible that the use of placeholders in the 
present experiment may have independently impacted on emotion processing (whilst not 
also disrupting face processing), but this is unlikely. In Experiment 3, the effect of 
emotion (p
2=.61) was very similar to the effect of manipulation (p
2=.59). Taken 
together, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that high-level processing does 
exist under CFS suppression, but that the emotional content of a face may not be its 
most salient component.        
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CFS has been used in several different ways to probe unconscious processing of 
stimuli at a behavioural level. For example, by measuring the time a stimulus takes to 
emerge from suppression (the paradigm used here and by Jiang et al., 2007, Yang et al., 
2007). Experiments 3 and 4 used suppression duration as the dependent measure. 
Suppression duration gives an index of prioritisation; previous reports have found that 
emergence time is reflective of the salience of the suppressed stimulus (Tsuchiya & 
Koch, 2004; Jiang et al., 2007). Measuring the time taken for a stimulus to emerge from 
suppression is dependent on respose time data. Response times are generally very 
skewed, variable, and outliers can have a strong effect on results (Whelan, 2008). The 
experiments in this thesis addressed the limitations of using reaction time data through a 
variety of methods (see Sections 4.2.5 and 5.2.5). However, it would be advantageous to 
explore unconscious processing of emotional faces using a different dependent variable 
(e.g. measuring the effects of unconscious faces on contrast sensitivity), to seek to 
provide convergent evidence and to utilise a methodology that avoids the problems 
inherent in the control condition used previously.  
A different way in which CFS has been used to probe unconscious processing is 
to measure the influence of a suppressed stimulus on subsequent perception (as used by 
Morodi et al., 2005; Adams, Gray et al., 2010; Yang, Hong & Blake, 2010 in adaptation 
paradigms). To date no experiment has investigated the effect of an image suppressed 
using CFS on attentional engagement using a probe detection technique. Recall that 
there have been a number of studies that have used backward masking to present 
competing faces unconsciously before probing attention with a visual-probe (e.g. Mogg 
& Bradley, 1999; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Carlson, Reinke & Habib, 2009). There are 
issues with this literature, particularly relating to the use of subjective awareness checks 
(Pessoa et al., 2005), and the lack of adequate control stimuli for low-level 
characteristics. The next chapter will use a conscious visual probe task to investigate 
attentional prioritisation to emotional stimuli, which may be adapted to an unconscious 
version using CFS. 
  In conclusion, the results of the present experiment suggest that LSF emotional 
faces are not granted privileged processing when presented unconsciously. This does 
not concur with results of increased amygdala activation elicited by LSF fear faces 
(compared to neutral faces; Vuilleumier et al., 2003), early ERP components in 
response to LSF fear (Pourtois, et al., 2005; Vlamings et al., 2009) or attentional 
prioritisation of LSF fear faces (over neutral faces, Holmes, Green & Vuilleumier,      
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2005). The present results add further evidence that the extraction of emotional meaning 
from faces does not occur when they are presented unconsciously. In addition, the 
results from this experiment add to the evidence provided by a number of studies that 
have found a ‘face’ effect in speeded emergence from suppression (including those 
found in Experiment 3, and also by Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007).  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigating the effect of a previously presented emotional face on probe contrast 
discrimination  
    
 6.1. Introduction 
Visual-probe tasks have been used to investigate whether emotional stimuli 
capture attention. Attentional prioritisation of fearful faces (Pourtois et al., 2004; 
Pourtois et al., 2006) and angry faces (Cooper & Langton, 2006; Holmes et al., 2009) 
has been found using the visual-probe task (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1). However, 
these findings have been somewhat inconsistent (e.g. Bradley et al., 1998), especially in 
low-anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Additionally, almost all studies that 
have investigated emotional prioritisation using the visual-probe task have not 
controlled for low-level visual characteristics of the stimuli. In Chapter 4, it was found 
that low-level characteristics fully explained the unconscious fear prioritisation effect. 
Therefore, it is unclear whether the emotional prioritisation found in visual-probe tasks 
is based on the extraction of emotional meaning from the faces, or visual properties, 
such as luminance or contrast. 
The modulation of spatial attention by unconscious stimuli can be investigated 
by probing attention after the presentation of a briefly presented and masked emotional 
face (Mogg & Bradley, 1999; Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Carlson et al., 2009). Using this 
unconscious version of the visual-probe task, Mogg and Bradley (1999) found faster 
responses to probes replacing masked angry faces than those replacing masked happy or 
neutral faces. In their study, Mogg and Bradley used an objective awareness check in 
which participants were unable to discriminate, confirming that the faces did not reach      
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consciousness. Other experiments reporting an attentional advantage for unconscious 
emotional faces have not employed checks for awareness, making it impossible to 
attribute findings to unconscious processing (Carlson & Reinke, 2008; Carlson et al., 
2009).  
Attentional prioritisation has also been investigated using a more sensitive 
version of the visual-probe task, by measuring contrast sensitivity of the probe rather 
than its location (Phelps et al., 2006; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). To measure 
contrast sensitivity, participants are required to discriminate the orientation of the probe, 
for which accuracy is measured at various contrast-levels. Experimenters have used this 
method to examine the selective processing of competing stimuli (analogous to the 
classic visual-probe task; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Experiment 2), and 
exogenously cueing attention (Phelps e al., 2006; Experiment 2). It has also been used 
to probe temporal attention, by presenting a face centrally and measuring contrast 
sensitivity of a peripheral target (or presenting the same face at a number of different 
locations on the screen; Phelps et al., 2006, Experiment 1; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 
2009, Experiment 1). Using this paradigm, temporal attention is probed, as the position 
of the probe does not vary; therefore spatial attention is not manipulated.  
Outside of emotional face processing research, contrast sensitivity to visual 
probes has helped inform our understanding of attention (Carrasco, Ling & Read, 2004). 
In a seminal paper published in 2004, Carrasco et al., found that attention boosts the 
apparent contrast of a probe stimulus. They measured contrast thresholds of a probe 
presented in the same location as a previous uninformative cue (that exogenously 
attracted attention), or the opposite location. Participants were more sensitive to the 
contrast of a probe presented in the same location as the cue, compared to the opposite 
location. These results suggest that attention increases the strength of a stimulus by 
increasing its apparent contrast. Is it possible that the same may be true of emotional 
faces?  
Phelps et al., (2006, Experiment 1) presented a fearful or neutral face centrally 
for a brief period (75ms) and then measured contrast sensitivity of a probe presented 
briefly afterwards. Four probes were presented, one of which was oriented slightly away 
from vertical (the target) whilst the others were vertically oriented (distractors). 
Participants were required to indicate whether the target was oriented clockwise or 
counter-clockwise from vertical. Across trials probe contrast was varied. Phelps et al. 
found that a lower contrast was needed for the tilt task (i.e. the psychometric function      
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was shifted further leftwards) when a fearful, compared to a neutral face, preceded it. 
This suggests that fearful faces enhance contrast sensitivity without directly 
manipulating spatial attention. Inverted faces were used as a control; no contrast 
threshold difference was found between inverted fearful and inverted neutral faces, 
suggesting that the expression effect in the upright condition was not explained by low-
level visual characteristics. Phelps et al. suggest that the facilitation of contrast 
sensitivity following a fearful face (vs. a neutral face) is related to the enhanced activity 
found in the visual system in response to emotional vs. neutral stimuli (e.g. Schupp et 
al., 2003). Enhanced contrast sensitivity following an emotional event would be 
advantageous in order for potential threat to be detected and responded to effectively 
(Phelps et al., 2006; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). 
There is indication from some behavioural studies that emotion may not enhance 
sensitivity, but actually impair it (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Zeelenberg & 
Bocanegra, 2010). Zeelenberg and Bocanegra (2010) suggest that enhancement of 
perception may be obscured by attentional resources being directed towards the 
emotional cue at the expense of the probe target. This may especially be the case for 
modality-specific attention (Zeelenberg & Bocanegra, 2010).  
It is not only the common-modality (i.e. within the same sense) between cue and 
target that is important to whether an emotion-induced enhancement or impairment is 
found. In a recent study, Bocanegra and Zeelenberg (2009) manipulated the spatial 
frequency (SF) of a contrast-varying probe, which followed the presentation of a fearful 
or neutral face. When a low spatial frequency (LSF) probe followed the presentation of 
a fearful face, probe sensitivity was increased compared to when it followed a neutral 
face; thus replicating Phelps et al.’s (2006) findings. However, when a high spatial 
frequency (HSF) probe followed the presentation of a fearful face, probe sensitivity 
decreased. This suggests that fearful faces selectively facilitate LSF information, and 
impede HSF information compared to neutral faces. 
Experiments 3 and 4 of the present thesis investigated unconscious emotional 
face processing using a CFS paradigm, with suppression duration as the dependent 
variable. Results from Experiment 3 suggested that fearful (rather than emotional faces 
generally) are prioritised to awareness, but that this prioritisation is fully explained by 
low-level visual characteristics. Low-level properties can also explain speeded search of 
emotional faces (Coelho et al., 2010; see Chapter 1; Section 1.3.1). It has only been 
relatively recently that researchers have attempted to control for low-level visual      
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characteristics in emotional face processing research. Thus, it is unclear the extent to 
which findings from Experiment 3 can be generalised across different paradigms. 
Indeed, Experiment 4 explored whether the SF content of an emotional face modulated 
the speed at which it emerged from suppression. Although there were differences 
between SF, and there was an overall ‘face’ effect (normal faces were found to emerge 
faster than manipulated faces), there was little effect of emotion.  
Motivated by the intention to replicate findings from Experiment 3 using a 
different dependent measure, and by the intriguing findings from Phelps et al.’s (2006) 
study, the present Chapter aims to adapt the paradigm used by Phelps et al. into an 
unconscious version. If, in an unconscious version of the task, a null effect on contrast 
sensitivity of a probe following different expressions was found, the source of this null 
effect would be unclear (whether due to the unconscious nature of the task, or slight task 
moderations). Therefore, the paradigm will first be tested in a conscious version.  
 
Experiment 5 
6.2. Introduction 
As with other research investigating the prioritisation of emotional expressions 
(see Section 1.4.1), both Phelps et al., (2006) and Bocanegra and Zeelenberg (2009), 
only compared fearful versus neutral expressions. The absence of any other expression 
makes the results of their studies difficult to interpret. Both studies inferred (using an 
inverted face control) that low-level characteristics were not responsible for the emotion 
effects found. However, it is impossible to tell whether these results are fear specific, 
threat-specific, or conform to the emotionality hypothesis. Therefore, happy expressions 
will be included in the present experiment, as well as fear and neutral expressions.  
Phelps et al., (2006) showed a significant shift in probe contrast sensitivity when 
the probe followed a fearful compared to a neutral expression. This was interpreted as 
‘facilitation’ of contrast sensitivity, driven by the fearful faces. However this 
interpretation is not supported by a close inspection of their data. In the upright face 
condition, the mean contrast sensitivity at threshold was 19% for fearful, and 22% for 
neutral faces; in the inverted face condition, the mean contrast sensitivity at threshold 
was 19% for fearful, and 18.7% for neutral faces (Phelps et al., 2006, p. 294). These 
descriptive statistics suggest that results might be better considered to reflect impaired 
contrast sensitivity by upright neutral faces, rather than enhanced contrast sensitivity by 
upright fearful faces, as contrast thresholds were equivalent in the upright and inverted      
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fear faces. Therefore, their data do not support that probe contrast sensitivity is 
increased following the presentation of an emotional face due to the extraction of 
emotion from the face, and its threat-relevance.  
In contrast, Bocanegra and Zeelenberg’s (2009) findings suggest that it is the 
threat-relevance that drives the effect. In their second experiment, Bocanegra and 
Zeelenberg centrally presented fear or neutral expressions that were either upright or 
inverted and followed by a HSF or LSF Gabor.  There was a significant interaction 
between emotion and SF when presented upright (fearful faces enhanced performance 
when the Gabors were LSF, and impaired performance when the Gabors were HSF; the 
opposite was true of neutral faces), but not when the faces were inverted. However, 
there was a difference between performance with the upright neutral face and the 
inverted faces (both fear and neutral), suggesting that the pattern found with the neutral 
faces was caused by their meaning. Due to this pattern of results, Bocanegra and 
Zeelenberg performed additional analyses and found that when comparing upright vs. 
inverted faces there was an interaction by SF for fearful faces but not neutral faces. This 
suggests that the 3-way interaction between orientation, SF and emotional expression 
was primarily caused by the content of the fear faces.  
The primary aim of Experiment 5 was to examine the predicted facilitation of 
perception by consciously presented positive and negative emotional expressions. The 
method of Phelps, et al., (2006; Experiment 1) was followed, with the exception that 
there was an additional happy face. Neither Phelps et al. nor Bocanegra and Zeelenberg 
(2009) found an effect of emotion on contrast sensitivity when the faces were inverted, 
suggesting that their results were not due to low-level characteristics and that the 
extraction of emotional meaning was responsible for the emotion effects. However, 
given that Experiment 1 and 2 of the present thesis clearly demonstrate inversion alone 
is insufficient to disrupt emotion processing, and that inverted, negative luminance 
polarity faces are a better control than spatial inversion alone for emotion classification, 
the ‘manipulated’ (inverted negative) faces were used as controls in the current 
experiment. 
   
Key predictions 
1)  Fearful faces will facilitate contrast sensitivity when presented normally (i.e. 
there will be lower contrast thresholds for probes that follow fearful, 
compared to neutral faces)      
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2)  Happy faces may also facilitate contrast sensitivity when presented normally 
(i.e. there will be lower contrast thresholds for probes that follow happy 
compared to neutral faces) 
3)  This will not be explained by low-level characteristics (i.e. there will be no 
difference in contrast thresholds for probes that follow manipulated facial 
expressions) 
And 
4)  Differences between expressions will be characterised by facilitation 
following emotional faces, rather than impairment following neutral faces 
(i.e. there will be a larger difference between upright and inverted 
fearful/happy faces than between upright and inverted neutral faces, 
consistent with Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009) 
or 
5)  Differences between expressions will be characterised by impairment
  following neutral faces, rather than facilitation following emotional faces
  (i.e. there will be a larger difference between upright and inverted neutral
  faces rather than upright and inverted fearful/happy faces, consistent with
  Phelps et al., 2006)  
 
6.3. Method 
6.3.1. Participants 
Sixteen undergraduates (4 males) participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit. Their mean age was 24.88 years (SD=5.83). All observers had normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and all gave informed consent. 
6.3.2. Questionnaires 
  Consistent with previous Experiments, participants completed the following 
measures of general and social anxiety: STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983), FNE (Watson 
& Friend, 1969), SADS (Watson & Friend, 1969), and social desirability: SDS (Strahan 
& Gerbasi, 1972). 
 
6.3.3. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  Head movements were controlled using a chin rest. The stimuli were created and 
presented using MATLAB (The Mathworks, USA) with the Psychophysics toolbox 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997), and were presented on a gamma-corrected monitor. A      
  109   
BITS++ box (Cambridge Research Systems Ltd, Kent, UK) provided a 14-bit greyscale 
resolution, allowing for accurate presentation of very low contrast stimuli.  
Eleven models were taken from the Pictures of Facial Affect series (Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1976; 6 females, 5 males)
16, each displaying fear, happy, and neutral facial 
expressions (the same models were used by Phelps et al., 2006). To control for low-
level characteristics, ‘manipulated’ (inverted negative) faces were also presented. As an 
additional control for low-level visual properties between stimuli, the faces were 
contained in an elliptical mask, and matched for RMS contrast and mean luminance.  
Gabor patches (a sinusoidal grating in a Gaussian window) were used as probes 
in the tilt discrimination task. Bocanegra and Zeelenberg (2009) found that fear faces 
showed facilitation for LSF Gobors (Gabors with SF of <3cpd), but impairment for HSF 
Gobors (SF of >3cpd). In the present experiment, Gobor SF was fixed at 2cpd (which is 
identical to the SF used by Phelps et al., 2006). Psychometric functions were obtained 
using the method of constant stimuli (contrast levels were varied randomly across 
trials). The contrast of the Gabors was randomly taken from a set of Michelson contrasts 
in nine log increments from 2% to 80% (percentage contrast: 2.00, 3.01, 4.54, 6.84, 
10.31, 15.53, 23.39, 35.24, 53.10, 80.00). 
 
6.3.4. Procedure 
Participants began the experimental session by completing the anxiety 
questionnaires. In the experimental task, a central fixation cross was presented for 
500ms, followed by the centrally presented emotional face cue (either neutral, fear or 
happy; at 5x6.6 degrees of visual angle; DVA), which was displayed for 75ms. 
Following an Inter Stimulus Interval (ISI) of 50ms, in which the fixation cross was 
presented, four Gabor patches (each 7.9 x 7.9 DVA) were presented for 40ms, 
equidistant from the central fixation cross (at 11 DVA eccentricity). On every trial, one 
of the Gabors was oriented ±8 from vertical (the target), with the three other Gabors 
always oriented vertically (distractors). Participants were required to indicate which 
direction the target Gabor was tilted in (2AFC), by pressing the left arrow key if the top 
of the Gabor was oriented to the left of vertical (counter-clockwise), and the right arrow 
key if the top of the Gabor was oriented to the right of vertical (clockwise). Correct 
                                       
16 Face numbers: Fear: 009, 016, 024, 037, 050, 059, 068, 079, 088, 095, 104; Neutral: 013, 021, 028, 
041, 056, 065, 072, 083, 092, 099, 110.      
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responses were followed by a tone, whereas incorrect responses were not (see Figure 
6.1. for a schematic of the procedure). Phelps et al., (2006) did not specify an inter-trial 
interval; the present experiment used 200ms between trials (after a response was given).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1, Schematic of an experimental trial used in Experiment 5. A tone was 
sounded when a correct response was given.  
 
There were 1980 trials (3 emotions x 2 manipulation conditions x 10 contrast 
levels x 11 models x 3 repetitions). Target position (the four possible locations of the 
target Gabor), and target orientation (whether the target Gabor was oriented to the left 
or right of vertical), were randomly allocated on each trial. 
 
6.3.5. Data Analysis 
  Phelps et al., (2006) took thresholds at 82% correct, however, lapsing (trials in 
which participants missed the presentation of the stimulus) made thresholds at 82% 
correct unreliable for some observers (i.e. some participants did not reach 82% accuracy 
at asymptote) in the present experiment, so thresholds were taken at 75%. The data for      
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each person, and each condition, were fit with separate Weibull functions. Thresholds 
(75% accuracy) were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA, with emotion (fear, 
happy, neutral) and manipulation condition (upright positive, inverted negative) as 
within participant variables.  
 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Sample Characteristics  
On each of the questionnaire measures there was a normal range of scores (see 
Appendix L), and correlations with performance measures were non-significant (see 
Appendix M).  
 
6.4.2. Facilitation of emotional expression 
As can be seen from the averaged data, there seems to be little effect of emotion 
in either the normal (see Figure 6.2) or manipulated (see Figure 6.3) faces.  
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Figure 6.2. Averaged psychometric functions from Experiment 5. Observers’ average 
accuracy for the orientation task as a function of whether the task was preceded by a 
fearful, happy or neutral upright positive face. 
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Figure 6.3. Averaged psychometric functions from Experiment 5. Observers’ average 
accuracy for the orientation task as a function of whether the task was preceded by a 
fearful, happy or neutral inverted negative face. 
 
Threshold data was entered into a 3 (emotion) x 2 (manipulation) repeated-
measures ANOVA (see Figure 6.4). There was no effect of emotion (F(1.07, 16.05) = 
2.84, p=.11), manipulation (F(1,15) = 2.10, p=.17), or emotion x manipulation 
interaction, (F(1.18, 17.73) = 1.27, p=.28). 
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Figure 6.4. Average (1 SE) 75% thresholds for each condition as a function of 
emotion. 
  
This null result was unexpected given Phelps et al.’s (2006) findings. One major 
difference between the present experiment and Phelps et al.’s, was the addition of the 
happy expression in the present experiment. This had the effect of increasing the length 
of the experiment by half again, and may have been responsible for the large lapsing 
rates. To investigate whether the null effects of emotion and manipulation were due to 
the length of the task, an additional analysis was performed on the first 1320 trials of the 
present experiment (this is the same number of trials used by Phelps et al.). This 
analysis indicated no significant effects of emotion (F(1.12, 16.77) = .22, p=.80), 
manipulation (F(1,15) = 1.30, p=.27) , and no interaction between emotion and 
manipulation (F(1.38, 20.74) = 1.53, p=.23).  
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6.5. Discussion 
Overall, the lack of an emotion effect was unpredicted, and somewhat surprising 
given previous research (Phelps et al., 2006; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). It may 
suggest that the effect of emotion on probe contrast sensitivity is not robust, and 
therefore may not be useful in considering emotion processing outside of awareness.  
The length of the present experiment was significantly longer than Phelps et 
al.’s, (2006) due to the inclusion of the happy expression. The additional analyses 
performed suggest null results were unlikely to reflect the longer duration of the study. 
However, this analysis may have been underpowered, given that the trials were divided 
over three expressions rather than two. Participants did seem to lapse rather a lot in the 
present experiment, making thresholds at 82% (the threshold cut-off used by Phelps et 
al.) unreliable for some.  
The lack of emotion and manipulation effects are unlikely to have been caused 
by the full experiment being underpowered. The same number of trials per condition 
were performed by participants in the present experiment as those performed by 
participants in Phelps et al.’s (2006) experiment. Additionally, 16 individuals 
participated in the present experiment, compared to the 6 participants tested in Phelps et 
al.’s.  
There were slight differences in the method used between Experiment 6, and 
Phelps et al.’s (2006) study. It is possible that the randomly interleaved happy 
expression trials had carry-over effects that affected probe sensitivity following the fear 
expressions. To discover which differences caused the dissimilar results between 
Experiment 5 and Phelps et al.’s experiment, it would be advantageous to follow their 
procedure exactly (i.e. present only fear and neutral expressions, use faces that are not 
matched RMS contrast and mean luminance, and use an inverted face as a control). If, 
with an exact replication, the results do not show the predicted emotion effects, it would 
suggest the method is unreliable. On the other hand, if the predicted emotion effects 
were found, it would suggest that the null effects found in Experiment 5 were caused by 
one of the methodological differences listed above. Therefore, in Experiment 6, the 
procedure used by Phelps et al. will be followed exactly. 
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Experiment 6 
6.6 Method 
Key predictions 
1)  Fearful faces will facilitate contrast sensitivity when presented normally (i.e. 
there will be lower contrast thresholds for probes that follow fearful, 
compared to neutral faces) 
2)  This will not be explained by low-level characteristics (i.e. there will be no 
difference in contrast thresholds for probes that follow inverted emotional 
faces) 
3)  Differences between expressions will be driven by facilitation following 
fearful faces, rather than impairment following neutral faces (i.e. there will 
be a larger difference between upright and inverted fearful faces than 
between upright and inverted neutral faces) 
 
6.6.1. Participants 
Twenty undergraduate and postgraduate students (6 males) participated in the 
study in exchange for course credit, or monetary payment. Their mean age was 25.65 
years (SD=4.21). All observers had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and 
gave informed consent. 
 
6.6.2 Questionnaires
17 
  As in Experiment 5.  
 
6.6.3. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  The apparatus and visual stimuli were the same used in Experiment 5, with 
exception of the following changes:  
1)  Only fear and neutral expressions were presented 
2)  The faces were not contained within an elliptical mask 
3)  Mean luminance and contrast was not equalised across the faces  
4)  Inversion was used as a control for low-level characteristics   
   
 
                                       
17 Anxiety measures were not taken by Phelps et al., (2006), and so this is the only way in which 
Experiment 6 deviates from their design.      
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6.6.4. Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 5 (see Figure 6.5). 
There were 1320 trials (2 emotions x 2 manipulation conditions x 10 contrast 
levels x 11 models x 3 repetitions). Target position (the four possible locations of the 
target Gabor), and target orientation (whether the target Gabor was oriented to the left 
or right of vertical), were randomly allocated on each trial. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Schematic of Experimental paradigm for Experiment 6. A tone was sounded 
when a correct response was given. 
 
6.6.5 Data Analysis 
  Three participants did not achieve more than 82% accuracy for any one of the 
conditions, and were therefore excluded. The data for each of the 17 remaining 
participants was fit with a separate Weibull function within each condition. Thresholds 
(82% accuracy) were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA, with emotion (fear, 
neutral) and manipulation condition (upright positive, inverted positive) as within 
participant variables.  
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6.7. Results 
6.7.1. Sample Characteristics  
On each of the questionnaire measures there was a normal range of scores (see 
Appendix N), and correlations with performance measures were non-significant (see 
Appendix O).  
 
6.7.2. Facilitation of emotional expression 
As can be seen from the averaged data, there does seem to be a small effect of 
emotion on contrast sensitivity in the normal (see Figure 6.6) and inverted (see Figure 
6.7) faces.  
 
 
Figure 6.6. Averaged psychometric functions from Experiment 6. Observers’ average 
accuracy for the orientation task as a function of whether the task was preceded by a 
fearful, or neutral upright face. 
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Figure 6.7. Averaged psychometric functions from Experiment 6. Observers’ average 
accuracy for the orientation task as a function of whether the task was preceded by a 
fearful, or neutral inverted face. 
 
To test this statistically, a 2 (emotion) x 2 (manipulation) repeated-measures 
ANOVA was run on the 82% threshold data
18 (see Figure 6.4). There was a main effect 
of emotion, F(1,16) = 6.64, p<.05, but no main effect of manipulation (F(1,16) = 1.15, 
p=.30) nor an interaction between emotion and manipulation (F(1,16) = 1.17, p=.30). 
Probe contrast thresholds were significantly lower following the presentation of a 
fearful face (M=10.12, SD=6.37) compared to a neutral face (M=11.70, SD=7.74). The 
interaction between emotion and manipulation was non-significant (see above). 
However, to explicitly compare Experiment 6 with Phelps et al., (2006), paired t-tests 
were conducted between the emotions within each manipulation condition. In the 
upright faces, fearful faces (M=8.94, SD=5.84) facilitated contrast performance (neutral: 
                                       
18 An identical analysis was performed on 75% thresholds; There was a marginal main effect of emotion, 
F(1,16) = 4.17, p=.058, and no effect of manipulation (p>.9), or emotion x manipulation interaction 
(p>.7).      
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M=11.27, SD=7.49; t(16) = 3.54, p=<01); whereas in the inverted faces, the effect was 
not significant (fear: M=11.30, SD=7.83; neutral: M=12.11, SD=9.76; t(16) = .71, 
p=.49). To explore whether this was caused by a facilitation following fear, or 
impairment following neutral, paired t-tests were also conducted to test the difference 
between manipulation conditions within each emotion. There was a marginal difference 
between upright fear and inverted fear (t(16) = 1.83, p=.09), and no difference between 
upright neutral and inverted neutral (t(16) = .43, p=.67). This suggests that the emotion 
effect may be driven by facilitated visual processing following the presentation of the 
fearful expression. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Average (1 SE) 82% thresholds for each condition as a function of 
emotion. 
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6.8. Discussion 
Experiment 6 was an exact replication of Phelps et al.’s (2006, Experiment 1) 
study. Results from Experiment 6 show that contrast sensitivity of a probe following a 
fearful face is higher than when the probe follows a neutral face. However, despite a 
near exact replication of Phelps et al.’s study, Experiment 6 failed to find the critical 
emotion by manipulation interaction. Given the pattern of results (Figure 6.8), paired 
comparisons were performed to provide additional insight. Although the results of these 
comparisons should be taken with caution, they suggest that the effect of emotion in the 
upright faces did not also exist on the inverted faces. This is consistent with Phelps et 
al.’s findings, although the effects found in the present experiment were far weaker (e.g. 
there was no significant interaction between emotion and manipulation). Additionally, 
the results from the present experiment tentatively suggest that shifts in contrast 
sensitivity is due to enhanced processing following fearful faces, rather than impaired 
processing following neutral expressions. This is contrary to the findings by Phelps et 
al., where their results seemed to be due to impaired sensitivity following the neutral 
face.  
Despite the difference between emotions being significant only in the upright 
faces, the interaction between emotion and manipulation was not significant. This may 
be due to 1) inversion not being a good control for emotion (i.e. permits some 
processing of residual emotion); 2) low-level characteristics drive some of the ‘emotion’ 
effect; 3) the emotion effect not being particularly large in the upright faces. Results 
from Experiment 1 of this thesis showed that inversion is not a good control for emotion 
recognition; where although recognition was reduced from upright to inverted faces, the 
effect was relatively small and performance with inverted faces remained well above 
chance. Therefore, it is possible that the emotion effect found in the present experiment 
is due to the extraction of emotional meaning in both the upright and inverted 
conditions. On the other hand, results from Experiment 3 showed that an effect that has 
been previously attributed to the extraction of emotional expression (i.e. Yang et al., 
2007), is the result of low-level visual characteristics.  
The findings from Experiment 6 are dissimilar from those of Experiment 5, 
where there was no change in probe sensitivity following different expressions. The 
difference between results may be due to the various methodological alterations: 
although the same models were used, the faces in Experiment 5 were modified to help 
control for low-level characteristics (e.g. mean luminance and RMS contrast were      
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equalised across stimuli). There was no effect of emotion in Experiment 5 (using well-
controlled stimuli), and the facilitation by fear in Experiment 6 only tended to occur 
more in the upright than inverted faces (there was no significant emotion by 
manipulation interaction). It is possible that low-level characteristics were responsible 
for the emotion effect found in Experiment 6. However, this still would not account for 
why Phelps et al., (2006) found no difference in probe sensitivity between fearful and 
neutral faces when they were spatially inverted. The differences in findings between 
Experiments 5 and 6 could also have been caused by the inclusion of the happy face in 
Experiment 5, which lengthened the experiment, and may have caused carry-over 
effects. It is possible that Phelps et al. used a longer inter-trial interval to limit carry-
over effects (this is unknown, given that they did not report an inter-trial interval).  
   A recent experiment, conducted by Phelps and colleagues (Ferneyhough, Stanley, 
Phelps & Carrasco, 2010) also failed to find any difference in probe contrast sensitivity 
when the probes followed fearful compared to neutral faces. Ferneyhough et al., 
investigated the effects of spatial attention on probe discrimination by presenting an 
emotional face cue on one side of fixation, or on both sides of fixation. Participants 
responded to both the location and orientation of a target Gabor, which was presented 
alongside a distractor Gabor (oriented vertically) at various contrasts. They found no 
effect of emotion; there was no difference in contrast sensitivity following fearful versus 
neutral faces for the valid, invalid or distributed cues (the distributed cue condition is 
the most similar to the procedure used in the present experiments). 
  It is possible that the SF of the Gabors that were used by Ferneyhough et al., 
(2010) to probe sensitivity were not likely to support emotional facilitation. They used 
Gabors with fairly high SF content (4cpd). Results from Bocanegra and Zeelenberg 
(2009) suggest that facilitation in response to fearful faces occurs in stimuli up to 3cpd. 
The same explanation cannot be levelled at Experiments 5 and 6 of this thesis, as 2cpd 
stimuli were used in both experiments. Indeed, facilitation of contrast sensitivity was 
found following the presentation of a fearful face (compared to neutral) in Experiment 
6, suggesting that the probe SF was appropriate.  
To date, only three studies have investigated emotional processing using the 
probe contrast sensitivity paradigm, and there does seem to be some controversy over 
which stimuli reliably elicit the effects (Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Phelps et al., 
2006; Ferneyhough et al., 2010). A recent meta-analysis of findings from (conscious) 
visual-probe studies suggest that a threat-related attentional bias is not observed in non-     
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anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). There is some evidence of an effect of 
emotion on spatial attention using the visual-probe task in nonanxious individuals 
(Pourtois et al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2006; Cooper & Langton, 2006; Holmes et al., 
2009), but the extent to which these are explained by low-level characteristics is unclear 
given the absence of control stimuli.  
The present Experiments were conducted in an attempt to find a dependent 
variable (in addition to response times) that would be sensitive to emotional face 
prioritisation outside of awareness. As the effects found in Experiments 5 and 6 are not 
robust (i.e. they are inconsistent with eachother), it was deemed inappropriate to explore 
this methodology in an unconscious version of the task. Indeed, given time constraints, 
no further attempts were made to discover a different methodology with which to 
explore unconscious emotional face processing.  Instead the final experiment in this 
thesis returns to an intriguing effect found in the previous experiments that explored 
unconscious emotional face processing using CFS. In Experiments 3 and 4 of this thesis 
there was a robust ‘face’ effect, where normal faces were found to emerge faster from 
CFS than manipulated faces. In the next Chapter, this ‘face’ effect in unconscious vision 
will be explored further using a CFS paradigm in an individual who finds it difficult to 
use facial information.  
In conclusion, findings from Experiments 5 and 6 suggest that the effect of 
emotion on subsequent probe contrast sensitivity is not robust. Despite finding an 
emotion effect using an exact replication of Phelps et al.’s (2006) study, the findings 
were weak and did not generalise to a modified version of the task that included better 
control stimuli and additional expressions.  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  124   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  125   
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigating unconscious face processing in a case of prosopagnosia  
 
7.1. Introduction 
  Experiment 3 of this thesis found that fearful faces emerge from suppression 
faster than other expressions due to their low-level characteristics, rather than the 
extraction of emotional content. However, an interesting ‘face’ effect was found in both 
Experiments 3 and 4, suggesting that high-level processing does occur during CFS 
suppression. Normal (upright positive) faces were found to emerge from suppression 
faster than less recognisable, manipulated (inverted negative) faces. These results 
concur with other studies that show upright faces break from suppression faster than 
inverted faces (Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007). This advantage for familiar stimuli 
presented unconsciously using CFS has also been found for words (recognisable vs. 
unrecognisable words; Jiang et al., 2007).   
Do these results imply that binocular rivalry is resolved at high-level visual areas 
(such as FFA)? There have been inconsistent results regarding the site of binocular 
rivalry resolution. Some researchers have found that brain activation mirrors conscious 
perception at low-level visual areas, such as LGN and V1 (Tong & Engel, 2001; 
Polonsky et al., 2000; Lee & Blake, 2002; Wunderlich et al., 2005), whereas others have 
found that brain activation does not mirror perceptual alternations until higher visual 
sites, such as the inferotemporal cortex (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997; Tong et al., 
1998). Recently it has been suggested that the resolution of binocular rivalry occurs 
over multiple stages (Freeman, 2005; Nguyen et al., 2003; Blake & Logothetis, 2002), 
thus validating both sets of neuroimaging findings. The advantage for normal faces over 
manipulated (inverted/ negative) faces suggests that some information from the 
suppressed stimulus reaches high-level visual areas (where face-specific processing 
occurs). Jiang et al. (2007) suggest two possible routes by which this may occur: either      
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1) some information from the suppressed stimulus is cortically processed to high-level 
visual areas, or 2) information from the suppressed stimulus does not persist at a cortical 
level, but is processed subcortically and projected to high-level cortical regions.  
The present Chapter will investigate the unconscious processing of face stimuli 
by examining emergence times in an individual that cannot process face identity 
information due to cortical lesions. Prosopagnosia is a type of visual agnosia (loss of 
recognition ability) that is specific to faces (Hecaen & Angelergues, 1962). It can be 
acquired through brain injury, or stroke, with lesions typically affecting the occipital 
and temporal lobes (Rossion, Caldara, Seghier et al., 2003). It can also be congenital, 
and therefore not caused by neurological pathology, but evident for as long as the 
individual can remember (possibly from birth; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006). The 
similarity between acquired (AP) and congenital (CP) prosopagnosia is unclear 
(Humphreys, Avidan & Behrman, 2007), therefore the present Chapter will focus on 
AP.  
It has been proposed that prosopagnosic individuals suffer from an inability to 
process faces configurally (Levine & Calvanio, 1989; Ramon, Busigny & Rossion, 
2010). Note that the definition of configural processing here encompasses all three 
‘types’ defined by Maurer et al., 2002: first-order relations, holistic, and second-order 
relations (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1). Configural processing is the ability to process 
the face as whole, rather than simply as a collection of parts (Maurer et al., 2002). 
Comparing upright and inverted face processing has provided evidence for the absence 
of configural processing in prosopagnosia. Some studies have shown an absence of an 
inversion effect in prosopagnosia (equal performance for upright and inverted faces; 
McNeil & Warrington, 1991; Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; Delvenne et al., 2004; 
Busigny & Rossion, 2009; occasionally, there have been reports of prosopagnosic 
individuals being better with inverted than upright faces; Farah et al., 1995; de Gelder et 
al., 1998), or a reduced inversion effect (reduced performance for inverted than upright 
faces, but the size of the effect is smaller than that found in control participants; Barton 
et al., 2003; Bukach et al., 2006). These results suggest that configural processing is 
disrupted in prosopagnosia. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, identity and emotional expression may be processed 
somewhat separately (Bruce & Young, 1986; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; Andrews & 
Ewbank, 2004; Adams, Gray et al., 2010), although are not completely distinct (see      
  127   
Calder & Young, 2005). So, are prosopagnosic individuals able to process emotional 
facial expressions? 
A number of studies suggest that emotional face processing is intact in 
prosopagnosia (Bentin, DeGutis, D’Esposito & Robertson, 2007; Duchaine, Parker & 
Nakayama, 2003; Humphreys et al., 2007; Riddoch, Johnston, Bracewell, Boutsen & 
Humphreys, 2008). However, the literature is full of controversies, with some finding 
disruption of emotional face recognition in CP (Bentin et al., 2007; Humphreys et al., 
2007) but not AP (Humphreys et al., 2007), and others reporting significant emotional 
face recognition impairments in AP also (Riddoch et al., 2008, Stephan et al., 2006). 
These inconsistencies are likely to be driven by the different methods used, and 
participants tested across experiments. To summarise the evidence, it can be suggested 
that some prosopagnosic individuals show relatively unimpaired emotion recognition, 
whilst others show vast disruption to emotional face recognition. In addition, some 
prosopagnosic individuals show impairment only with specific emotions. For example, 
in a matching task, an AP observer showed normal recognition of happy expressions, 
but impairment for the other 5 basic expressions (surprise, fear, sad, disgust and anger; 
Stephan, Breen & Caine, 2006).  
Interestingly, there is some indication that emotional expression can modulate 
face processing in prosopagnosia; the very presence of an emotional expression may 
facilitate identity processing. A study by de Gelder and colleagues (2003) showed that 
in a relatively large number of prosopagnosic individuals (N=7), emotional expression 
enhanced facial identity processing. When required to perform a matching task on the 
identity of a face (which of two faces matched a third), the prosopagnosic observers had 
very low accuracy. However, when the face displayed an emotional expression, 
accuracy increased. In this experiment, participants were given one whole face and 
asked to match which out of two face parts matched the whole face. The ‘parts’ were 
either the mouth or the eyes of a face. The faces were neutral or emotional (angry or 
happy), and were either upright or inverted (i.e. in the neutral upright condition, the 
neutral whole face was presented along with two neutral parts that were also upright). 
De Gelder et al. found that when matching neutral faces, none of the prosopagnosic 
participants displayed an inversion effect (similar RTs were found for the upright and 
inverted conditions), whereas a significant inversion effect was found in the control 
participants. However, when the faces displayed emotion, most participants, including 
each of the prosopagnosic individuals (with the exception of one) displayed a normal      
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face inversion effect (i.e. faster responses to upright compared to inverted faces). These 
results suggest that emotional expression may modulate face processing in 
prosopagnosia. 
To date, most research investigating emotional face processing in prosopagnosia 
has focused on whether recognition of facial emotional is impaired. However, a recent 
study has investigated whether emotional prioritisation is evident in AP. Peelen, Lucas, 
Mayer and Vuilleumier (2009) conducted several studies investigating emotional 
prioritisation in an individual with AP. In a visual search task, emotional (fearful/ 
happy) or neutral face targets were presented with neutral distractors. The target and 
distractors always had a different identity (thus when the target was neutral, it was a 
different identity to the neutral distractors). They found facilitated search in the AP case 
when the target was emotional, compared to when the target was neutral.  
In the same paper Peelen et al. (2009) also used a change detection procedure. A 
face was presented on one side of fixation and a house on the other side of fixation for 
250ms. After an interval, the face and house were presented again, but one, neither or 
both of the pictures could have changed. Participants were required to indicate which 
stimuli had changed on each trial. The expression of the face (fearful or neutral) was 
always constant over the change (only the identity of the face could differ). The 
prosopagnosic individual correctly identified the same number of changes in the house 
stimuli as controls, but was much worse for the faces (controls were better at detecting 
changes in the faces compared to houses, and slightly better for fearful than neutral 
expressions). However, the prosopagnosic observer detected changes more accurately 
when the face was fearful than when it was neutral. The authors suggest that this is 
because attention is directed towards the fearful faces due to their emotional content. 
Neither of Peelen et al’s experiments included controls for low-level visual 
characteristics. Although the general impairment towards faces may have been driven 
by a lack of higher-level face processing in the prosopagnosic observer, the emotional 
effect may have been driven by low-level characteristics of the emotional face stimuli. 
Visual search experiments can be particularly affected by low-level characteristics of 
the stimuli (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.1), therefore it is impossible to tell whether the 
apparent fear prioritisation in a case of AP was driven by the extraction of emotional 
meaning, or low-level characteristics. 
Note that the exploration of face processing in prosopagnosia tends to be 
confined to individual case studies (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999). This is an obvious      
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limitation, as it is unclear whether results can be generalised to the prosopagnosic 
population. However, prosopagnosia is relatively rare, and thus studies are limited to 
small sample sizes due to recruitment constraints. The present chapter will use a single 
case of AP to investigate whether a face prioritisation effect is present in the AP 
participant (as found in normal observers in Experiments 3 & 4 of the present thesis).  
PHD is a 52 year-old man, who had a severe head injury in 1977 and has had 
severe (acquired) prosopagnosia since. There have been two previously published 
studies on PHD (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999; Eimer, 2000). Neurological scanning has 
revealed that PHD has a focused region of damage in the left temporal-parietal region 
(Eimer & McCarthy, 1999). However, PHD’s lesion has been described as ‘moderately 
diffuse’ (p. 255, Eimer & McCarthy, 1999) and this may be reflected in his additional 
cognitive deficits, including visual agnosia (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999; Eimer, 2000). 
Eimer and McCarthy (1999) tested PHD with a battery of face and object tests. 
They found his object recognition was within the normal range, yet he was unable to 
learn and recognise unfamiliar faces. He was also very poor at recognising famous 
people by their faces, but was within the normal range when describing them from their 
names. For detailed results on his performance on a range of tasks, see Eimer and 
McCarthy (1999). Eimer and McCarthy also investigated PHD’s face processing with 
ERPs. As previously noted (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1 of this thesis), normal 
individuals consistently display a negative deflection in ERP amplitude at around 170 
ms post-stimulus in response to face stimuli (N170; Eimer, 1998). However, PHD did 
not display such an effect. This suggests that PHD has difficulties in encoding the 
structure of a face, prior to identification (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999).  
PHD’s face processing was also investigated by Eimer (2000) using ERPs. ERPs 
were measured in response to pictures of familiar faces, unfamiliar faces and houses. A 
simple task was used to ensure PHD was attending, in which he had to detect infrequent 
‘target’ pictures (pictures of hands). In concurrence with Eimer and McCarthy, there 
was no evidence of a face-specific N170 in PHD’s ERP data, nor did PHD show any 
ERP effects of familiarity.  
The primary aim of the present Chapter was to investigate the unconscious  
‘normal’ (upright positive) face advantage found in Experiments 3 and 4 using an AP 
individual (PHD). Before using a CFS paradigm to investigate unconscious face 
processing in PHD, it is first necessary to establish his recognition of both normal 
(upright positive) and manipulated (inverted negative) emotional faces.        
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Experiment 7 
 7.2. Introduction    
It is unclear whether emotion recognition is preserved in prosopagnosia, as the 
research to date has been inconsistent (e.g. Humphreys et al., 2007; Riddoch et al., 
2008). Generally, the inconsistent results may be due to the diversity in lesion locations 
between prosopagnosic individuals, or differences between tasks. 
Recently, there has been some limited research on PHD’s emotion recognition 
(Mestry, Menner, Godwin, McCarthy & Donnelly, 2010). Mestry et al., (2010) used a 
matching task to investigate PHD’s discrimination of emotional intensity (within each 
emotion). Morphs of emotional faces were presented alongside each other, and he was 
asked to discriminate which face was more emotional. Happy, fear, angry and disgust 
expressions were explored. PHD was found to have normal discrimination of happy and 
fear expressions (compared to 4 age-matched controls), but very poor discrimination of 
angry and disgust expressions. In an additional experiment, a categorisation task was 
conducted, where participants had to label the expression of a centrally presented face 
(given 2 choices). PHD’s results were similarly sensitive to controls when categorising 
between positive and negative faces, but he was poor at categorising between 
expressions that were both negative (e.g. fear and angry).  
A recent study investigated the effect of inversion on emotion recognition in a 
prosopagnosic individual. Baudouin and Humphreys (2006) presented upright and 
inverted emotional faces and asked participants to judge whether the face was happy or 
angry. The individual with AP was better than chance at discriminating emotion (happy 
vs. angry) in upright faces, but not with inverted faces, and his performance was 
generally lower than that of controls. This suggests that the information he used to 
classify emotional expression was disrupted with inversion.  
Baudouin and Humphreys (2006) argue that the prosopagnosic individual’s 
emotion processing may not be normal. Instead, they suggest that he may use “critical 
local features” (Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006, p. 1368) when making emotional 
classifications. Although there was no evidence of configural processing in their 
prosopagnosic observer (i.e. no composite effect), he did show a significant inversion 
effect when categorising emotion. This suggests that it is not simply configural 
processing that is disrupted by inversion, and inversion may also impact on the local 
features that are critical to emotion perception in prosopagnosia.      
  131   
The primary aim of the present experiment was to find a good control for 
emotion processing for the prosopagnosic observer, PHD, so the unconscious face effect 
could be investigated. PHD’s emotional face recognition to both normal and 
manipulated faces was explored using a version of Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, 
angry, happy and fearful faces were presented centrally, and participants categorised the 
faces (using a 3AFC) according to their emotional expression. In the present 
experiment, the faces are either: 1) ‘normal’ (upright and with positive luminance 
polarity), or 2) ‘manipulated’ (inverted with negative luminance polarity). Experiment 1 
investigated emotion recognition in a normal undergraduate sample. The results 
indicated that both inversion and negation impaired emotion recognition, and 
importantly, the effects of inversion and negation were additive. Is this effect also likely 
to be found in an individual with AP? The effects of inversion and polarity negation on 
identity processing in prosopagnosia are unclear, as are their effects on emotion 
processing. 
PHD’s emotion recognition of the manipulated (inverted negated) faces may be 
1) impaired, or 2) unaffected, relative to the upright positive faces. However, given the 
inversion effect found when making emotional classifications in an AP individual 
(Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006), it is predicted that PHD will also show impaired 
recognition of emotional faces when they are inverted and negative.  
 
Key Hypotheses 
1)  Generally, PHD’s emotion recognition will be worse than that of Controls 
2)  PHD’s emotional recognition will be further impaired with the inverted 
negative faces 
3)  PHD will have good recognition of happy and fear faces, but his recognition 
of angry faces will be impaired 
4)  PHD and Controls will recognise emotional faces more accurately when they 
are presented in high emotional intensity, rather than low emotional intensity 
 
7.3. Method 
7.3.1. Participants 
  PHD: PHD (described in detail above) is a left-handed 52 year old AP with no 
visual field loss (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999) and corrected to normal visual acuity. He 
gave informed consent.       
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Control participants: Three male, age-matched controls were used. Control A: 
left-handed, 59 years old, Control B: left-handed, 52 years old, Control C: right-handed, 
47 years old. All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and all gave informed 
consent. 
 
7.3.2. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  Face stimuli consisted of the same 4 male models that have been used previously 
in this thesis (in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4; taken from the NimStim face set; 
Tottenham et al., 2002), each displaying fear, happy, and angry expressions. The faces 
were either presented normally (upright positive) or manipulated (inverted negative). 
Both 50% and 100% emotional morph-strength faces were used (the morphs were 
prepared as in Experiment 1). 
  Stimuli were prepared and presented using Matlab (The MathWorks, USA), with 
PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). As with the previous Experiments in this 
thesis (Experiments 1 and 2), the faces were scaled, cropped, displayed within a black 
elliptical mask and matched for mean luminance and RMS contrast. As with 
Experiment 1, the faces were presented at 3.5 x 2.5 of visual angle (viewing distance 
= 65cm).  
 
7.3.3. Procedure 
 A fixation cross was presented for 500ms, followed by a centrally presented 
face. The face was displayed for 200ms for the Control participants; for PHD it was 
displayed until he made a response, or up to a maximum of 10 seconds. It was 
impossible to use the same timings for PHD and controls, as at shorter durations, PHD’s 
performance would likely have been at chance levels, whereas at longer durations, 
control participants would have been at ceiling (pilot data from undergraduates suggest 
that with 500ms presentation duration, participants were uniformly good). Participants 
classified each face as one of three emotions (fear, happy or angry) in a 3AFC. All 
participants used arrow keys to toggle through the possible options and selected their 
response using the space bar. There were 384 trials, (2 stimulus manipulations x 3 
emotions x 2 emotion strengths x 4 models x 8 repetitions) in a single session.  
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7.3.4. Data Analysis 
Statistical tests were conducted on the frequency of correct responses using chi-
square tests. PHD was considered as a single case, and data from the Control 
participants were averaged. 
 
7.4. Results 
7.4.1. Emotional categorisation 
PHD: PHD was good at categorising emotional faces when they were upright 
positive (collapsed across emotion and morph: 90% correct; see Figure 7.1. and 
Appendix P). He was significantly worse at categorising expression when the faces 
were inverted negative (collapsed across emotion and morph: 42% correct; 
2(1)=16.79, p<.001). PHD had statistically equal recognition of the different 
expressions (p>.1), and morphs (p>.1). There was no difference in performance between 
PHD’s accuracy and the mean Control accuracy (p>.8). 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Frequency results for a) PHD and b) averaged Control (±1SE) as a function 
of manipulation condition, emotion and morph-level. 
 
It is possible that PHD resolved the emotion task using a speed/ accuracy trade-
off. Therefore as an additional check, RTs were analysed for PHD as he was given up to      
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10 seconds to respond to the emotion of a face. PHD’s mean RT data are presented in 
Figure 7.2. 
 
Figure 7.2. PHD’s mean RTs (S) across emotion, and morph for a) Upright Positive 
and b) Inverted Negative faces (error-bars = 1 SD). 
 
  PHD responded to most faces (90.63%) within the ten-second cut-off. He does not 
show a speed/accuracy trade-off; he tended to respond faster when he achieved very 
good emotion classification (r =-0.77, p<.01; R
2=0.59). 
Controls: The mean Control data suggest that Controls correctly identified more 
expressions when they were upright positive than inverted negative (see Figure 7.1; 
collapsed across emotion and morph; 89.1% vs. 36.1%, 2(1)= 36.54, p<.001). There 
was no effect of morph (p>.3), or emotion (p>.2).  
 
7.4.2. Sensitivity and Bias 
Given the possible role of bias in a 3AFC experiment, the data were also 
converted into A scores, as in Experiment 1 (see Section 2.2.6 for the formulae used). 
Although these data could not be analysed statistically, the pattern of sensitivity found 
for PHD (Figure 7.3) and Controls (Figure 7.4) can be seen. As previously suggested, 
when considering sensitivity it can also be useful to examine bias. Given the interest in 
the present experiment in the strategies used by PHD to resolve emotion recognition, 
bias (B) is also presented.      
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Figure 7.3. PHD’s sensitivity and bias as a function of emotional expression and 
emotion strength for a) Upright Positive, and b) Inverted Negative faces. The black line 
represents chance performance on sensitivity, and the grey line represents a bias of 0. 
Figure 7.4. Sensitivity and bias as a function of emotional expression and emotion 
strength for a) Upright Positive, and b) Inverted Negative faces for the mean Control 
data (errorbars=±1SD). The black line represents chance performance on sensitivity, 
and the grey line represents a bias of 0. 
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PHD was more accurate with upright positive faces than inverted negative faces, 
even when biases were accounted for. PHD tended to respond conservatively towards 
upright positive angry faces when they were low in intensity, but liberally when they 
were high in intensity. Additionally he tended to respond conservatively towards upright 
positive fearful faces when they were high in intensity, but liberally when they were low 
in intensity. This differential effect of bias in the negative emotions across emotional 
intensity was unexpected, but may be caused by a strategy he was using to decode the 
low-morph strength emotional faces. He showed little effect of bias in the inverted 
negative faces. 
The Controls had higher recognition of upright positive compared to inverted 
negative faces. The general pattern of sensitivity found from the Control participants 
follows the pattern found in the mean undergraduate sample in Experiment 1 (see 
Figure 2.3). There were individual differences in bias across the Control participants 
(indexed by the large error-bars). 
 
7.5. Discussion 
  PHD was more accurate when categorising the emotional expression in normal 
(upright positive) faces than manipulated (inverted negative) faces. Generally, his 
pattern of results was similar to the control participants (which followed the expected 
pattern given results from Experiment 1). PHD’s response time data suggest that his 
results were not based on a speed-accuracy trade-off. Both PHD and Controls were 
biased in their responses, and there were differences across individuals in the amount 
and direction of bias.  
The impairment of PHD’s emotion classification with inversion and negation 
was predicted given the findings of an inversion effect for emotional stimuli in AP 
(Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006). However, in identity processing research, some 
experimenters report a lack of inversion effect in AP (Boutsen & Humphreys, 2002; 
Delvenne et al., 2004; Busigny & Rossion, 2010). PHD’s emotion processing in 
inverted faces was not tested directly here. However, he did show that when emotional 
faces were both inverted and negated, he was worse at classifying emotional expression. 
This is critically important for the proposed investigation of the unconscious ‘face 
effect’ in PHD. Generally, the pattern of results for PHD was very similar to the 
controls. However, he was considerably slower, so it cannot be said that he has normal 
emotional face processing.       
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There was no statistical difference between PHD’s recognition of happy and 
fear/angry expressions found in the present experiment. However, he did tend to show 
good recognition of happy expressions, and worse recognition of low-intensity angry 
faces, thus concurring with Mestry et al.’s (2010) findings with PHD, using a different 
experimental paradigm. 
It is important to note that although the tasks were comparable for PHD and the 
control participants, PHD was given up to 10 seconds to view the faces, whilst Controls 
were limited to 200ms. Thus PHD’s results are not equivalent to Controls. Given that 
PHD had up to 10 seconds of viewing time on each trial, it is possible that he was using 
analytic strategies (for example, judging a happy face by its white teeth) to resolve the 
task. There is some evidence to suggest that prosopagnosics use analytic strategies to 
match/ discriminate faces (Davidoff & Landis, 1990; Farah, 1990). If PHD was using 
analytic strategies, the strategies cannot have been particularly useful in the manipulated 
faces (as PHD had fairly poor recognition of inverted negative emotions). It is possible 
that he could have been using cognitive strategies that may have been developed over a 
number of years, and thus may not have been directly transferrable to the manipulated 
images. Nevertheless, PHD was not at chance in recognising emotion in the 100% 
intensity manipulated faces; this suggests that he is able to adapt his strategy according 
to the task and stimuli presented.  
To conclude, results from this emotional recognition experiment suggest that 
inversion and luminance polarity negation impair emotional face categorisation in PHD, 
an individual with AP. Therefore emotional faces with these manipulations will be used 
as a control to investigate unconscious emotional face processing in PHD. 
  
Experiment 8 
7.5. Introduction 
In the present Experiment, the processes responsible for the unconscious face 
effect (found in Experiments 3 and 4) will be explored. In addition to findings from CFS 
(e.g. Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007), other paradigms have also provided evidence 
that faces can be processed outside of awareness. Using a backward masking procedure, 
it has been found that neurological and behavioural priming towards facial identity can 
occur when the prime faces are presented unconsciously (Kouider, Eger, Dolan & 
Henson, 2008; Henson, Mouchlianitis, Matthews & Kouider, 2008).       
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The extent to which activity in face-selective brain regions (i.e. FFA) is 
correlated with awareness has been investigated extensively. Using a binocular rivalry 
paradigm, some have found that that activation is not induced in the FFA in response to 
unconsciously presented faces (Pasley et al., 2004; Williams et al., 2004, Tong et al., 
2006). Jiang and He, (2006) presented faces unconsciously using CFS whilst recording 
brain activation using fMRI. Contrary to results with binocular rivalry (e.g. Pasley et al., 
2004), although activation in the FFA was reduced in response to invisible faces, it was 
still reliably observed. Activation in FFA in response to faces rendered unconscious 
using CFS (Jiang & He, 2006) may be responsible for the unconscious face effect found 
in previous experiments of this thesis (Experiments 3 and 4).  
The present experiment will investigate the unconscious face effect in PHD: an 
individual with AP. It is known that PHD finds it very difficult to use information from 
faces (Eimer & McCarthy, 1999). So, will faces still be granted preferential access to 
awareness in this individual? Critically, in this paradigm, the participants are not 
required to recognise the face (or categorise the face in any way). Recall that emergence 
time from CFS is proposed to be an index of image saliency. There is evidence that this 
includes the saliency of low-level properties of an image, such as contrast (Tsuchiya & 
Koch, 2004), and high-level salience, like meaning or familiarity (Jiang et al., 2007). 
Experiments 3 and 4 of this thesis (along with evidence from two separate research 
groups; Jiang et al., 2007; Yang et al., 2007) have found strong evidence that normal 
faces are afforded preferential access to awareness, compared to manipulated controls. 
If the effect found in normal samples is caused by the meaning of the face stimuli, then 
this effect would be unlikely to be evident in PHD (there is no evidence that faces are 
particularly salient for him; Eimer & McCarthy, 1999).   
As discussed previously, de Gelder et al., (2003) found a modulatory role of 
emotion in identity processing for a number of prosopagnosic individuals. Given these 
findings, PHD may show a ‘face’ effect in the emotional, but not neutral expressions 
(i.e. upright positive faces may emerge faster than inverted negative faces when they 
display happy, fear or angry expressions, but no difference between manipulation 
conditions in the neutral faces).  
In addition to investigating the unconscious face effect, the present experiment 
will also explore the effect of emotion on unconscious face processing in PHD. A recent 
experiment investigated the effect of emotion on attention in individuals with AP. 
Peelen et al., (2009) conducted a series of experiments to investigate whether      
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emotionally expressive faces guide attention in prosopagnosia. They found that emotion 
did guide attention in AP, replicating the effect found in normal populations, although 
they did not control for low-level characteristics. Given their findings, emotion may 
modulate unconscious processing of faces in AP. Experiment 3 (present thesis) showed 
that, in normal samples, CFS emotion effects (e.g.‘fear prioritisation’) are driven by the 
low-level characteristics of the stimuli. Thus, it is likely that any emotion effects found 
for PHD would also be driven by low-level properties, and not the extraction of 
emotional meaning. However, it is unclear whether PHD will show any unconscious 
emotion effects, such as the fear enhancement found in normal populations (Experiment 
3). 
In this experiment, a CFS paradigm will be used to discover whether normal 
(upright positive) emotional faces emerge from suppression faster than manipulated 
(inverted negative) emotional faces in a prosopagnosic individual. The procedure used 
was similar to that used in Experiment 3, with one significant difference. In the present 
experiment, in order to ascertain whether any effects are specific to face processing, an 
additional ‘house’ condition is used. As PHD has displayed normal recognition of 
buildings (McCarthy, Evans & Hodges, 1996), in this extra condition, houses were 
displayed in a CFS procedure. The houses were either normal (upright and positive 
luminance polarity) or manipulated (inverted with negative luminance polarity).  
Again, a control condition was included in which response biases were 
measured. There are limitations associated with this control condition (see Chapter 4, 
Section 4.4.), however it is included as it does provide some information on the biases 
that may affect the CFS data. This control condition consisted of both the face/house 
and the dynamic noise being presented to both eyes (i.e. not suppressed), and the 
contrast of the face/house slowly increased (as in Jiang et al., 2007). 
 
Key hypotheses: 
1.  PHD will not show a ‘face effect’ (there will be no difference in 
emergence between upright positive and inverted negative faces).  
 
In addition: 
2.  PHD may show a face effect in the emotional faces, but not in the neutral 
faces (upright positive faces emerge faster than inverted negative faces 
when they are emotional)      
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3.  PHD may display an effect of emotion that is based on low-level 
characteristics (any effect of emotion found in the upright positive faces 
will be evident to the same extent in the inverted negative faces) 
 
7.6. Method 
7.6.1. Participants 
  PHD and the same three control participants were used as Experiment 7. 
 
7.6.2. Apparatus and Visual Stimuli 
  The same 100% emotional faces were used as in Experiment 3; each of the 4 male 
models taken from the Nimstim face set (Tottenham et al., 2002) displayed angry, fear, 
happy, and neutral facial expressions. The dynamic noise was created the same way as 
in Experiments 3 and 4. The house stimuli used in the present experiment consisted of 4 
photographs of different houses (independently sourced). They were based in a 
rectangular frame and matched for mean luminance and RMS contrast. They were 
presented either spatially upright with positive luminance polarity, or spatially inverted 
with negative luminance polarity. 
 
7.6.3. Procedure 
 The faces and houses were presented in CFS (Figure 7.5) and in the control 
condition following the procedure from Experiment 3. The experiment was blocked by 
stimulus type (face/house). There were 256 trials with the face stimulus, (2 suppression 
conditions x 2 stimulus manipulations x 4 emotions x 4 models x 4 repetitions) and 64 
trials with the house stimulus (2 suppression conditions x 2 stimulus manipulations x 4 
models x 4 repetitions). Blocks were counterbalanced between participants: PHD and 
Control B completed the face block first, whereas Controls A and C completed the 
house block first.      
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Figure 7.5. Schematic of the procedure used in Experiment 8, for the house stimulus, 
including a) the CFS condition, and b) the control condition. Dashed circles represent 
the (other) possible locations the houses could appear.  
 
7.6.4. Data Analysis 
  RTs were computed on correct responses only. PHD’s error rate was 4.4%, whilst 
the mean error rate for the Controls was 0.52% (SD=0.48%). The data were prepared 
and normalised using the same method at in Experiments 3 and 4. RTs below 250ms 
were removed, the reciprocal (1/RT) of the data was taken, and outliers were removed 
(scores > mean 3SD within participant and condition). The removed scores accounted 
for less than 2% of PHD’s data, and less than 1% of the Control participant data. 
Removed scores were replaced by the mean of the condition. 
  PHD’s RTs were analysed using an independent ANOVA (as used by a number of 
researchers performing statistical tests on single case studies; Williams, Savage & 
Halmagyi, 2006; Striemer et al., 2009; Bate et al., 2009). Conducting an ANOVA with 
only one subject, and using individual trials as the experimental unit, has associated 
problems. As the data are not independent, the degrees of freedom are inflated, which 
will overestimate the significance of any differences (Type 1 error). However, there is a 
lack of a suitable alternative. Control participant data were prepared in the same way as 
PHD’s, and were then averaged, before being submitted to an independent ANOVA.  
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7.7. Results 
7.7.1. CFS condition 
The mean transformed scores from the CFS condition for PHD and Controls are 
displayed in Figure 7.6. 
PHD: In the CFS face condition, PHD had significantly faster responses to 
upright positive faces (M=.127, SD=.038) than inverted negative faces (M=.094, 
SD=.049; indexed by a main effect of manipulation; F(1,120)=17.95, p<.001)
19. In other 
words, ‘normal’ faces are responded to faster than ‘manipulated’ faces when presented 
unconsciously in a prosopagnosic individual. PHD did not show faster responses to any 
particular emotional expression (main effect of emotion; p>.05), and this was true in 
both the upright positive and inverted negative faces (no emotion x manipulation 
interaction; p>.05). However, with the house stimulus, PHD’s responses did not differ 
between upright positive and inverted negative (indexed by a non-significant effect of 
manipulation in the house condition: t(30) = 1.34, p=.19).  
  Controls: The mean control data displayed a significant effect of manipulation, 
whereby upright positive (M=.129, SD=.027) faces were responded to faster than 
inverted negative faces (M=.100, SD=.034; F(1,120)= 37.14, p<.001). This ‘face 
facilitation’ effect replicates that found in Experiments 3 and 4 with an undergraduate 
sample, and is comparable to the effect found in PHD. The mean control data was 
modulated by emotion, (F(3,120) = 8.43, p<.001), and there was a significant emotion x 
manipulation interaction (F(3,120) = 5.60, p=.001). Exploration of the interaction 
suggested that there was not an effect of emotion in the positive upright faces (p>.05), 
but there was in the inverted negative faces (F(3,60) = 10.79, p<.001). The emotion 
effect in the inverted negative faces was due to slowed responses to angry faces 
(Bonferroni corrected t-tests between angry and other emotions: fear, t(30)=5.25, 
p<.001; happy, t(30) = 3.19, p<.05; neutral, t(30) = 4.44, p<.001). This slowed response 
to angry faces was also seen in the mean RT data from undergraduates in Experiment 3. 
That it was only found in the inverted negative stimuli (and not also in the upright 
positive stimuli) was unexpected, but consistent with the effect being driven by low-
level characteristics. 
                                       
19 This effect was also significant when tested with the more conservative Mann-Whiney U test, 
Z=3.68, p<.001.      
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  There was no effect of manipulation for the house stimulus in the Controls (t(30) 
= .66, p>.05). Thus, there are comparable findings for PHD and Controls in the house 
condition. Overall, these results suggest that the effect of inversion and luminance 
polarity negation on unconscious house processing is less pronounced than in face 
processing. There are two possible reasons for this; either there is something special 
about faces and words (Jiang et al., 2007) that makes them unconsciously salient; or 
familiar objects in general are more salient, but that the houses still looked familiar 
when they were manipulated. In reference to this second point, the house stimuli that 
were used in this experiment are presented in Figure 7.7. 
 
Figure 7.6. Mean reciprocal RTs (±95% CI) for the face CFS condition for PHD and 
the mean Control data as a function of emotion and manipulation condition.      
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Figure 7.7. Upright positive and inverted negative house stimuli 
 
7.7.2. Control condition 
The mean transformed scores from the control condition for PHD and the mean 
Control data are displayed in Figure 7.8. As in Experiments 3 and 4, response biases 
may have affected the CFS data. It is unclear the extent to which the control condition 
adequately measures these biases (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4), although it may provide 
some approximation.  
  PHD: PHD did show condition-specific effects in the control condition. PHD 
detected upright positive faces (M=.154, SD=.025) faster than inverted negative faces 
(M=.108, SD=.033; main effect of manipulation, F(3,120) = 80.14, p<.001). In addition, 
PHD’s detection speed was modulated by the expression of the face (main effect of 
emotion, F(3,120) = 4.05, p<.01), whereby happy faces were detected faster than 
neutral faces, t(62) = 2.77, p<.01. There was no difference in PHD’s detection times 
across manipulation condition in the house stimuli, t(30) =.17, p=.87. 
Controls: The mean Control data showed that upright positive faces (M=.190, 
SD=.015) were detected faster than inverted negative faces (M=.167, SD=.018; F(1,120) 
= 72.57, p<.001). There was also a main effect of emotion (F(3,120) = 8.99, p<.001), 
where fear and happy expressions were detected faster than angry expressions 
(Bonferroni corrected t-tests between angry and fear, t(62) = 3.40, p<.01; and happy, 
t(62)=3.13, p<.05). This effect of slowed detection of angry is in line with the slowed      
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responses to angry found in the CFS condition. The Control participants detected the 
upright positive and the inverted negative houses at similar speeds (t(30) =.82, p=.42). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.8. Mean reciprocal score (±1SD) from the face Control condition for PHD and 
the mean Control data as a function of emotion and manipulation condition. 
 
Assuming that the CFS and control conditions were subject to the same response 
biases, they can be combined to estimate unbiased emergence times. The unbiased      
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measure of emergence time was calculated in the same way as in Experiments 3 and 4; 
as variability across conditions was slightly higher in the CFS than the control data, 
each data set was first normalised using a zscore transformation. Thus the emergence 
time for each emotion and stimulus manipulation was given by CFS zscores – control 
zscores
20. 
 
7.7.3. Unbiased measure of emergence 
Emergence scores for PHD and the Control participants are displayed in Figure 
7.9. 
  PHD: For PHD, in emergence time data, there was a significant interaction 
between emotion and manipulation (F(3,120) = 7.02, p<.001). The interaction was 
caused by there being an effect of emotion in the upright positive faces (F(3,60) = 8.78, 
p<.001), but not in the inverted negative faces (F(3,60) = 1.31, p=.28). In the positive 
faces, angry emerged slower than fear (t(30) = 3.04, p<.01), happy (t(30) = 4.35, 
p<.001) and neutral (t(30) = 3.49, p<.01). PHD showed a significant effect of 
manipulation in the angry faces (inverted negative faster than upright positive, t(30) = 
2.37, p=.025). There was also an effect of manipulation in the happy expression (upright 
positive faster than inverted negative (t(30) = 3.81, p<.001), suggesting face-related 
processing in the happy expression that cannot be explained by low-level 
characteristics. Additionally, PHD’s data showed no difference across manipulation 
condition for the house stimuli, t(30) = .77, p=.45 (as would be expected, given there 
was no difference in the CFS or Control conditions). 
  Controls: In the mean Control data, there was a main effect of emotion, F(1,120) 
= 7.39, p<.001, but no other effects were significant (p>.05). The main effect of 
emotion was due to fear expressions emerging faster than happy (t(62) = 3.91, p<.001), 
and angry (t(62)= 3.73, p<.001), expressions, and also, happy expressions emerging 
slower than neutral expressions (t(62) = 2.73, p<.05). Again, there was no difference in 
emergence times between upright positive and inverted negative houses for control 
participants (t(30) = .16, p=.91). 
                                       
20 Parallel analyses using the difference between the raw scores, rather than z-scores produced almost 
identical results.      
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Figure 7.9. Mean CFS corrected by control data (CFS-control; ±95% CI) for PHD and 
Control mean as a function of emotion and manipulation condition. 
 
7.8. Discussion 
The present experiment used a CFS paradigm to investigate unconscious 
emotional face processing in the prosopagnosic individual, PHD. Results from the CFS 
condition in the present experiment indicate that the same general face prioritisation 
effect found in Experiments 3 and 4 of this thesis is replicated in a case of 
prosopagnosia (PHD responded faster to upright positive faces than inverted negative 
faces). This was unexpected, given that the ‘face-effect’ was hypothesised to be driven      
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by the meaningfulness of the stimuli. PHD is an individual who finds it very difficult to 
use information from faces, and does not find them particularly salient; indeed, he does 
not show the classic, robust, early electrophysiological response to faces (N170, Eimer 
& McCarthy, 1999). However, he still displays a convincing ‘face’ prioritisation effect 
in CFS. This suggests that it may not be the assessed meaningfulness of the stimuli that 
drives preferential access to awareness in this paradigm. It is possible that even in an 
individual who finds it very difficult to extract information from faces, it is the 
familiarity of the stimulus that is responsible for the effect. Thus, even though faces 
seem to hold little meaning for PHD, he (and his visual system) is used to seeing faces 
as upright and positive, rather than inverted and negative.  
PHD was better at categorising emotional faces when they were presented 
normally, compared to when they were manipulated (Experiment 7). Is it possible that 
PHD’s accurate overt recognition of the normal faces drove their faster emergence from 
suppression? It is unclear whether PHD’s emotion recognition (as found in Experiment 
7) is based on analytic/cognitive strategies. These cognitive strategies are unlikely to 
have affected responses in the CFS paradigm; participants were instructed to record the 
location of the stimulus as soon as they saw anything emerge from the noise – they did 
not need to recognise the identity or emotion of a stimulus before responding.  
De Gelder et al. (2003) suggested a modulatory role for emotion on identity 
processing. They found that prosopagnosics performed better on a face-matching task 
when the faces displayed an emotional expression, compared to neutral. The 
neurological process by which this may occur was also investigated. In response to 
emotional faces, prosopagnosics (with damage to areas typically associated with face 
identification), showed brain activation in emotion-sensitive pathways (e.g. the SCS and 
amygdala). A modulation of face processing by emotion in the present study would 
have been evidenced by a face prioritisation effect (faster responses to upright positive 
faces than inverted negative faces) found in the happy, angry and fear expressions, but 
not in the neutral faces. PHD showed no such emotion-contingent effects, emotion did 
not appear to modulate face processing in PHD when the faces were presented 
unconsciously.  
Peelen et al., (2009) used visual search and change-blindness tasks to explore 
whether emotional faces are prioritised in prosopagnosia. They found that an AP 
individual showed attentional capture with consciously presented fearful and happy 
expressions (over neutral faces). This was explained by the emotion processing systems      
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used to preferentially process emotional information functioning normally in AP. In the 
present experiment, no evidence for unconscious emotional prioritisation was found in 
PHD. It would be interesting to replicate Peelen et al.’s method in PHD for conscious 
attentional prioritisation with good control stimuli, to determine the role of low-level 
visual characteristics in these ‘emotion’ effects.  
Note that although the CFS data give an overall measure of the time it takes for 
unconscious stimuli to reach awareness, it may include different ‘conscious’ detection 
times (variation in times to respond to the stimuli after they emerge from suppression). 
Our control data suggest that these conscious detection times did vary across the stimuli 
used in the present experiment for both PHD and Controls. As discussed previously, 
(Chapters 4, Section 4.4), the correct interpretation and implementation of these control 
data is not entirely clear. Not withstanding these reservations, in the present experiment, 
when these conscious detection times were eliminated from the CFS data, the only 
significant effect of manipulation in PHD’s data (where upright positive faces emerged 
faster than inverted negative faces) was in the happy expression. This is interesting and 
may suggest there is something special about PHD’s processing of happy expressions 
(i.e. the processing of happy expressions may have been less disrupted by his lesions). 
This concurs with findings from Experiment 7, and Mestry et al. (2010), and results 
from another prosopagnosic individual (Stephan et al., 2006). 
In the present experiment, the controls showed a face effect in the CFS 
condition, thus replicating findings from Experiments 3 and 4 with an older sample. 
Emotion also modulated response time in the control participants. As the emotion effect 
was found in the inverted negative faces, it is likely to be caused by the low-level 
characteristics of the stimuli.  
Neither PHD nor the controls showed any effect of manipulation in the house 
condition. No preliminary test was used to explore how recognisable the houses were 
when normal (upright positive) versus manipulated (inverted negative). It is possible 
that the manipulations do not impair recognition of a house to the same degree as they 
impair face perception. Alternatively, it is possible that faces can be processed (and 
prioritised) when they are unconsciously presented, whereas houses are not. Jiang et al., 
(2007) found that upright faces emerged from suppression faster than inverted faces, 
and that recognisable words emerged from suppression faster than unrecognisable 
words. Jiang et al.’s study is the only experiment to date that has explored unconscious 
processing of meaningful stimuli – other than faces – under CFS. In order to ascertain      
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why there is a lack of manipulation effect in the house condition, it would be necessary 
to investigate recognition of the house stimulus with the inversion/polarity 
manipulations.  
In summary, the present experiment has found that a prosopagnosic individual 
does display prioritised processing of faces when they are presented unconsciously. 
Further investigations on PHD and other prosopagnosic individuals would be necessary 
to explore this effect further and delineate the processes by which this face effect is 
preserved in an individual with very poor face recognition. To conclude, the 
unconscious face effect found in previous Experiments using a CFS paradigm cannot be 
explained in terms of the ‘meaningfulness’ of the stimuli. The results found here 
warrant additional investigation, and suggest that the use of prosopagnosia is valuable in 
investigating face and emotional face processing, both inside and outside of awareness. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
8.1. Summary  
  Theories of emotion processing with an evolutionary perspective highlight the 
adaptive nature of fast and efficient processing of emotional information (e.g. Ohman & 
Mineka, 2001). This has lead to a large number of studies designed to investigate whether 
emotional stimuli are granted prioritised access to attention and awareness. 
There is some evidence that emotional information is preferentially attended; 
experiments have shown attentional prioritisation of emotional over neutral stimuli (e.g. 
Koster et al., 2004; Pourtois et al., 2004; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). Importantly 
though, the vast majority of the studies investigating attentional prioritisation of emotional 
information have failed to use control stimuli. Thus, they are unable to differentiate between 
the extraction of emotional content, or low-level characteristics.  
Evidence from visual search does not indicate that faces can be processed without 
attention, as there is no robust evidence for a ‘pop-out’ effect (e.g. Fox et al., 2000; Ohman 
et al., 2001; Horstmann, 2007). Although some studies have reported a more efficient search 
with threatening rather than positive or neutral faces (e.g. Fox et al., 2000), others have 
found faster search for happy expressions (Calvo & Marrero, 2009; Juth et al., 2005). 
However, both sets of results may be due to the low-level characteristics of the stimuli 
(Calvo & Marrero, 2009; Coelho et al., 2010; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). Specifically, it 
seems that with pictorial faces, happy expressions have particularly salient low-level 
characteristics (e.g. Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008), and with schematic emotional face 
stimuli, angry expressions have particularly salient low-level characteristics (e.g. Coelho et 
al., 2010).       
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Neuroimaging studies indicate that emotional faces can be processed with limited 
attention. When attention is distracted away from emotion stimuli, amygdala activation 
elicited by fearful expressions is increased compared to that in response to neutral 
expressions (Vuilleumier et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 2003). This suggests that emotional 
faces can differentially activate emotion-specific brain areas when they are not the focus of 
attention. However, when attention is fully distracted, there is no difference in amygdala 
activation in response to fearful versus neutral faces (Pessoa et al., 2004). None of these 
high-impact neuroimaging studies (cited above) used control stimuli. Therefore, it is 
possible that these results are not caused by the extraction of emotional meaning.  
The prioritisation of emotional faces outside awareness has been investigated 
using a number of methods, with varying success. Backward masking has been used 
considerably (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1), but most of the research using this paradigm 
has not used objective awareness tests; thus the effects may be conditional on conscious 
processing (Pessoa et al., 2004).  
The experiments that have used binocular rivalry as a behavioural tool to investigate 
the relative predominance of emotional over neutral faces have shown that emotional faces 
(both threatening and positive) are prioritised; however, some suffer from major 
experimental flaws (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007; Bannerman et al., 2008; Yoon et al., 2009). In 
these studies, it was unclear whether the stimuli were in fact rivalling (due to large stimuli, 
and overall similarity in the stimuli presented to each eye), or whether predominance of the 
emotional stimulus was caused by the suppressed, or the dominant image (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4.3). My recent study controlled for both issues, but could not distinguish whether 
the results were caused by high-level or low-level factors (Gray et al., 2009). Continuous 
flash suppression (CFS) has also been used to discover whether emotional faces are 
prioritised when presented outside of awareness (Yang et al., 2007). Despite a conclusive 
fear prioritisation effect, again, results from Yang et al.’s study were ambiguous regarding 
the origin of the effect (high- vs. low-level characteristics). 
Finally, neuroimaging techniques have been used to monitor brain activation in 
response to unconsciously presented emotional faces. These studies have suggested that 
fear-specific brain activation can occur outside of awareness (Pasely et al., 2004; Williams et 
al., 2004; Jiang & He, 2006); as amygdala activation is increased in response to fearful 
compared to neutral faces, even when the faces are unconsciously perceived (i.e. suppressed 
in rivalry or CFS).      
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  Generally, few studies that have investigated emotional face processing have 
controlled for low-level visual characteristics of the stimuli. Within emotion processing 
research, researchers have typically investigated differences between emotional and 
neutral faces. The neutral face does act as a control for emotion (as it has none). 
However, the low-level characteristics vary a great deal between a neutral and an 
expressive face, meaning that there are many reasons why responses might differ. Low-
level visual characteristics are critically important in attentional allocation. Indeed, in 
visual search experiments, ‘pop-out’ occurs when the target has a visual feature that is 
unique (e.g. colour, luminance contrast, or orientation) and not shared with the 
distractors (Triesman & Gelade, 1980). Salient visual information (i.e. stimuli with high 
contrast) is also prioritised when presented outside of awareness (Tsuchiya & Koch, 
2005). Therefore, there is danger that without adequate controls, the emotional face 
literature is simply confirming low-level effects that are well-documented with simple 
stimuli. The use of control stimuli in emotional face processing research is therefore 
critically important in the interpretation of any emotion effects.  
The work presented in this thesis represents a well-controlled, thorough 
investigation of the unconscious processing of emotional expressions. An overview of 
the major results of each experiment are summarised below, including a discussion of 
the limitations of each study, and ideas for further research. 
 
8.1.1. Experiments 1 & 2: Emotion categorisation of normal and manipulated broad, 
high and low spatial frequency faces  
This thesis first addressed the issue of what makes a good control for low-level 
characteristics in emotional face processing. Generally, studies investigating emotional 
face processing have not used controls. In the rare instances that low-level controls are 
used, inverted faces have been chosen (Phelps et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2007; 
Bannerman et al., 2008; Gray et al., 2009; Holmes et al., 2005). Previous research has 
shown a limited effect of inversion on emotion recognition (Prkachin, 2003; McKelvie, 
1995), despite a large effect on identity recognition (Valentine, 1989; Freire et al., 
2000). With this in mind, stimuli were created that retain most low-level characteristics 
but are more difficult to recognise than normally presented faces, and inverted faces. 
Spatial inversion and luminance polarity negation are two manipulations that do not 
affect critical low-level features, such as contrast, luminance, spatial frequency. When 
combined, these manipulations significantly impair identity processing (e.g. Kemp et      
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al., 1990; McMullen et al., 2000). However, there has not been a systematic study of 
both manipulations on emotion recognition. In Chapters 2 & 3 it was shown that 
orientation and luminance polarity manipulations disrupted emotion processing with 
additive effects. Therefore the best control was given when both manipulations were 
used: low-level properties were vastly similar to the original images, but the extraction 
of emotional information was severely disrupted. This was true for BSF (Experiment 1; 
Experiment 2), HSF and LSF (Experiment 2) faces.   
The interpretation of the data from latter studies in this thesis is reliant on the 
inversion and negation manipulations severely disrupting the extraction of emotional 
meaning from the faces. Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that the emotional content of the 
manipulated stimuli was significantly harder to recognise than the normal face stimuli. 
However, it is possible that residual emotion processing may exist, even in faces with 
these manipulations. For example, it is arguable that even though emotions are very 
difficult to classify, participants may be able to discern that the manipulated faces are 
generally positive or generally negative. This is unlikely, as participants would have 
been above chance at classifying emotion (performance did not differ from chance for 
the inverted negative expressions in Experiment 1, although with increased presentation 
time, performance was significantly better than chance in Experiment 2). It is also 
possible that although observers cannot overtly classify the emotions, that they have 
some physiological reaction (i.e. increased skin conductance responses) to the threat-
related manipulated stimuli. Neither of these possibilities was addressed in this thesis, 
providing an obvious development for future research. 
 
8.1.2. Experiment 3: Unconscious processing of threat 
There has been some indication that emotional faces can be processed outside of 
awareness (Yang et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2006). A number of studies have reported 
sub-cortical, amygdala-based activation in response to fearful faces that are presented 
unconsciously (Williams et al., 2004; Pasley et al., 2004, Jiang & He, 2006). However, 
it is unclear whether this is paralleled in behavioural measures (due to methodological 
issues with the behavioural tasks employed; see above). To be adaptive (i.e. increase 
chances of survival; Ohman & Mineka, 2001), it is critical that the emotional 
prioritisation impacts on behaviour (e.g. by directing attention towards emotional 
stimuli, or granting them prioritise access to awareness).       
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Recall that an interesting behavioural study investigated the unconscious 
processing of emotional faces and found a fear prioritisation effect (Yang et al., 2007). 
However, the design of this study could not differentiate whether the fear prioritisation 
was driven by the extraction of emotional meaning (in both the upright and inverted 
faces) or low-level characteristics. Therefore, in Experiment 3, using the control stimuli 
validated in Experiment 1, the origin of the unconscious fear prioritisation effect 
previously found with CFS (Yang et al., 2007) was explored. Results from Experiment 
3 indicated that all the variability in prioritisation across emotional expressions was 
explained by the low-level visual characteristics of the stimuli, as the same emotion 
effect was found in both the normal (upright positive) and the manipulated (inverted 
negative) faces. 
The control condition used in Experiment 3 was derived from a similar control 
condition used by Jiang et al. (2007). It attempted to measure the bias in conscious 
detection times that might have been influencing the CFS data. For example, if a 
manipulated face is generally less recognisable, observers may respond more 
conservatively / slowly to it. Therefore, the CFS response times may consist of 
unconscious detection time plus conscious bias. The control condition was used to 
measure conscious bias, enabling it to be extracted from the CFS data to produce an 
‘unbiased’ emergence from suppression time. However, there are several problems (that 
have been raised earlier in this thesis, Chapter 4, Section 4.4.) with this approach. 
Firstly, the rate of contrast increase chosen for the control trials was arbitrary (although 
based on that used by Jiang et al.). Secondly, it is not clear whether the same detection 
mechanisms are being tapped in the CFS and Control conditions. In the CFS condition, 
the stimuli do not appear to slowly emerge into awareness, as if their contrast is being 
increased. Instead, they tend to either be perceived or not perceived (suggesting a 
minimal effect for conscious biases in the detection times of stimuli in CFS). Given 
these limitations, the control data and unbiased emergence data are interesting, while 
main conclusions should be drawn from the CFS data. 
It would be interesting to discover whether the low-level explanation of emotion 
effects found in Experiment 3 can also explain emotion effects found across different 
types of emotional stimuli. There is some indication that emotional scenes are 
preferentially processed (e.g. Calvo & Lang, 2004). To investigate this possibility, a 
good control for low-level characteristics for emotional scenes would first need to be      
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verified. Similar manipulations to those used in this thesis (i.e. inversion and luminance 
polarity negation) would offer a good starting point.  
 
8.1.3. Experiment 4: Investigating the visual characteristics that contribute to 
unconscious emotion processing: spatial frequency 
To ascertain which visual characteristics are involved in the unconscious 
processing of emotional faces, the influence of spatial frequency (SF) was investigated 
in Experiment 4. The low-spatial frequency (LSF) information contained in an 
emotional face has been suggested to account for the prioritisation of emotional stimuli 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2003). This proposition has been supported by the suggested 
involvement of the largely magno-cell dominated, sub-cortical processing pathway, in 
rapid emotion processing (LeDoux, 1996). Holmes, Green and Vuilleumier, (2005) 
found that LSF fearful faces were selectively attended in a dot probe technique; this 
effect was not found with high-spatial frequency (HSF) faces. In Experiment 4, little 
effect of emotion was found in any of the SF categories (HSF, LSF, or broad spatial 
frequency; BSF). Certainly, there was no greater effect of emotion in the LSF faces than 
the faces in the other SF bands. Holmes et al. used conscious presentation, whereas 
Experiment 4 used a CFS method to present the faces unconsciously. Taking these data 
together, it is possible that the LSF prioritisation of emotional faces is only observable 
in conscious vision.  
The effect found in Experiment 3 for the BSF faces was not replicated in 
Experiment 4. It could be that the there was not enough power to detect the emotion 
effect (less participants were tested). However, the ‘face’ effect (with a statistically 
similar effect size to the emotion effect in Experiment 3) was found in Experiment 4. 
There were methodological differences between Experiments 3 and 4. Place-holders 
were used in Experiment 4 to control for the suggested contour-confound in the HSF 
faces. The use of hybrid SF faces (a face containing an expression in one SF band, and a 
neutral face in the other SF band) would also have controlled for the HSF contour 
confound. Hybrid SF faces have been used by other researchers when investigating 
emotion effects (Winston et al., 2003; Pourtois et al., 2005). It would be interesting to 
compare the results found in Experiment 4 with a study that used these hybrid SF faces 
in CFS. Additionally, observers’ search strategies may have changed between 
Experiments 3 and 4, as the stimuli were, on average, less face-like in Experiment 4      
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(HSF, LSF and BSF faces were interleaved). Blocking the design by SF may reduce this 
effect. 
Further studies could extend the investigation into which low-level 
characteristics are responsible for the fear-prioritisation effects found in Experiment 3. 
Results from Experiment 4 suggest that SF is not a critical variable. However, given the 
pattern of results from Experiment 3, low-level characteristics are responsible for the 
fear effect. As discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4), it is possible that local luminance 
contrast in the eye region may lead to preferential processing of fear. A previous 
experiment found that the amygdala shows increased activation in response to just the 
eye region of a fear face (compared to the eye region of a neutral face) when presented 
unconsciously (Whalen et al., 2004). In addition, fearful eyes were found to emerge 
faster than neutral eyes when just the eye area of an emotional face was presented under 
CFS (Yang et al., 2007). Therefore, the fear prioritisation effect found in Experiment 3 
is likely to have been driven by high-contrast in the eye region, although this was not 
tested directly in the present thesis.  
 
8.1.4. Experiments 5 & 6: Investigating the effect of a previously presented emotional 
face on probe contrast discrimination 
The use of a different dependent measure (than reaction times) was investigated 
in Experiments 5 and 6. Some have measured contrast discrimination of a visual probe 
to investigate emotional facilitation (Phelps et al., 2006; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 
2009). Despite the limited research using this method, Phelps et al.’s (2006) study has 
been cited over 80 times (source: Web of Science). However, to date, only fearful 
expression facilitation (cf. neutral expressions) has been investigated using this 
paradigm (Phelps et al., 2006; Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009). There is some 
ambiguity in the direction of the emotion effect, and whether fearful faces enhance, or 
neutral faces impair contrast sensitivity for a subsequently presented probe (Phelps et 
al., 2006).  
A number of studies that have investigated emotional prioritisation have only 
done so for fearful (vs. neutral) faces (e.g. Phelps et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2005; 
Whalen et al., 1998). Neuroimaging data has tended to suggest robust activation in 
subcortical brain structures in response to fearful faces (Breiter et al., 1996; Morris et 
al., 1996), whereas activation in response to other expressions is mixed (Morris et al., 
1996; Whalen et al., 1998). It is possible that fear expressions alone tend to be explored      
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in this research due to an issue of power (the power to find a significant effect is 
reduced when more comparisons are being made). However, there does not seem to be 
any reason why the same emotion effects (enhancement or attentional/ unconscious 
prioritisation) would not also be predicted to occur in response to angry expressions as 
well as fear expressions. Indeed, some of the visual search literature has focussed on 
angry expressions (Ohman, et al., 2001; White, 1995; Fox et al., 2000; Horstmann, 
2007); it is possible that this is because fear expressions are difficult to represent in a 
schematic (which have been used extensively to limit low-level effects). There has been 
some suggestion that the amygdala specialises in threat processing (Whalen et al., 
1998). However, theoretically, if the emotional face effects are driven by a threat-
prioritisation, then they should generalise to other threatening (like angry) expressions. 
In turn, they should not generalise to happy expressions (although in the literature a 
happy’ effect has also been found, Calvo & Marrero, 2009). It is difficult to get a 
complete picture of what is happening in emotional face processing when only fear and 
neutral expressions are tested.  
All experiments reported in this thesis presented fear, neutral, happy and angry 
expressions, with the exception of Experiments 5 and 6. In Experiment 5, fear, neutral 
and happy faces were presented, and the expressions were limited to just fear and 
neutral in Experiment 6 (to exactly replicate Phelps et al., 2006). The results of 
Experiments 5 and 6 were somewhat surprising. Overall, the probe contrast 
discrimination was not robustly affected by the expression of a previously presented 
face. The effect found by Phelps et al., (2006) was not evident at all in Experiment 5, 
where subtle changes in the design of the study, including the addition of a happy face, 
seemed to nullify the effects. Using a near exact replication of Phelps et al.’s study in 
Experiment 6, a significant ‘fear’ effect was found, but there was not a convincing 
emotion by manipulation interaction.  
It would be interesting to explore the role of low-level characteristics in other 
conscious attentional prioritisation paradigms. For example, the classic visual-probe 
task, or exogenous cuing task (that index visuo-spatial attention) could be investigated 
using manipulated faces as a control for low-level characteristics.   
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8.1.5. Experiments 7 & 8: Investigating unconscious face processing in a case of 
prosopagnosia  
Motivated by the findings from Experiments 3 and 4 (and those found by Yang 
et al., 2007 and Jiang et al., 2007), the present thesis also investigated the face 
prioritisation effect. Upright positive faces consistently emerged from suppression faster 
than inverted negative faces (Experiments 3 and 4), and this tended to be a stronger 
effect than that of emotion (Experiment 4). Experiments 7 and 8 attempted to 
investigate this effect in an individual with acquired prosopagnosia. Experiment 7 
investigated the suitability of using manipulated faces as controls for emotional faces in 
the prosopagnosic individual. Unconscious face processing in the prosopagnosic 
individual was explored in Experiment 8. Critically, he did show the same unconscious 
face effect, whereby normal faces emerged faster than manipulated faces. This suggests 
that the processing required for the unconscious face effect may not be dependent on 
intact cortical face processing, or being able to extract information from a face easily. 
There were constraints in the number of trials/duration of the experiment, as the 
prosopagnosic observer tested tended to find it difficult to concentrate for a long period 
of time. Thus, collecting data over a succession of days would be a good way to collect 
a larger number of trials, which would help to reduce the confidence limits on the mean 
RT scores.  
 
8.2. General comments 
In every experiment in this thesis (with exception of Experiments 7 & 8, with 
the prosopagnosic individual), anxiety measures were taken. A considerable volume of 
research suggests that individual differences in anxiety significantly impact threat-
related processing. Indeed, leading models of anxiety propose that threatening 
information can be processed before conscious appraisal, and is granted prioritised 
access to attention and awareness to a greater extent in anxious than non-anxious 
individuals (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). There is even some indication that the attentional 
effects found in the visual-probe task are not reliably found in normal samples, but are 
robustly found in anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). No effect of anxiety was 
found on the dependent measures of any of the experiments in the present thesis.  
The experimental designs used in this thesis were not optimised to discover an 
effect of anxiety: participants were not pre-selected for anxiety levels; clinically anxious 
participants were not tested; and samples did not tend to include a large number of      
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participants. However, individual differences in anxiety were not the main focus of this 
thesis. Anxiety measures were taken to check that anxiety was not a confounding factor 
across experiments.  
It is possible that emotional faces are unconsciously prioritised based on a 
combination of both high-level and low-level factors. In the present Experiments, all of 
the variance can be explained by low-level visual characterisics. However, there may be 
individual differences in the magnitude of an additional high-level (i.e. emotional 
content) effect. In anxious individuals, high-level factors may add to the effect of low-
level characteristics, increasing the emotion effect by further prioritising fear, and 
perhaps anger in the emergence from suppression. This is a possibility that would help 
explain the vast emotional face prioritisation literature in anxious participants (see 
Section 1.5).  
It would therefore be interesting to conduct an experiment based on Experiment 3 
on clinically anxious participants (given the above hypothesis, clinically anxious 
participants should demonstrate the largest high-level emotional effect). It is predicted 
that in a clinically anxious population, the emergence of emotional faces into awareness 
may be modulated by the basic low-level features (as found in the normal population), 
with an additional effect of higher-level emotional meaning. In other words, it is 
predicted that the effects of fear prioritisation will be greater in anxious participants, in 
line with findings from previous experiments probing attentional prioritisation (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). 
  The present thesis concentrated exclusively on emotional face stimuli. Emotional 
faces may be somewhat ecologically valid, as facial expressions inform us about the 
environment and potential threats (Ohman, 2002). The emotions displayed by models 
used in the experiments of the present thesis were selected on the basis of their validity 
(from the NimStim face set, Tottenham et al., 2009). However, static faces are very 
rarely seen, and some research has suggested that dynamic faces are much more 
ecologically valid (Kilts, Egan, Gideon, Ely & Hoffman, 2003). The low-level 
characteristics of faces are relatively easy to control, but emotional faces are not 
particularly arousing stimuli (compared to images of negative and positive scenes; Lang 
et al., 1993, or dynamic faces; Kilts et al., 2003). It would be interesting to investigate 
the effects found here for more arousing stimuli.  
Finally, it is possible that the distinction between the extraction of emotional 
content and low-level characteristics in the prioritisation of emotional information may      
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be considered unimportant. The fact that the fear prioritisation effect (found in 
Experiment 3) was driven entirely by low-level characteristics does not negate the fact 
that the fear-prioritisation effect was found. Theories of emotion processing suggest that 
the threat content of a stimulus drives its prioritisation (e.g. Ohman & Mineka, 2001; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, data from the present thesis suggests that one should 
be careful when interpreting data from emotional face studies. Findings from the present 
thesis suggest that the apparent threat biases can be explained without threat-specific 
processing, or the extraction of meaning from threatening stimuli from sub-cortical 
pathways. Instead, it may also suggest that our facial expressions have developed to be 
salient to our visual systems.  
 
8.3 Concluding remarks 
The main points from this collection of experiments are that 1) emotional 
expression may facilitate emergence into awareness; 2) when emotion is prioritised it is 
due to low-level visual characteristics, not the extraction of emotional meaning; 3) It is 
unclear whether the emotion prioritisation is driven by a particular SF band; 4) Face 
specific processing occurs during unconscious vision; 5) unconscious high-level face 
processing may not be dependent on intact cortical face processing. 
  A number of researchers have started questioning the basic emotion-prioritisation 
effects, and are investigating them using well-controlled paradigms (e.g. Coelho et al., 
2010; Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). Indeed, Pessoa and Adolphs, (2010) provide a 
review that challenges the traditional idea that sub-cortical brain regions drive rapid 
processing of emotional information (note that this traditional idea receives significant 
support; see review by Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). Instead, Pessoa and Adolphs 
emphasise the involvement of more general-purpose cortical regions in threat detection. 
Thus, the question of whether emotional face prioritisation is driven by the extraction of 
emotional meaning, or low-level visual characteristics, is being considered widely. This 
thesis is timely in its exploration of this question, and contributes to the resolution of 
this high profile debate, and theoretical tension.  
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Appendices 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Experiment 1: Bias data 
A.1. Data analysis 
The hits (H) and false alarms (FA) were converted into proportions, and then into B a 
non-parametric measure of bias (Grier, 1971), which is given as 
 
                                                 (A1) 
 
If the proportion of hits were lower than the proportion of false alarms, a different 
formula was used (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), where 
 
            
  
¢  ¢  B  =
FA 1-FA ( ) -H 1-H ( )
H 1-H ( )+FA 1-FA ( )
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú                                                   (A2) 
 
Bias scores range from 1 to -1, with values less than 0 indicating a bias towards 
the ‘yes’ response (i.e. the happy response when the face is happy), and values greater 
than 0 indicating bias towards the ‘no’ response (i.e. the fear or angry response when 
the face is happy). A value of 0 represents no bias. 
 
A.2. Design 
The B scores were entered into a 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA, with 
emotional face (angry, happy, fear), orientation (upright, inverted), polarity (positive, 
negative), and morph strength (low, high) as within subject IVs.  
  
¢  ¢  B  =
H 1-H ( ) -FA 1-FA ( )
H 1-H ( )+FA 1-FA ( )
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú      
  164   
A.3. Results 
There was a significant main effect of polarity (F(1,20)= 17.22, p=.001), and 
significant interactions between polarity and emotion (F(2,40)= 4.32, p<.05), 
orientation and morph (F(1, 20)= 5.37, p<.05), emotion and morph (F(2,40)= 7.89, 
p=.001), and a significant three-way interaction between orientation, polarity and morph 
(F(1, 20)= 10.70, p=.01). 
Generally, a liberal criterion was adopted when the stimuli were ambiguous. 
Participants were more conservative when the faces were positive polarity than negative 
polarity (positive: M=.17, SD=.01; negative: M=0.11, SD=0.11). In the positive faces, 
there was no difference between the emotions (p>.05). However, in the negative faces, 
fear (M=.02, SD=.10) was responded to more liberally than happy (M=.18, SD=.13; 
t(20) = 3.98, p=.001) or angry expressions (M=.13, SD=.14; t(20) = 2.14, p<.05). This 
suggests that when the stimuli were ambiguous, fearful faces were responded to more 
liberally than angry or happy expressions. This may be the result of fearful faces being 
slightly more ambiguous than angry or happy expressions, and generally a little harder 
to categorise.  
Another example of a more liberal criterion used with ambiguous stimuli is that 
in the 50% morph strength condition, upright faces (M=.17, SD= .05) were responded to 
more conservatively than inverted faces (M=.12, SD=.10), t(20) = 5.03, p<.001. 
Whereas in the 100% morphs, there was no difference in bias between the two 
orientations (p>.05). 
In the 50% morph, fear (M=.02, SD=.15) was responded to more liberally than 
happy (M=.22, SD=.11; t(20) = 4.05, p=.001) and angry (M=.19, SD=.15; t(20) = 3.14, 
p<.01). Whereas in the 100% morph there was no difference between the emotions 
(p>.05). Again, this suggests that when stimuli are ambiguous, participants become 
more liberal in answering ‘fear’ than ‘happy’ or ‘angry’.  
In the 50% morph, there was a main effect of orientation (F(1,20) = 25.30, 
p<.001), polarity (F(1,20) = 24.10, p<.001) and a significant interaction (F(1,20) = 
18.69, p<.001). The interaction shows that upright faces were responded to more 
conservatively than inverted faces when they were presented in positive polarity (t(20) 
= 6.47, p<.001), but not negative polarity (p>.05). And also positive faces were 
responded to more conservatively than negative faces when they were upright 
(t(20)=6.32, p<.001), but not inverted (p>.05). In the 100% morph, there was no 
significant effect of orientation or polarity on bias (p>.05).      
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Figure A1. Bias as a function of emotional expression and emotion strength for a) 
Upright Positive, b) Inverted Positive, c) Upright Negative, and d) Inverted Negative 
faces.  
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Appendix B 
Experiment 1: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table B1.  
Sample characteristics: Experiment 1 
Anxiety Questionnaires   M (SD)  Min  Max 
STAI-T  39.71(12.97)  20  74 
FNE  15.43 (9.09)  0  30 
SADS  4.48(5.64)  0  23 
SDS  3.24 (1.67)   0               8 
STAI-S  35.67 (13.82)  20          75 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  167   
Appendix C 
Experiment 1:  
Correlations between performance and anxiety measures 
 
Table C1. Correlations between sensitivity and questionnaire measures 
      STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry   1  0.03  0.12  0.27  0.14  -0.07 
Positive    2  -0.09  -0.05  0.04  -0.08  -0.12 
  Fear   1  -0.22  -0.14  0.01  -0.14  0.03 
    2  -0.06  0.00  0.17  -0.05  -0.19 
  Happy   1  -0.22  -0.10  -0.19  -0.34  0.26 
    2  -0.17  -0.06  0.04  -0.21  -0.09 
Upright   Angry   1  -0.53*  -0.49*  -0.22  -0.20  0.27 
Negative    2  -0.46*  -0.51*  -0.15  -0.15  -0.16 
  Fear   1  -0.33  -0.39  -0.19  -0.28  0.21 
    2  -0.24  -0.27  0.06  -0.16  -0.00 
  Happy   1  -0.37  -0.33  -0.26  -0.40  0.14 
    2  -0.56**  -0.65**  -0.35                 -0.47  0.17 
Inverted   Angry   1  -0.01  0.05  0.17  0.19  -0.07 
Positive    2  -0.07  0.07  0.03  -0.08  0.03 
  Fear   1  -0.22  -0.11  -0.01  -0.06  -0.11 
    2  -0.20  -0.08  -0.01  -0.09  -0.03 
  Happy   1  -0.11  -0.00  -0.17  0.00  0.13 
    2  -0.25  -0.16  -0.08  -0.25  0.05 
Inverted   Angry   1  -0.23  -0.13  0.05  0.03  -0.15 
Negative    2  -0.17  -0.09  0.23  -0.06  0.13 
  Fear   1  0.00  0.02  -0.22  -0.14  0.17 
    2  -0.20  -0.04  -0.20  -0.06  0.24 
  Happy  1  -0.13  -0.15  -0.20  -0.15  -0.15 
    2  -0.07  0.02  0.02  -0.23  0.35 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 1=50% 
morph-level; 2=100% morph-level. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Appendix D 
Experiment 2: Bias data 
Bias data were calculated and analysed in the same way as Appendix A. 
Design 
The B scores were entered into a 3 x 2 x 2 x 3 x 2  repeated measures ANOVA, 
with emotional face (angry, happy, fear), orientation (upright, inverted), polarity 
(positive, negative), spatial frequency (broad, high, low) and morph strength (low, high) 
as within subject IVs. 
Results 
Due to the main effect of spatial frequency, and the number of unpredicted 
interactions that contain the spatial frequency variable
21, it was deemed appropriate to 
split the remaining analyses by spatial frequency (data entered into three separate 3 
(emotion) x2 (orientation) x2 (polarity) x2 (morph) repeated-measures ANOVAs). 
 
BSF: There were main effects of orientation (F(1,18) = 8.16, p=.01), polarity (F(1,18) = 
4.84, p<.05), and emotion (F(1.4,25.5) = 7.89, p<.01. There were significant 
interactions between polarity and emotion (F(2,36) = 12.23, p<.001), emotion and 
morph (F(2,36) = 11.71, p<.001), and a three-way significant interaction between 
polarity, emotion and morph (F(2,36) = 14.59, p<.001). 
  In agreement with the bias data from Experiment 1, participants were more 
conservative to upright (M=.18, SD=.01) that inverted faces (M=.13, SD=.01). However, 
in this experiment participants were more conservative to negated (M=.18, SD=.01) than 
positive faces (M=.13, SD=.02). Responses to happy (M=.32, SD=.03) were more 
conservative than fear (M=.02, SD=.05; t(18) = 4.78, p<.001), and angry (t(18) = 2.98, 
p<.01). 
When presented in positive polarity, angry faces were responded to more 
liberally when they were high than low morph strength (t(18) = 4.68, p<.001), whereas 
fear faces were the opposite: they were responded to more liberally when they were low 
than high morph strength (t(18) = 5.38, p<.001). There was no difference in bias 
between the morph strengths in the happy face (p>.4). This agrees with bias data from 
                                       
21 Including: a significant main effect of SF, F(2,36) =8.18, p=.001; Orientation x SF interaction, 
F(2,36) = 5.97, p<.01; Emotion x SF interaction, F(4,72) = 7.65, p<.001; Polarity x emotion x SF 
interaction, F(4,72)=4.51, p<.01; SF x morph interaction, F(2,36) = 5.33, p<.01; Orientation x SF x 
morph interaction, F(2,36) = 5.52, p<.01; Polarity x emotion x SF x morph interaction, F(4,72) =7.39, 
p<.001.      
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Experiment 1, and suggests when fear faces are ambiguous, they are likely to be 
responded to more liberally.  
When presented in negative polarity there was no difference in bias between 
morph strengths for any of the emotions (p>.05). 
 
HSF: In the HSF faces, there was a main effect of emotion (F(2,36) =7.32, p<.01), an 
orientation x morph interaction (F(1,18) = 13.90, p<.01), and a emotion x morph 
interaction (F(2,36) = 32.24, p<.001). 
  Angry faces (M=.03, SD=.19) were responded to more liberally than happy 
(M=.24, SD=.18; t(18) = 2.80, p=.012) or fear faces (M=.26, SD=.15; t(18) = 3.83, 
p=.001). There was no difference between happy and fear (p>.8). This shows that  
when presented in HSF, and a liberal criterion was set for angry expressions. 
  In the 50% morph level, happy was responded to more conservatively than fear 
(t(18) =4.63, p<.001) and marginally more conservatively than angry (t(18) =2.56, 
p=.20). There was no difference between angry and fear (p>.05). 
  In the 100% morph strength, fear was responded to more conservatively than 
happy (t(18) = 5.26, p<.001) and angry (t(18) = 9.21, p<.001). There was no difference 
between angry and happy (p>.05). 
 
LSF: There were main effects of orientation (F(1,18) = 6.29, p<.05) and morph (F(1,18) 
= 14.68, p=.001). There were also significant orientation x emotion (F(2,36) = 7.92, 
p=.001), and polarity x emotion (F(2,36) = 3.68, p<.05) interactions. These were 
subsumed under an orientation x polarity x emotion interaction (F(2,36) = 4.01, p<.05). 
In the LSF faces, inverted faces were responded to more liberally than upright 
faces, and the 50% morph level was responded to more liberally that the 100% morph 
level. These results suggest that when the stimuli were more ambiguous (i.e. had lower 
morph strength or were manipulated), a more liberal criterion was set.  
  The three-way interaction was explored by investigating each emotion separately. 
In the angry expression, there was a main effect of orientation (F(1,18) = 11.62, p<.01), 
and of polarity (F(1,18) = 7.08, p<.05), where inverted and negative faces were 
responded to more liberally than upright and positive faces. In the fear expression there 
was a main effect of polarity (positive more conservative than negative), F(1,18) = 5.34, 
p<.05. In the happy expression there was a main effect of orientation (upright more 
conservative than inverted), F(1,18) = 5.24, p<.05.      
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Appendix E 
Experiment 2: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table E1.  
Sample Characteristics 
Anxiety 
Questionnaires 
M (SD)  Minimum  Maximum 
STAI-T  41.35 (8.85)  26  55 
FNE  17.65 (8.98)  2  30 
SADS  7.47 (7.19)  0  23 
SDS  4.00 (1.97)  0  7 
STAI-S  34.41 (8.85)  21  54 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
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Appendix F 
Experiment 2:  
Correlations between performance and anxiety measures 
 
Table F1. Correlations between sensitivity of broad spatial frequency faces and 
questionnaire measures 
      STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry     1               0.08          -0.08         -0.17            0.33            0.12 
Positive    2  0.04  -0.16  -0.17  0.08  -0.31 
  Fear   1  0.04  -0.27  -0.15  0.16  0.11 
    2  0.03  -0.15  -0.05  -0.06  -0.13 
  Happy   1  0.16  -0.01  -0.12  0.26  0.01 
    2  0.24  0.16  0.44  0.00  0.05 
Upright   Angry     1  0.01  -0.11  0.06  -0.04  0.21 
Negative    2  -0.10  -0.31  0.09  -0.15  0.44 
  Fear   1  -0.16  -0.22  -0.31  0.01  0.03 
    2  -0.23  -0.48  -0.20  -0.20  0.30 
  Happy   1  0.05  -0.15  -0.15  0.14  -0.07 
    2  0.03  -0.38  0.26  -0.46    0.65** 
Inverted   Angry   1  0.13  0.04  0.04  0.24  0.41 
Positive    2  0.11  0.09  -0.16  0.34  -0.42 
  Fear   1  0.24  0.08  0.08  0.19  0.19 
    2  -0.09  -0.25  -0.17  0.16  -0.12 
  Happy   1  -0.12  -0.13  -0.25  -0.04  0.43 
    2  0.06  -0.08  -0.32  0.17  -0.31 
Inverted   Angry   1  -0.23  -0.10  0.05  -0.21  0.29 
Negative    2  0.07  -0.20  -0.30  0.02  -0.07 
  Fear   1  -0.34  -0.40  -0.16  -0.40  0.24 
    2  0.06  -0.27  -0.17  -0.05  0.16 
  Happy  1  -0.11  0.04  -0.31  -0.18  -0.12 
    2  0.13  -0.14  -0.20  0.15  -0.24 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 1=50% 
morph-level; 2=100% morph-level. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Table F2. Correlations between sensitivity of high spatial frequency faces and 
questionnaire measures 
      STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry   1  -0.46  -0.44  -0.18  -0.23  0.24 
Positive    2  0.11  0.06  0.14  0.01  -0.21 
  Fear   1  -0.28  -0.30  0.04  -0.45  0.01 
    2  0.20  0.06  0.20  0.12  -0.08 
  Happy   1  -0.22  -0.25  -0.12  -0.27  -0.16 
    2  0.27  0.14  0.24  0.04  -0.35 
Upright   Angry   1  0.18  0.05  0.18  -0.05  -0.08 
Negative    2  0.29  0.01  0.01  0.20  -0.03 
  Fear   1  -0.12  -0.29  0.03  -0.25  0.31 
    2  0.31  0.12  0.02  0.24  -0.06 
  Happy   1  0.10  -0.14  0.08  -0.10  0.07 
    2  0.06  -0.08  -0.30  -0.00  -0.22 
Inverted   Angry   1  -0.03  -0.12  -0.17  0.10  -0.21 
Positive    2  -0.05  -0.16  -0.23  0.00  0.06 
  Fear   1  -0.19  -0.35  -0.26  0.06  0.25 
    2  -0.04  -0.17  0.17  -0.23  0.31 
  Happy   1  0.09  0.04  -0.15  0.06  -0.18 
    2  0.01  -0.09  -0.21  0.00  0.00 
Inverted   Angry   1  0.16  0.10  0.16  0.17  -0.13 
Negative    2  0.06  -0.20  -0.08  -0.06  -0.08 
  Fear   1  -0.03  -0.12  0.13  -0.21  0.30 
    2  0.11  -0.14  -0.19  0.10  0.09 
  Happy  1  0.14  -0.02  -0.07  0.07  0.09 
    2  0.18  -0.05  -0.12  -0.01  -0.06 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 1=50% 
morph-level; 2=100% morph-level. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Table F3. Correlations between sensitivity of low spatial frequency faces and 
questionnaire measures 
      STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry   1            -0.15  -0.41  -0.30  -0.18    0.52* 
Positive    2  -0.06    -0.05  -0.36  -0.08  0.36 
  Fear   1  -0.19   -0.53*  -0.23  -0.16  0.31 
    2  0.14  -0.29  -0.23  0.03  0.38 
  Happy   1  -0.12    -0.49*  -0.07  -0.42  0.22 
    2  -0.07  -0.42  -0.36  0.17  0.18 
Upright   Angry   1  0.11  0.20  0.48  0.05  0.26 
Negative    2  -0.35  -0.09  -0.34  0.10    -0.47* 
  Fear   1  -0.05  0.00  -0.03  0.20  0.23 
    2  -0.14  -0.30  -0.25  0.23  -0.12 
  Happy   1  0.42  0.33  0.15  0.13  0.05 
    2  -0.19    -0.50*  -0.42  0.21     0.51* 
Inverted   Angry   1  0.02  -0.25  -0.16  -0.02  0.39 
Positive    2  0.05  -0.39  -0.28  0.11  0.42 
  Fear   1  -0.09  -0.00  0.09  0.23  0.23 
    2  -0.28      -0.05  -0.20  -0.04  0.30 
  Happy   1  -0.06  -0.36  -0.25  -0.05  0.08 
    2  -0.28      -0.05  -0.12  -0.06  0.03 
Inverted   Angry   1  -0.02  -0.12  0.23  -0.33  -0.13 
Negative    2  0.22  0.09  -0.28  0.07  -0.33 
  Fear   1  -0.15  -0.13  0.32  -0.25  0.04 
    2  -0.18  -0.33  0.26  -0.06  -0.03 
  Happy  1  -0.27  0.05   -0.56*  0.04  -0.05 
    2  -0.06  0.04  -0.25  0.24  0.25 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 1=50% 
morph-level; 2=100% morph-level. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Appendix G 
Experiment 3: Box plot of incorrect responses 
 
 
Figure G1. Distribution of the incorrect responses in Experiment 4. *= the scores of the 
four participants that were removed.  
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Appendix H 
Experiment 3: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table H1.  
Sample Characteristics 
Anxiety 
Questionnaires 
M (SD)  Minimum  Maximum 
STAI-T  41.20 (10.02)  23  59 
FNE  15.69 (9.44)  0  30 
SADS  6.69 (7.05)  0  27 
SDS  3.77 (1.88)  1  7 
STAI-S  35.91 (9.37)  21  59 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
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Appendix I 
Experiment 3:  
Correlations between performance and anxiety measures 
 
Table I1. Correlations between CFS data and questionnaire measures 
    STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry   0.05  0.15  0.01  0.17        -0.17 
Positive  Fear   -0.01         0.12  -0.04  0.21  -0.08 
  Happy   -0.00         0.13  -0.10  0.14  -0.06 
  Neutral  0.00         0.14  -0.05  0.12  -0.16 
Upright   Angry   0.10  0.08  0.07  0.09  -0.07 
Negative  Fear   0.09  0.12  -0.02  0.14  -0.15 
  Happy   0.05  0.09  -0.05  0.04  -0.15 
  Neutral  0.03  0.05  0.04  0.18  0.03 
Inverted   Angry   0.03         0.05  0.11  0.17  -0.17 
Positive  Fear   0.09  0.17  0.05  0.18  -0.07 
  Happy   -0.06  -0.36  -0.25  -0.05  0.08 
  Neutral  0.05  0.12  -0.03  0.18  -0.15 
Inverted   Angry   0.03  0.07  0.04  0.14  0.09 
Negative  Fear   0.04  0.07  -0.03  0.10  -0.12 
  Happy  0.10  0.03       0.07  0.08  -0.17 
  Neutral  0.07  0.08  0.05  0.14  0.04 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Table I2. Correlations between Control data and questionnaire measures 
    STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry   0.02  -0.02  -0.09  0.07         0.18 
Positive  Fear   -0.04       -0.10  -0.13  0.08  0.04 
  Happy   -0.04       -0.14  -0.11  0.02  -0.09 
  Neutral  0.02       -0.12  -0.11  0.00  -0.08 
Upright   Angry   -0.07  -0.14  -0.10  0.09  0.16 
Negative  Fear   -0.05  -0.11  -0.13  0.03  0.15 
  Happy   -0.06  -0.19  -0.12  0.01  -0.08 
  Neutral  -0.05  -0.11  -0.13  0.04  0.01 
Inverted   Angry   -0.00       -0.08  -0.06  0.06  0.11 
Positive  Fear   -0.01  -0.11  -0.10  0.06  -0.02 
  Happy   -0.06  -0.20  -0.11  0.04  0.15 
  Neutral  -0.01  -0.09  -0.09  0.06  -0.03 
Inverted   Angry   -0.07  -0.14  -0.10  0.70  0.24 
Negative  Fear   0.02  -0.10  -0.12  0.05  -0.06 
  Happy  0.10  0.03       0.07  0.08  -0.17 
  Neutral  -0.09  -0.15  -0.17  -0.03  0.20 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  178   
 
 
Table I3. Correlations between unbiased emergence data and questionnaire measures 
    STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Angry   0.02  0.13  0.08  0.08        -0.44 
Positive  Fear   0.02         0.19  0.09  0.10  -0.20 
  Happy   0.03         0.22  0.02  0.09  -0.00 
  Neutral  -0.01         0.23  0.05  0.11  -0.23 
Upright   Angry   0.13  0.15  0.11  0.02  -0.38 
Negative  Fear   0.11  0.18  0.08  0.08  -0.42 
  Happy   0.08  0.21  0.06  0.02  -0.36 
  Neutral  0.06  0.12  0.13  0.10  0.04 
Inverted   Angry   0.03         0.10  0.13  0.10  -0.27 
Positive  Fear   0.04  0.20  0.08  0.12  -0.26 
  Happy   0.12  0.28  0.11  0.12  -0.23 
  Neutral  0.05  0.08  0.05  0.09  -0.24 
Inverted   Angry   0.07  0.14  0.10  0.08  -0.06 
Negative  Fear   0.02  0.14  0.08  0.03  -0.13 
  Happy           0.16         0.11       0.11  0.02  -0.24 
  Neutral  0.11  0.16  0.16  0.12  -0.19 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Appendix J 
Experiment 4: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table J1.  
Sample Characteristics 
Anxiety 
Questionnaires 
M (SD)  Minimum  Maximum 
STAI-T  40.11 (8.33)  29  57 
FNE  17.28 (7.29)  3  28 
SADS  6.94 (8.93)  0  28 
SDS  3.17 (2.23)  0  7 
STAI-S  35.61 (9.80)  25  62 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
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Appendix K 
Experiment 4:  
Correlations between performance and anxiety measures 
Table K1. Correlations between CFS data and questionnaire measures 
      STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
BSF  Upright     Angry  0.17  0.03  0.29  -0.06  -0.06  
  Positive  Fear       0.17    -0.01  0.25  -0.03  -0.16        
    Happy   0.12  0.06  0.21  -0.06    0.36 
    Neutral  0.19  -0.02  0.32  -0.04   0.22 
  Inverted   Angry   0.14  -0.09  0.21  -0.06  0.23 
  Negative  Fear   0.15  -0.03  0.21  -0.00  0.26 
    Happy  0.12      -0.01  0.16  -0.05  0.31 
    Neutral  0.19  -0.01  0.06  -0.02  0.36 
HSF  Upright     Angry  0.10  -0.06  0.21  -0.08   0.02 
  Positive  Fear       0.18      -0.04       0.20     -0.12   0.41 
    Happy   0.15  -0.02  0.26  -0.08  0.30 
    Neutral  0.14  -0.12  0.24  -0.05  0.19 
  Inverted   Angry   0.19  -0.07  0.31  -0.05  0.10 
  Negative  Fear   0.18  0.01  0.21  -0.01  0.22 
    Happy  0.17  0.03  0.29  -0.05  0.32 
    Neutral  0.14  -0.01  0.26  -0.04  0.26 
LSF  Upright     Angry  0.22  0.02  0.32  -0.08    0.14 
  Positive  Fear   0.19     0.10  0.25  -0.06    0.23 
    Happy   0.16  0.06  0.24  -0.10    0.24 
    Neutral  0.25  0.10  0.32  -0.08    0.11 
  Inverted   Angry   0.15  0.04  0.30  -0.05    0.16 
  Negative  Fear   0.14  -0.04  0.30  -0.12    -0.09 
    Happy  0.25  0.10  0.32  -0.08    0.23 
    Neutral  0.16  -0.01  0.30  -0.11    0.28 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Table K2. Correlations between CFS data and questionnaire measures 
      STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
BSF  Upright     Angry  0.14  0.09  0.03  0.29  -0.19 
  Positive  Fear   -0.06  -0.15  0.12  -0.02   -0.38 
    Happy   0.01  -0.24  0.09  -0.01  -0.39 
    Neutral  -0.17  -0.09  -0.17  0.06  -0.44 
  Inverted   Angry   -0.06  -0.10       0.03  0.04  -0.46 
  Negative  Fear   -0.04  -0.08  0.07  0.05  -0.32 
    Happy  -0.05  -0.10  0.08  0.03  -0.44 
    Neutral  -0.04  -0.08  0.04  0.07  -0.27 
HSF  Upright     Angry  -0.07  -0.11  0.02       0.00   -0.27 
  Positive  Fear   0.00  -0.12  0.05     0.07  -0.37 
    Happy   0.00  -0.06  0.07  0.07  -0.11 
    Neutral  0.03    -0.13  0.16  0.08  -0.27 
  Inverted   Angry   -0.14  -0.17  0.04  -0.00  -0.38 
  Negative  Fear   -0.01  -0.02  0.15  0.07  -0.25 
    Happy  -0.06  -0.16  0.09  0.03  -0.41 
    Neutral  -0.08  -0.18  0.05  0.02  -0.42 
LSF  Upright     Angry  0.14  0.09  0.03  -0.29  -0.29 
  Positive  Fear   -0.06  -0.15       0.12     -0.02  -0.38 
    Happy   0.01  -0.24  0.09  -0.01  -0.39 
    Neutral  -0.17  -0.09  -0.17  0.06  -0.44 
  Inverted   Angry   -0.06  -0.10  0.31  0.04  -0.46 
  Negative  Fear   -0.04  -0.08  0.07  0.05  -0.38 
    Happy  -0.05  -0.11  0.08  0.03  -0.44 
    Neutral  -0.04  -0.08  0.04  0.07  -0.27 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Appendix L 
Experiment 5: Sample Characteristics 
 
Table L1.  
Sample Characteristics 
Anxiety 
Questionnaires 
M (SD)  Minimum  Maximum 
STAI-T  35.57 (11.86)  21  58 
FNE  12.43 (8.08)  1  27 
SADS  5.64 (7.07)  0  26 
SDS  3.29 (2.43)  0  8 
STAI-S  34.43 (8.92)  20  49 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
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Appendix M 
  
Experiment 5:  
Correlations between performance and anxiety measures 
 
Table C1. Correlations between sensitivity and questionnaire measures 
 
    STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Fear  -0.21  0.39  0.21  -0.21  0.06 
Positive  Happy  -0.37  0.23  0.17  -0.02  0.34 
  Neutral  -0.35  0.41  0.13  -0.04  0.41 
Inverted   Fear  -0.11  0.36  -0.10  -0.02  0.24 
Negative  Happy  -0.08  .56*  -0.14  0.24  -0.17 
  Neutral  -0.18  0.27  0.17  -0.11  0.33 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Appendix N 
Experiment 6: Sample Characteristics 
 
 
Table N1.  
Sample Characteristics 
Anxiety 
Questionnaires 
M (SD)  Minimum  Maximum 
STAI-T  34.89 (10.98)  20  56 
FNE  11.87 (7.87)  1  27 
SADS  6.65 (6.92)  0  26 
SDS  3.54 (2.13)  0  8 
STAI-S  32.31 (10.42)  21  48 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
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Appendix O 
  
Experiment 6:  
Correlations between performance and anxiety measures 
 
Table M1. Correlations between sensitivity and questionnaire measures 
 
    STAIT  STAIS  FNE  SADS  SDS 
Upright   Fear  -0.24  0.29  0.23  0.13  0.21 
  Neutral  -0.02  0.18  0.15  -0.08  0.04 
Inverted   Fear  -0.17  0.25  0.02  -0.03  0.18 
  Neutral  -0.11  0.31  -0.15  -0.09  0.31 
Note. STAI-T= State Trait Anxiety Inventory trait version, FNE=Fear of Negative 
Evaluation, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, SDS = Marlow-Crowne 
Social Desirability Scale, STAI-S= State Trait Anxiety Inventory state version. 
*=p<.05; **=p<.001 
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Appendix P 
  
Experiment 7:  
PHD and Control recognition of emotional expression 
 
 
Table P1. PHD and Control accuracy to recognise emotional expressions at different 
morph-levels and manipulation conditions 
  PHD  Control Mean 
Angry  Normal  50%  16/32 (50)  23.3/32 (72.9) 
100%  32/32 (100)  30.7/32 (95.8) 
Manipulated  50%    6/32 (18.8)  7.7/32 (24.0) 
100%  10/32 (32.3)  9.7/32 (30.2) 
Fear  Normal  50%  30/32 (93.8)  27.3/32 (85.4) 
100%  30/32 (93.8)  29.7/32 (92.7) 
Manipulated  50%  14/32 (43.8)  12.7/32 (39.6) 
100%  20/32 (62.5)  12.3/32 (38.5) 
Happy  Normal  50%  32/32 (100)  28.3/32 (88.5) 
100%  32/32 (100)  31.7/32 (99.0) 
Manipulated  50%  12/32 (37.5)  17.0/32 (35.1) 
100%  18/32 (56.3)  15.7/32 (49.0) 
Nb. Percentage correct in brackets 
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